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PRINCES OF DARKNESS AND ANGELS OF LIGHT:
THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER
DAVID BARNHIZER*
Thus the classic epitome of the lawyer... spreads through-
out the western world: a consummate malevolence, callous-
ness to truth the basic vice, hardened with the sin of
avarice, and a consequent denial of God's favored-the
downtrodden poor.1
-David Mellinkoff
There is an effort to foreclose the absolute freedom of law-
yers to represent their clients and the reason is that lawyers
have been successful in doing so. I can't think of any time
in the history of the country... that the independence of
the legal profession has been as threatened as it is now.
2
-Philip S. Anderson
The basic concept of freedom under law, which underlies
our entire structure of government, can only be sustained
by a strong and independent bar.
3
-Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
* Professor of Law, Cleveland State University College of Law. I thank
the Cleveland-Marshall Fund for its support of this work. This article is dedi-
cated to Monroe Freedman, Gary Bellow, William Greenhalgh, and Beatrice
Moulton.
The following people provided the gift of time and insight: Daniel
Barnhizer, Sue Barhizer, Susan Becker, Veronica Dougherty, Patricia Falk,
Monroe Freedman, Candice Hoke, Kenneth Kowalski, Arthur Landever, Ste-
phen Lazarus, James Moliterno, Sandy Ogilvy, Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, Susan
Scheutzow, Thomas Shaffer, David Snyder, Roy Stuckey, and William Tabac.
1. DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 13 (1973).
2. William Glaberson, Lawyers Contend With State and Federal Efforts to
Restrict Their Rising Power, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1999, at A16.
3. Future Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., wrote in 1962: "This Committee is
deeply concerned with improving ... the economic status of lawyers .... It is
plainly in the public interest that the economic health of the legal profession be
safeguarded. One of the means toward this end is to improve the efficiency and
productivity of lawyers." ABA COMMITTEE ON ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE, THE
LAWYER's HANDBOOK vii (1962) [hereinafter LAWYER's HANDBOOK].
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I. INTRODUCTION
Life is not made up of love; it is made up of fear and greed
and money.4
Rather than being perceived as helping professionals and
conservators of democratic values in the way described in Toc-
queville's classic work, Democracy in America, lawyers have become
the butt of jokes that call into question the basic values of the
adversary system and the lawyer's responsibility within it.5 In one
reasonably typical cartoon, a patient is sitting on the edge of a
doctor's examining table with the physician standing thought-
fully behind him. On the patient's back is an ugly gnome-like
creature-complete with miniature suit and briefcase-with its
teeth and claws dug into the patient's back. The doctor offers
the following diagnosis: "I can see what's causing the problem-
you've got a lawyer on your back." In another attempt at humor,
two women are sharing coffee and one remarks to the other: "It's
finally over-Frank's lawyer got the apartment, and my lawyer
got our two cars and the beach house."6
Lest we think such pointed jibes are unfair or lack any
grounding, it may be useful to consider a report of a coup at the
venerable New York based law firm of Cadwalader, Wickersham
and Taft-a carefully plotted strategy among younger partners to
oust some of their seniors. The strategy, designated "Operation
Rightsize" by the conspirators, was not cost-free, either to the law-
yers who were pushed out or to the firm which ended up on the
losing end of several multi-million dollar judgments. The dis-
missed partners at Cadwalader sued the firm, and the litigation
offered a dramatic insight into how far the idea of principled
behavior and institutional loyalty has plummeted among some
members of the legal profession. The Wall Street Journal reported
4. Paul M. Barrett, Putsch and Shove: A Once-Stodgy Firm Makes a Flashy
Return, But at What Cost?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1998, at Al (quoting deposition
testimony of Jack Fritts, former chairman of Cadwalader, Wickersham and
Taft).
5. Alexis de Tocqueville described lawyers as the "aristocracy" of the
American system, a profession that held the system together and protected the
basic values of democracy:
In America there are no nobles or literary men, and the people are
apt to mistrust the wealthy; lawyers consequently form the highest
political class and the most cultivated portion of society .... If I were
asked where I place the American aristocracy, I should reply without
hesitation that it is not among the rich, who are united by no common
tie, but that it occupies the judicial bench and the bar.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 42 (1945).
6. LAwYERs! LAWYERS! LAWYERS!: A CARTOON COLLECTION 1, 11 (S. Gross
ed., 1994).
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that " [i] n deposition testimony in the Beasley case ... Jack Fritts,
a former firm chairman who backed Project Rightsize, observed
that 'life is not made up of love; it is made up of fear and greed
and money.""
A. Extreme Commercialization and the Decline of the Legal Profession
The increasing belief among many lawyers that life is com-
prised of "fear and greed and money" has altered the legal pro-
fession and helped make lawyers into one of the most feared and
powerful groups in American society-and one of the most
scorned.' In the midst of the widespread contempt American
society is showing lawyers, this article seeks to explain the special
role the legal profession serves in our complex democracy. At
the same time it condemns attitudes such as those reflected in
Fritts' statement. The belief that life is driven by fear, greed, and
money has created a process that is resulting in the extreme com-
mercialization of the legal profession to such an extent that the
profession is being "deprofessionalized." This process has been
unfolding for almost half a century, but has accelerated in the
past decade.
The extreme commercialization of the legal profession is
stripping away from lawyers any entitlement to be treated as a
special profession in our society. Jules Henry suggests the effect
on principle that results when humans convert everything into
financial considerations. Henry observes: "Monetization waters
down values, wears them out by slow attrition, makes them banal
and, in the long run, helps Americans to become indifferent to
them and even cynical. Thus the competitive struggle forces the
corruption of values."' Unless steps are made to reverse the pro-
7. Barrett, supra note 4, at Al; see also id.:
[A] group of younger partners at Cadwalader decided to clean house
.... In a secret meeting in a midtown hotel, they compiled the names
of less productive colleagues-and then forced them out, cutting the
size of the partnership nearly 20% .... The remaking of 330-attorney
Cadwalader exemplifies a sweeping transformation in the law industry.
8. See Glaberson, supra note 2, at A16:
"We're still at a place where we can avoid what happened to the medi-
cal profession," said LawrenceJ. Fox, a Philadelphia trial lawyer who is
a former chairman of the bar association's ethics committee. "But we
have to defend the proposition of professional independence right
now-today. We can't wait any longer."
9. JULES HENRY, CuLTumR AGAINST MAN 65 (1965). Francis Fukuyama,
one of our more exceptional modem thinkers, concludes:
Although conservatives like William J. Bennett are often attacked for
harping on the theme of moral decline, they are essentially correct:
the breakdown of social order is not a matter of nostalgia, poor mem-
2000]
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fessional decline, lawyers in a "free-market legal profession" will
soon be seen as nothing more than profit-driven business people
who are entitled to no more respect or deference than a Wal-
Mart or a pizza carryout. The problem with this is that lawyers-
as zealous advocates and wise counselors-are an integral part of
a complex and competitive American society attempting to retain
its character under the rule of law.
Lawyers are increasingly confused about the legitimacy of
the legal profession, as well as how to determine where moral
and professional limits exist as to appropriate behavior.10 While
lawyers sense that by providing an advocate's voice in disputes
they are doing something of importance for our democratic soci-
ety generally, and for their clients specifically, they are under-
standably troubled by a society that makes no bones about the
fact that it views them as immoral manipulators who are unwor-
thy of trust.
Distrust of lawyers is ancient; even Plato could not resist
describing lawyers as, "keen and shrewd" but with "small and
unrighteous" souls who have no mature human soundness and
wrongly think themselves masters of wisdom.11 Although ancient
and chronic, the criticisms have recently intensified to a level
approaching vilification. The past decade has witnessed an
explosion in books, studies, law courses and articles that deal
with issues such as professional ethics, professional responsibility,
professionalism, what it means to be a lawyer, role-differentiated
morality, the "civility" movement, "skills and values," and more. 2
We have heard of the "good" lawyer, the zealous lawyer, the
"alternative" lawyer, the "kinder and gentler" lawyer, the moral
ory or ignorance about the hypocrisies of earlier ages. The decline is
readily measurable in statistics on crime, fatherless children, reduced
educational outcomes and opportunities, broken trust, and the like.
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION: HuMAN NATURE AND THE RECONSTI-
TUTION OF SOCIAL ORDER 5 (1999).
10. A decline in principle is afflicting the U.S. See infra pt. VI and sources
cited therein. This decline has led not only lawyers-but many other people
and professions-to be confused about the limits of what they should do. Con-
sider the irony of Ken Starr's intensive investigation of Bill Clinton for lying,
and the fact that Starr's office was investigated for abuses allegedly committed
during the process, including lying. See David Johnston & Don Van Natta Jr.,
Inquiry to Ask Whether Reno Was Misled by Starr's Office, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999,
at Al.
11. MARTIN MAYER, THE LAWYERS 4 (1966).
12. Assessing the nature of law practice is in part shooting at a moving
target. The profession is changing so rapidly in structure, scope and diversity of
activities, internal competitiveness, numbers of competitors, values and much
more, that it seems almost impossible to capture.
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lawyer, the principled lawyer, and the need for "civic virtue."' 3
While much of the literature is commendable, it typically fails to
confront the fundamental nature and consequences of being a
lawyer. Nor does it have much to say about the effects of law
practice on those who devote themselves to lives representing cli-
ents. Missing from most of the literature is any awareness of the
critical contribution made by the advocate to the well-being of a
complex democratic society based on the rule of law.
B. Zealous and Competent Representation as the Lawyer's
Central Principle
This article seeks to present a tough and realistic sense of
what it means to be a principled lawyer. It does so in a context of
admiration for what good lawyers do, and contempt for the com-
mercialization of the legal profession. But the essay is not an
apology for the legal profession as it now exists, nor is it an urg-
ing that lawyers and what they do for their clients be limited and
made "kinder and gentler." This article defends both good law-
yers and the adversary system-and asserts that there are not
enough effective advocates working zealously on behalf of their
clients.
13. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM
(1975) [hereinafter FREEDMAN, ADVERSARY SYSTEM]; MONROE H. FREEDMAN,
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS (1990); LAWYERS: A CITICAL READER (Richard
Abel ed., 1997); THE MAcCRATE REPORT: BUILDING THE EDUCATIONAL CONTIN-
UUM, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS (Joan S. Howland & William H. Lindberg eds.,
1994) [hereinafter MAcCRATE REPORT]; Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and
the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, Legal Education and Professional Development -An
Educational Continuum, A.B.A. SEC. OF LEGAL ED. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR
(1992); Nathan M. Crystal, Limitations on Zealous Representation in an Adversarial
System, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671 (1997); Monroe H. Freedman, The Ethical
Danger of "Civility" and "Professionalism," 6 CrM. JUST. J. 17 (1998) [hereinafter
Freedman, Ethical Danger]; Monroe H. Freedman, The Trouble With Postmodern
Zeal, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63 (1996); James E. Moliterno, Lawyer Creeds and
Moral Seismography, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 781 (1997); Carl M. Selinger, The
Public's Interest in Preserving the Dignity and Unity of the Legal Profession, 32 WARE
FOREST L. REV. 861 (1997); Symposium, The Lawyer's Duties and Responsibilities in
Dispute Resolution, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 1 (1997). See alsoJohn Q. Barrett, A Post
Conference Reflection on Separate Ethical Aspirations for ADR's Not-So-Separate Practi-
tioners, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 705 (1997); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers From the Adversary Conception of
Lawyers'Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 407 (1997); Symposium Papers from the
W M. Keck Foundation Forum on the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L.
REV. (1996). For excellent sources on many issues of professionalism and pro-
fessional responsibility, see DEBORAH RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
LEGAL ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD (1994); RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL
LANGFORD, LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAw (1995).
2000]
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The main premise of this essay is therefore that the person
who is performing the lawyer's mission well through providing
zealous and competent representation to the client is simultane-
ously a "prince of darkness" and an "angel of light." The meta-
phor of the "prince of darkness" does not stand for evil, but for
the application of power and manipulation of people to gain the
client's ends. Similarly, the "angel of light" does not represent
the pursuit of specific ends that everyone would consider "good,"
as opposed to legitimate ends that are allowed as legal by our soci-
ety. Lawyers representing tobacco companies, murderers and
polluters are consequently serving the interests of society and
working for a form of the good, just as much as are those we
commonly think of as public interest lawyers. Although there are
limits to what the lawyer should do for the client, for most law-
yers the issue is that of less-than-zealous advocacy and considera-
bly less than competent assistance to clients rather than the over-
zealousness that is popularly lamented.
The duty to provide zealous and competent representation
is inherent in the lawyer's assumption of responsibility for
another's fate and is reflected in-though not ultimately derived
from-obligations such as are described in the ABA Model Code
of Professional Responsibility relating to zealous representation.
The Code provides:
EC 7-1: The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the
legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the
bounds of the law.... The professional responsibility of a
lawyer derives from his membership in a profession which
has the duty of assisting members of the public to secure
and protect available legal rights and benefits. In our gov-
ernment of laws and not of men, each member of our soci-
ety is entitled to have his conduct judged and regulated in
accordance with the law; to seek any lawful objective
through legally permissible means; and to present for adju-
dication any lawful claim, issue, or defense. 4
14. 1999 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 202
(Thomas Morgan & Ronald Rotunda eds., 1999) [hereinafter 1999 STANDARDS]
(quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1980)). "Law-
yers are accused of taking advantage of 'loopholes' and 'technicalities' to win.
Persons who make this charge are unaware, or do not understand, that the
lawyer is hired to win, and if he does not exercise every legitimate effort in his
client's behalf, then he is betraying a sacred trust." William J. Rochelle & Har-
vey 0. Payne, The Struggle for Public Understanding, 25 TEX. B.J. 109, 159 (1962).
Compare the Model Code with the altered language of the ABA's Model Rules
of Professional Conduct: Rule 1.3 provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with reason-
able diligence and promptness in representing a client." MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1998). The comment to this rule states:
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Although some might argue this obligation should be
changed, or that it has severe limits, in this essay I suggest
strongly that the duty created in the ideas of zealous and compe-
tent representation set forth in Ethical Consideration 7-1 repre-
sents the heart of the lawyer's principled obligation, both to the
client and to the society. I argue that it is our failure to honor
this duty-rather than the reverse as many suggest-that is at the
center of many of the most intractable conditions in American
society. This means there are reasons to seek a clarification and
a strengthening of the adversary system and the role of the advo-
cate in our society, rather than the weakening that seems to be
the prevailing view. A legal profession without a strong sense of
duty to its clients is not entitled to any special privileges or status
in our society. Too frequently, however, claims of service to soci-
ety are only masks for privilege. As Thomas Shaffer suggests:
A lawyer or doctor or teacher has to give some reason for
her or his privileges-licensed access to mysteries, social
power, status, and, usually, high income. He and his frater-
nities (she and her sororities) feel the need anyone does,
and particularly anyone in the modern world, to fit his or
her situation into some universal and objective morality.
The usual way this is done in the professions is through the
claim that professionals are set aside for service.
15
C. Strong Advocates are a Critical Balance Against
Entrenched Power
Ironically, but totally consistent with the adversary process, is
the fact that those who have had the resources and political
power to dominate the legal system and obtain laws that favor
their positions often lead attempts to restrict the quality, sub-
stance and access to legal representation by less powerful people
and by those who have been directly harmed by their clients'
actions and failures of responsibility. Ralph Nader describes
what has been occurring in the American legal system as a plot by
extremely powerful interests to undermine the legal system.' 6
A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests
of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf. How-
ever, a lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that might be
realized for a client. A lawyer has professional discretion in determin-
ing the means by which a matter should be pursued.
Id. Rule 1.3 cmt.
15. THOMAS SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS 58-59 (1987).
16. See RALPH NADER & WESLEY SMITH, No CONTEST: CORPORATE LAwYERs
AND THE PERVERSION OFJUSTICE IN AMERICA (1996).
20001
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A recent string of decisions by judges seems to be reversing a
fifteen-year trend of legislative victories by the combined power
of large corporations, doctors, and the insurance industry.'7 Sev-
eral studies have shown that the so-called "litigation explosion"
that has been used to help fuel popular. depictions of lawyers, is
in fact often made up of deliberate exaggerations aimed at creat-
ing anger toward lawyers in order to develop political support for
laws limiting the liability of the wealthy and powerful groups
backing the "reform" strategy. William Glaberson recently
reported a variety of exaggerated claims by lawyers representing
powerful interests that were aimed at gaining passage of legisla-
tive changes that would restrict their clients' own tort liability.
He cited a law professor's description of the strategy as: "The
story of tort reform across the country is that it is one of the most
carefully developed and exquisitely executed political campaigns
ever," and includes statistics relating to the award of punitive
damages-a main argument of the corporate defenders in their
quest for legislative "reforms.""s Glaberson asks:
Huge punitive damage awards, for example, have become
everyday events, right? Actually, a study of courts in the
nation's 75 largest counties conducted by the National
Center for State Courts found that only 364 of 762,000
cases ended in punitive damages, or 0.047 percent. OK,
but isn't it true that more and more liability claims are
filed every year? Actually, a study of 16 states by the same
17. See Ashbel S. Green, Court Says Damages Cap Violates Constitution, ORE-
GONIAN, July 16, 1999, at Al:
According to some legal experts, the ruling is part of a nationwide
trend of state courts overturning 15 years' worth of efforts by busi-
nesses, insurance companies and medical groups to limit jury awards.
"The state courts are invalidating huge parts of the tort reform legisla-
tion to the consternation of supporters of tort reform," said professor
Mark Geistfield of New York University Law School. "There is much
more judicial hostility to this kind of legislation than anyone was
expecting."
The Model Code also contains Canon 8, A Lawyer Should Assist In Improving the
Legal System. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8 (1980). EC
8-1 provides, for example, that "[c]hanges in human affairs and imperfections
in human institutions make necessary constant efforts to maintain and improve
our legal system." Id. EC 8-1. This is amusing in light of what Ralph Nader
aptly describes as "the corporate scheme to wreck our justice system." NADER,
supra note 16, at 24. Part of that "scheme" has been to prevent plaintiffs from
obtaining substantial damages against several extremely powerful classes of
defendants by lobbying for legislative limitations on the state level. It must be
extremely frustrating for the defense firms to see a considerable number of
their wins evaporate.
18. William Glaberson, When the Verdict Is Just a Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES, June
6, 1999, at Al.
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center showed that the number of liability suits has
declined by 9 percent since 1986.19
But my comments about how lawyers function need to be
separated into personal, social and moral beliefs in which I find
the lawyers' behavior contemptible, and my professional beliefs,
where I find them legitimate and even admirable. This article
deals with the obligations of lawyers as zealous advocates and as
zealous and wise counselors. One of its main points is that this
kind of strategic behavior represents how an advocate is supposed
to function and how the advocate should function. This premise
rests on a simple insight. We are not going to change human
behavior as reflected in how powerful interests attempt to manip-
ulate every aspect of the system to acquire, protect and expand
their shares of wealth and power-and seek to insulate them-
selves against others' efforts to take what they possess. This is
human nature and not particularly nice. But it will not change.
In the complex and competitive political system we find in
America, such behaviors are both necessary and inevitable.2" It is
the job of the lawyer to provide a voice to the competing inter-
ests.2 1 The difficult aspect, however, and one that most people
do not want to confront, is that many people do not want their
less powerful competitors to have an effective voice through zeal-
ous and competent representation. Thus, whenever possible,
they implement strategies to ensure less-than-effective represen-
tation by disfavored opponents. 22 Those strategies will often
19. Id.
20. See HENRY, supra note 9, at 13 (describing America perfectly: "Ours is
a driven culture. It is driven on by its achievement, competitive, profit, and
mobility drives, and by the drives for security and a higher standard of living.").
21. See AUERBACH, infra note 25, at 141:
The dependence of Americans upon law, and their apprehension
about it, are reciprocal. The exercise of freedom, channeled into the
acquisitive pursuit of wealth, requires the vigorous assertion of individ-
ual rights, which law protects. It also assures incessant conflict
between competing individuals, who are virtually unrestrained by any
purpose beyond self-aggrandizement. The Darwinian jungle is filled
with the excitement of the hunt, but it is a scary place because the
hunters simultaneously are hunted. As Americans pursue their
quarry, they need protection (provided by law) for themselves, and
weapons (also provided by law) against their adversaries.
22. See id. at 145:
Law can symbolize justice, or conceal repression. It can reduce
exploitation, or facilitate it. It can prohibit the abuse of power, or
disguise abuse in procedural forms. It can promote equality, or sus-
tain inequality .... But diversion from the legal system is likely to
accentuate that inequality. Without legal power the imbalance
between aggrieved individuals and corporations, or government agen-
20001
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involve making up reasons that support their positions, because,
after all, if insurance companies, doctors, and product manufac-
turers came right out and said: "We don't want to pay all this
money to people we have hurt. We don't want to have to be
more careful and thoughtful in what we do. And we want to
keep all the money for ourselves," it wouldn't be all that effective
in helping them to obtain legislative changes favorable to them.
What the most powerful interests understand fully, while the less
powerful and traditionally disadvantaged still do not grasp ade-
quately, is that the only way through which they can gain a
greater share of power or call those who have wronged them to
account, is by becoming empowered through law and access to
zealous and competent lawyers.
D. The Impact of the Adversary System on Lawyers
There are consequences for lawyers in serving as the client's
voice in the adversary system, and those consequences are poorly
understood. In this article, I have sought to capture the role of
the lawyer through the combination of the metaphors of the
"prince of darkness" and the "angel of light"-the manipulator
of people and systems in the championing of the client's cause.
And here, I emphasize, is meant in the service of any client with a
legitimate legally protected interest, or a right to do something
or not be compelled to do something the client doesn't desire.
The argument offers a different perspective on "darkness." It is
that the exercise of the "dark" skills necessarily used by all lawyers
and through which they manipulate power-while being neither
inherently satanic nor saintly-has a profound impact on creat-
ing and defining the "soul" of those who use such skills on their
clients' behalf. This will often mean that some human qualities
and personality characteristics are repressed and others elevated
to prominence through the combination of heightened need
and frequent use. The concept of the dark skills-which are in
fact the skills involved in manipulation and strategy of the kind
done by nearly all lawyers-makes lawyers "princes of dark-
ness.23 The service they render to clients and to the preserva-
cies, cannot be redressed. In American society, as Laura Nader has
observed, "disputing without the force of law... [is] doomed to fail."
23. Certain kinds of behaviors produce corresponding effects or at least
reveal something "true" about the actor. I am using the idea of "dark skills" to
capture the fact that inherently manipulative processes generate emanations of
a specific kind and quality. In large part we create ourselves through our acts.
Marshall McLuhan described a similar process as humans increasingly relied on
written words and moved away from oral and physical activities. See MARSHALL
McLuHAN, THE GUTENBERG GALAXY 93 (1962).
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tion of our complex political system makes lawyers into "angels of
light." A central thesis is that while use of the dark skills is a
necessary part of being a good lawyer, their use extracts a price.
24
The price lawyers pay is created in part by the dynamics of
the adversary system. Jerold Auerbach warned us against the
impacts of the adversary system, even while conceding its vital
purpose. "Litigation expresses a chilling, Hobbesian vision of
human nature. It accentuates hostility, not trust. Selfishness sup-
plants generosity. Truth is shaded by dissembling." 25 Auerbach's
warning is uncomfortably accurate even while being inadequate.
The practice of law is even more powerful than he suggests, and
its effects on those who engage in it-profound. The interaction
of dark and light I am suggesting is offered as an integrated qual-
ity explaining how people actually function. In this essay, I am
arguing for the intellectual illumination of a system of real
morality, one based honestly on human nature and the legiti-
mate culture of law practice. The approach is difficult to accept
both emotionally and intellectually because it requires that we
24. See Beck et al., infta note 209; Goldberg, infra note 38; David Luban,
The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER 93 (David Luban ed., 1984);
Kevin Lyskowski, Conflicted Liberals and the Lure of Money, NAT'L L.J., May 2, 1994,
at A19.
25. JEROLD AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAw? vii (1983) [hereinafter
AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW?]. In two illuminating works Auerbach has
attempted to describe some of the evils of the social system and legal profession
and also sketch the lineage for what he considers to be a much healthier system
of alternative dispute resolution. He recognizes the severe limits of alternative
approaches to dispute resolution of the kind now being prescribed as cures for
the deficiencies of the adversary process-admitting the adversary system, while
problematic, is a necessary evil in an anonymous society which has increased
greatly in its scale of operation and lost any real sense of local and tight-knit
community. See id.; JEROLD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter
AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE]. See also Michael Wolf, Of Devils and Angels, Law-
yers and Communities: Justice Without Law?, 97 HARv. L. REv. 607 (1983) (book
review). Locke and others have also understood the important role of the legal
system as umpire. See JOHN LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 67, 68 (Henry
Regnery ed., 1955). Hobbes tells us:
Men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of griefe) in
keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all.
For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the
same rate he sets upon himselfe .... Hereby it is manifest, that dur-
ing the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in
awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a
warre, as is of every man, against every man.
THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 185 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1968). Law, and
its processes, are critical instrumentalities by which Hobbes' "common Power"
keeps the disputants "in awe."
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step away from several of the most powerful metaphors that
shape, distort and define how we perceive the world.
26
The challenge faced by the lawyer is enormous because
moral conflict and compromise creep up on us on cat feet rather
than through conveniently clear and obvious choices. As we
accept small inroads into our value systems, the detritus of con-
fused choices and small seductions tends to accumulate and
eventually changes us. The subtlety of the process is due in part
to the very fact of our professional obligation to serve others zeal-
ously and competently. This means that we assert or defend
others' behaviors and failures and are at least a step removed
from the actual consequences produced by our clients' acts. We,
therefore, do not feel the full consequences on others of the
decisions we advance through our representation and instead
live our professional lives "at a remove."
The professional distance lawyers should keep from their cli-
ents is an integral part of the dispassionate judgment required of
effective advocates, but creates its own moral risk-much like the
distinction between bomber pilots who experience very little
emotion when dropping bombs from 50,000 feet that cause the
deaths of 1,000 people, and the infantry soldier who must pay the
moral costs of knowing the face of the person he is forced to kill.
Shaffer warns, "Professional morals, because they are vicarious,
tend to obscure the moral question, 'What am I up to?"' 27 He
suggests that when:
The moral question being asked is, "What is the client up
to?" The modem, professional moral answer is, "That's
none of my business. I'm just doing my job." But the
moral question can be answered in another way, a way...
that would interpret the question, "What is the client up
to?" as a different and more troubling question. "How is
the client, in his association with me, changing? What is
she or he becoming because of me?"
s2
While Shaffer's question concerning how clients are influ-
enced by their lawyers is important, of greater significance to the
issues developed in this article is the question of how the lawyer is
being changed through the interactions with clients, through the
processes of obtaining clients' goals, and by the weight of the
cumulative experiences of law practice. Shaffer puts it thus: "pro-
26. See, e.g., MAXINE GREENE, TEACHER AS STRANGER 72 (1976) (discussing
the Platonic dichotomy between our ordinary human existence and the "higher
and better" person that philosophy has told us hides within us).
27. SHAvER, supra note 15, at 60.
28. Id.
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fessionals find it necessary to protect themselves from their cli-
ents. Otherwise we end up asking whether it is moral for us to
lie, to kill, to destroy-questions that would be readily answered
if one of us professionals was acting only for himself.
29
The shaping of the lawyer is inevitable because lawyers are
submerged in the maelstrom of law practice and must continu-
ally make critical and immediate moral decisions while being
subjected to the powerful forces of client interests and competi-
tive advocacy-as well as the increasingly difficult economics of
practice.3" Practicing lawyers must live in the world and work on
its front lines while engaging in its conflicts of morality and the
exercise of power. Some lawyers thrive on the interplay and take
energy and meaning from the conflict. Many others adapt and
go through a moral transformation. Others are wounded emo-
tionally and morally, with many resorting to aberrant behavior in
an effort to cope. Few lawyers possess a viable flight option even
if they want it.
A former associate in a Los Angeles law firm describes the
unanticipated moral impact of the lawyer's bargain that he
experienced in law practice:
I never could absolve myself of culpability for my clients'
misdeeds. I remember holding a farm worker's baby born
without legs, probably because of pesticide sprayings I had
helped defend in court. Professional ethics would have
had me just wash my hands of complicity. I felt like Pon-
tius Pilate before Christ's crucifixion. All my life, my fam-
ily, my teachers, my church had taught me to accept
responsibility for the consequences of my actions. Law
29. Id.
30. Economics is taking over everywhere and altering the nature of virtu-
ally every activity from law to medicine and even publishing-which, after all-
ought to represent the pinnacle of our intellectual activity. See Ted Solotaroff,
Free-market Writing, THE NATION, Oct. 16, 1995, at 439 (commenting on the
changes he perceives within the publishing industry in terms of a decline in
professionalism caused by the "takeover of the arts and other professions
[including law] by the market economy"). For some thoughts on the direct
impacts of economic trends on law practice, see Marc Galanter, The Many
Futures of the Big Law Firm, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 905 (1994); Alex M. Johnson, Jr.,
Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School and
Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. Rxv. 1231 (1991); Vincent R. Johnson & Virginia
Coyle, On the Transformation of the Legal Profession: The Advent of Temporary Lawyer-
ing, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 359 (1990); F. Bentley Mooney, Jr., How to Triple
Your Effective Hourly Billing Rate, LEGAL ECON., Oct. 1989, at 32.
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school lectures on professional responsibility could not
undo that instinct. They were too little, too late.3 '
Peter Drucker observes: "Education is for somebody, not for
something. The product of education is not knowledge or learn-
ing; it is not skills, ability or virtue, jobs or success, -dollars or
goods. It is always a person .... "32 But what kind of person is it
realistic to expect will develop through the combination of the
experiences, obligations, and culture of law practice? Consider
Abraham Maslow's description of the characteristics of the
healthy person and compare it with the observations by Kevin
Lyskowski, who described law firm associates as "conflicted liber-
als" whose private values were contradicted by their professional
work and as "groveling" before senior partners and clients who
held their professional fates in their hands. Maslow indicates:
[T]he objectively describable and measurable characteris-
tics of the healthy human specimen are-clearer, more
efficient perception of reality. More openness to experi-
ence. Increased integration, wholeness, and unity of the
person. Increased spontaneity, expressiveness; full func-
tioning; aliveness. A real self; a firm identity; autonomy,
uniqueness. Increased objectivity, detachment, trans-
cendance of self. Recovery of creativeness. Ability to fuse
concreteness and abstractness. Democratic character
structure. Ability to love, etc.3 3
E. The Legal Profession's "Avoidance Behavior" Has Undermined
Its Integrity
My assertion is that the failure to confront and understand
the stresses of using the dark skills of law practice and of operat-
ing within the culture of law practice has severely undermined
the legal profession as a principled activity. We have long
ignored and confused the values that provide legitimacy to the
profession, and that justify what we do, who we are, and why we
act. In part this is because the lawyer's culture and skills repre-
sent an environment and set of behaviors that polite society tradi-
tionally used but did not want to admit. People avoid facing
unpleasant truths, and the avoidance behavior of the legal pro-
31. Lyskowski, supra note 24 (quoting a young lawyer: "I wish I could still
commit to an idea or cause with abandon; often I feel I've lost what made my
life meaningful.").
32. PETER DRUCKER, LANDMARKS OF TOMORROW 137 (1965).
33. ABRAHiM ]MASLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING 157 (2d ed.
1968).
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fession is predictable. Abraham Maslow warned, in terms directly
applicable to lawyers and the legal profession:
We tend to be afraid of any knowledge that could cause us
to despise ourselves or to make us feel inferior, weak,
worthless, evil, shameful. We protect ourselves and our
ideal image of ourselves by repression and similar defenses,
which are essentially techniques by which we avoid becom-
ing conscious of unpleasant or dangerous truths.
34
In any case, this close relation between knowing and
doing can help us to interpret one cause of the fear of
knowing as deeply a fear of doing, a fear of the conse-
quences that flow from knowing, a fear of its dangerous
responsibilities. Often it is better not to know, because if
you did know, then you would have to act and stick your
neck out.
3 5
The self-denial in which lawyers engage, and the values con-
flict that is consuming many members of the legal profession, is
created in part by the social myths and unreal assumptions we
have made about use of the skills of manipulation and strategy-
powers of action I am calling the dark skills. The point made
here is that some of what are intuitively thought of as bad ways to
act are in fact integral and legitimate aspects of being a human-
and the responsibility of the lawyer to the client requires the law-
yer to draw upon those abilities to an even greater degree than is
typically found in other areas. 6 The conflict rests in part on
what Shaffer and others have termed "task morality" in which
"[a] common professional and political view is that a lawyer may
do for his client, or an official for his country, or a physician for
his patient, what would be immoral if either acted in the same
way for himself.""7
Our conflicting systems of morality generate moral disso-
nance among lawyers. Stephanie Goldberg reported on a survey
of thirty-four managing partners of Denver-based law firms:
[T] he problem of lawyer impairment-one that firms of all
sizes are slow to acknowledge and even slower at doing
something about-is far from unusual....
34. Abraham Maslow, the founder of "Third Force" psychology based on
the characteristics of healthy humans rather than Freud's analysis of neuroses,
further explains why we avoid knowledge. See, id.
35. Id. at 157-58.
36. See McLUHAN, supra note 23.
37. SHAFFER, supra note 15, at 73.
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The causes of impairment were most often alcoholism
and marital problems, and the areas of performance most
often affected were billable hours (79 percent), the ability
to withstand pressure (79 percent) and the quality of work
(75 percent),."
Those who seek cloistered lives of ethereal purity or the pur-
suit of knowledge for itself should therefore not become lawyers.
But even given the consequences of being a lawyer, I argue
against the idea that we should seek to alter the legal profession
to make it "kinder and gentler." Instead I advocate the need for
a more honest and realistically principled understanding of what
it means to be a lawyer, and educating lawyers about how to limit
its most harmful personal effects while understanding the social
importance of lawyers in American society. This demands a great
deal more honesty and depth in our examination of the legal
profession. Part of this honesty requires that we accept the price
of being our client's advocate and champion. 9
F. The Rich and Prominent Lawyer Contrasted with the
Great Lawyer
One of the problems with principled action of the kind the
good advocate performs on the client's behalf is that we have lost
any belief in heroic sacrifice and substituted banal celebrity in its
place. Daniel Boorstin contrasts celebrity which can be made into
an ongoing and marketable commodity, with heroism which tends
to be quickly rendered an historical event rather than an ongo-
ing process which can be exploited for commercial gain. Those
who benefit from the sale of celebrity have no regard for hero-
38. Stephanie B. Goldberg, Lawyer Impairment: More Common Than You
Might Think, Denver Survey Suggests, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1990, at 32, 32.
39. For many, the stresses of the "game" lead to what has come to be
called occupational "burnout." SeeJanice S. Gomez & Ron C. Michaelis, An
Assessment of Burnout in Human Service Providers, J. REHAB., Jan. 12, 1995, at 23,
23-24:
The chronic emotional stress associated with the provision of human
services produces "a syndrome of physical and emotional exhaustion,
involving the development of negative self concept, negative job atti-
tudes, and a loss of concern and feelings for clients."
Some individuals seem more predisposed than others to burnout.
"Feeling" personality types (as classified by the Myers-Briggs Type Indi-
cator) experience a much greater depletion of emotional energy in
the face of negative reactions to people than do "thinking" types. In
addition, those who are more likely to become emotionally involved in
their work are more likely to burn out than those who have a more
detached workstyle.
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ism. Indeed, our society gives credit for the debunking of the
hero-as if we can't stand the comparison. Boorstin observes:
"[T]he growth of the social sciences has given us additional rea-
sons to be sophisticated about the hero and to doubt his essential
greatness."4 He continues: "We see greatness as an illusion; or,
if it does exist, we suspect we know its secret. We look with know-
ing disillusionment on our admiration for historical figures who
used to embody greatness."" What are the deep principles of a
society that consumes and trivializes its heroes?
In such a debased culture what does it even mean for a law-
yer to be principled? What is the image of the great lawyer? Is it
Clarence Darrow and Abraham Lincoln, Thurgood Marshall or
Michael Tigar-or the top ten lawyers ranked by The American
Lawyer based on how much money they earned last year or who
won the year's biggest jury verdict? Martin Buber put the issue
eloquently:
Our age has experienced this paralysis and failure of the
human soul successively in three realms. The first was the
realm of technique. Machines which were invented to
serve men in their work, impressed him into their service.
They were no longer, like tools, an extension of man's
arm, but man became their extension, an adjunct on their
periphery, doing their bidding.
4 2
The power and scale of institutional structures is part of the
pervasive force of the economic and political technique Jacques
Ellul describes as shaping modern society. Ellul writes, "propa-
ganda seeks to induce action, adherence, and participation-
with as little thought as possible."4" He describes the shift toward
specialization and its cost:
Technique is of necessity, and as compensation, our uni-
versal language. It is the fruit of specialization. But this
very specialization prevents mutual understanding. Every-
one today has his own professional jargon, modes of
thought, and peculiar perception of the world .... The
man of today is no longer able to understand his neighbor
because his profession is his whole life, and the technical
40. DANIEL BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE: A GUIDE TO PSEUDO-EVENTS IN AMERICA
50 (1961).
41. Id. at 51.
42. MARTIN BUBER, BETWEEN MAN AND MAN 158 (1965) (The second
realm was the economic, and the third, the political).
43. JACQUES ELLUL, PROPAGANDA 180 (1965).
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specialization of this life has bound him to live in a closed
universe .4
II. THE LAWYER'S BARGAIN WITH SOCIETY
A. The "Sacred Oath" to Represent the Client Zealously
and Competently
In Goethe's classic work, Faust entered an unwise bargain
with Mephistopheles in which he traded his eternal soul and con-
demned himself to damnation in exchange for transient earthly
power. The terms of the bargain as stated by Mephistopheles
were deceptively simple:
I'll pledge myself to be thy servant here,
Still at thy back alert and prompt to be;
But when together yonder we appear,
Then shalt thou do the same for me.
45
At the time he agreed to the exchange, Faust was blinded by his
desire to regain his youth and the hope for love and beauty. The
trade seemed worth it to him when made, but as his world dis-
integrated around him he soon discovered one does not win a
bargain with Satan. After great anguish, however, his resurgent
faith gained Faust redemption in the eyes of God and the chance
to recapture his soul. Lawyers to some degree enter a similar
bargain, and it poses great risks to their souls. As with Faust, law-
yers seek power and earthly wealth through their bargain. And
as with Faust, at the time the oath is taken and the obligation
agreed to, the new lawyer has no real sense of its implications or
of the demands that will be placed on them by the Mephistophe-
lian combination of clients, legal institutions, and employers.
Part of the knowledge deficiency is inevitable, because experi-
ence is required as a precondition to full understanding. Butjust
as with initiation into any special order, most of the experience
can only come after the person is already bound to the
obligation.
Judge William Hoevelar describes the lawyer's responsibility
to the client as a "sacred trust," stating that "[m]en and women
entering the practice of law undertake an important trust, a trust
that involves the care of other people's lives, their money, their
fortunes and their futures. That's why we are required to take an
oath, because we are undertaking this sacred trust. "46 Francis
44. JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 132 (1969).
45. JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, FAUST (Charles W. Eliot ed., 1909).
46. Professionalism in Practice, A.B.A.J., Aug. 1998, at 48, 50 (comments of
Judge William M. Hoevelar).
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Bacon reminds us of the responsibility of the counselor, and
remarked that if we who are counselors do not see our oath as a
sacred trust accepted on our client's behalf, but instead consider
our own interests first-whether they be personal, systemic, or
financial-then "that is the case of bad officers, treasurers,
ambassadors, generals, and other false and corrupt servants;
which set a [personal] bias upon their bowl [in which their share
is measured], of their own petty ends and envies, to the over-
throw of their master's great and important affairs."
47
The contract between lawyers and society begins with the
special oath lawyers take in which they promise to represent their
clients zealously and competently.48 That obligation both limits
an individual's freedom to pursue personal aims at the expense
of the client and creates an oath and duty-based responsibility
that legitimates a different kind of moral code. The legal profes-
sion's oath requires the lawyer to be the client's agent and even
apologist in order to achieve the client's goals.49
There is, however, a close link between the economic condi-
tions within which lawyers are required to operate and the ability
to fulfill the contract through functioning professionally by
devoting sufficient quality of work and time to a particular cli-
ent's case. The problems that are produced by inordinate time
pressure and competing financial demands include the quality of
the work done, the cultivation of the right attitudes and values of
47. FRANCIS BACON, ESSAYS, CIVIL AND MORAL 64 (Charles W. Eliot ed.,
1909).
48. The oath taken as part of a lawyer's admission to the bar in Ohio
provides in part:
I will represent my client zealously within the bounds of the law, and
will not knowingly assert any unwarranted claim or defense, take any
unjust action, or employ or countenance any undue influence, decep-
tion, falsehood, or fraud; I will attend to my clients' affairs with dili-
gence, dispatch, and competence, free from compromising influences
and conflicting interests, and preserve the confidence of my
clients ....
OHIO R. OF CT. Rule 1, § 8 (1997).
49. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1980) ("In
our government of laws and not of men, each member of our society is entitled
to have his conduct judged and regulated in accordance with the law; to seek
any lawful objective through legally permissible means; and to present for adju-
dication any lawful claim, issue, or defense."). Canon 5 of the ABA Model Code
provides: "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on
Behalf of a Client." Id. Canon 5 (1980); see also id. EC 5-1:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the
bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of com-
promising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the
interests of other clients, nor the desire of third persons should be
permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.
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professionalism, and the need to operate a practice under con-
stant financial and competitive conditions.5 ° It has been
observed that the shift to hourly billing undermined profession-
alism. One critic argues the "hourly fee system is a devilish crea-
ture that rewards inefficiency and paralyzes productivity."51
Technological changes have further intensified and speeded up
the movement toward a kind of "free-market deprofessionalism."
Arthur Schlesinger 2 cites Hans Morgenthau's argument
regarding the intellectual world:
The contemporary intellectual, in his view, lived in a world
that was distinct from, though potentially involved with,
that of the politician. The intellectual ... seeks truth; the
politician, power. And the intellectual ... can deal with
power in four ways: by retreat into the ivory tower, which
makes him irrelevant; by offering expert advice, which
makes him a servant;, by absorption into the machinery,
which makes him an agent and apologist or by "prophetic con-
frontation." The "genuine intellectual," Hans Morgenthau
wrote, "must be the enemy of the people who tells the
world things it either does not want to hear or cannot
understand.""3
Lawyers should have no false dreams about being what Mor-
genthau calls a "genuine intellectual." When lawyers are working
as advocates and counselors on their clients' behalf, they are
agents and even apologists. The responsibility and the relation-
ship needs to be better appreciated and understood by both aca-
demics and practicing lawyers. Confronting the effects and
responsibilities of the task of the lawyer requires considerable
courage, and also is necessary for true principled behavior
because the connection with power between the lawyer and cli-
ent tends to seduce the lawyer-not the client. We all possess the
natural tendency to be attracted to power, and, unless we under-
stand and control this, it is likely to corrupt us. 54 Hexter
50. Twenty years ago there were three lawyers for every 1,000 adult Amer-
icans. Now there are more than 4.6 lawyers for every 1,000 adult Americans. See
Glaberson, supra note 2.
51. Kenneth Roberts, The Hourly Fee System is a "Devilish Creature", in
BEYOND THE BILLABLE HOUR: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ALTERNATIVE BILLING METHODS
35, 35 (Richard C. Reed ed., 1989).
52. Arthur Schlesinger, Intellectuals Role: Truth to Power, WALL ST. J., Oct.
12, 1983, at 28.
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. See, e.g., J.H. HEXTER, MORE'S UTOPIA: THE BIOGRAPHY OF AN IDEA 137
(1965) (discussing the turmoil Thomas More felt in considering whether he
should continue to work as an external critic, or become part of the King's
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explained that intellectuals are always tempted to think them-
selves able to resist the corruption of the process and instead
always end up subordinating themselves to the king's agenda.55
At the core of the analysis is the understanding that the law-
yer engages in principled behavior based on the fulfillment of
the duty to the client accepted through oath and professional
obligation. Of course there are other duties-less central and
secondary, but still important, owed to society and the legal sys-
tem-but too many people fail to understand that the primary
function and contribution of the lawyer to the preservation and
growth of our political system is the protection through zealous
advocacy of members of our society against abuses of power, and
the resolution of disputes that would otherwise damage the sys-
tem.56 These represent lawyers' primary obligations and their
vital purposes and contributions to a complex system founded on
the rule of law. 57 This allows lawyers to function on behalf of
their clients in ways that are undeniably strategic and manipula-
council). Hexter addresses the rationalization in which we engage in deciding
whether to serve power:
Hythloday's answer to the [rationalizing idea of the innovating intel-
lectual in government service as a] devil's advocate is that he [the
innovator] is misconstruing what necessarily happens in a prince's
council and evading the moral implications of that kind of service for
the Christian humanists themselves. Men are called into a prince's
service only to help the prince work out expeditious ways for getting
what he is determined already to have at any cost. Instead of leading
him along paths that they believe to be good, they soon find out that
they are having their brains picked to ease his way along paths they
know to be bad. Such talents as they have end up being deployed not
to support but to subvert the causes closest to their hearts.
Id.
55. See id. ("The innovating intellectual who surrenders his freedom to
define the problem and ends up by merely giving those in power advice on the
handiest way to follow a predetermined course of action cannot evade responsi-
bility for what he is doing.").
56. See AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAw?, supra note 25; HOBBES, supra
note 25.
57. The current president of the ABA sees the numerous legislative
efforts to limit lawyers and lawsuits as a sign that they are working effectively
against interests that may have traditionally been able to control the legal pro-
cess. See Glaberson, supra note 2:
Some lawyers see a connection between their growing power in Ameri-
can society and new efforts to control them. Anderson, a Little Rock
lawyer who has been the bar association president for a year, said "civil
rights and liability cases like the tobacco and gun suits, showed that
lawyers were sometimes more capable than government of tackling
problems." "That," he said, "made lawyers a target."
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tive-as well as sometimes unpleasant-and makes that action at
least potentially principled. 8
B. The Oath-Bound Duty Alters the Oath-Taker
Regardless of whether the lawyer has the ability to select the
clients for whom the dark skills are used, consider the real mean-
ing of the lawyer's acceptance of a code that defines and guides a
vital part of one's life and of taking a solemn vow to commit one-
self to serving another person's interest. The idea of a code of
honor or absolute obedience can obviously be taken too far-as
evidenced by the Nazi SS motto, "My Duty is My Honor"-a code
that justified anything. Nor would many lawyers elect to follow
the Japanese Code of Bushido in which one committed suppuku
or ritual suicide at the order of the master. But all codes in
which one commits to the benefit and service of another are a
surrender of a degree of free will and personal interest in service
to a calling. All real codes have consequences both on those who
accept the duty and on those who are served. Such commit-
ments inevitably alter the oath-taker.
Many lawyers are uncertain about the force and meaning of
a professional code that to many seems an antiquated concept of
duty based on an oath of service to another. While language his-
torically has been seen as a source of power, codes and oaths
have lost much of their meaning and effect in the modern world.
The very idea that "a man's word is his bond," and neither to be
lightly given nor breached must strike a large number of people
as humorous. Stephanie Salter describes a society that believes in
nothing but money:
Like much of Hollywood and cable television, Madison
Avenue appears to be in the grasp of clever but sopho-
moric young men who never met a person, product or
issue they couldn't turn into ajoke-preferably one with a
babe in it. Not only is nothing sacred or deserving of dig-
nity, anything that was once held as such-say, a sense that
excess, greed-driven wealth is obscene-is Public Enemy
No. 1, begging for a put-down. But lightweight intentions
do not always produce inconsequential results. Advertising
is ubiquitous today because it works. Added to the not-so-
subtle message that conspicuous consumption and the
widening wealth gap already send to all Americans, is it
58. See DAVID BARNHIZER, THE WARRIOR LAWYER (1997) (discussing the
connections between the strategic processes and what lawyers do on their cli-
ents' behalf).
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such a far reach to expect hip and clever ads to intensify
the situation?
59
This unfortunately captures the banal culture from which
lawyers emerge and in which their values are formed. As
Auerbach makes clear, "lawyers . . . are creatures of American
culture, not its creators. It is, ultimately, a question of values,
translated into social structure."6 Shaffer brings out the point
that the terms of the lawyer's oath in America have been consist-
ently diluted over the past century:
Each generation of American lawyers since Judge Jones's
[Alabama Code of 1887] has revised its code of ethics; and
each revision says less about morals, and says what it does
say about morals less precisely. . . . The American Bar
Association's... Rules of Professional Conduct for Ameri-
can lawyers (1983) bring this development to new fullness
by avoiding the traditional words of ethical argument-
words such as conscience, morality, right, good, and pro-
priety-in favor of the words of mandate and permission
that are the stuff of statutes and court orders.61
Nor can it be said that law schools or the legal profession do
anything to reverse the decline. In such a situation it is unsur-
prising that lawyers educated in a system without values and sur-
rounded by a culture filled with contempt for ideas such as duty
and loyalty have difficulty taking the lawyer's oath of zealous and
committed responsibility seriously. Oaths have traditionally been
solemnly-entered and substantial manifestations of duty, commit-
59. Stephanie Salter, Suffering from an Unseemly Lust for Money, OREGO-
NIAN, July 15, 1999, at D9. "Being rich as Croesus isn't enough; we desire more-
more-more and want it now-now-now." Id. This greed as the driving force
behind almost everything was certainly reflected in the question asked by one of
the partners forced out in Cadwalader's "Operation Rightsize." Some might
appreciate the court's response to Mr. Fritts:
In a biting July 1996 ruling, Circuit Court Judge Jack Cook of West
Palm Beach responded to Mr. Fritts, writing, "While life in the market-
place may well be made up of fear, greed and money, life in a partner-
ship is not so composed." Judge Cook awarded Mr. Beasley $3.6
million, which was reduced on appeal to about $1.5 million. Last
December, a New York state-courtjury awarded Mr. Ruskin $3 million,
a judgment Cadwalader is seeking to reverse.
Barrett, supra note 4.
60. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAw?, supra note 25, at 10. Fukuyama
observes a continuing decline in trust within the American culture: "Trust. . . is
not in itself a moral virtue, but rather the by-product of virtue; it arises when
people share norms of honesty and reciprocity and hence are able to cooperate
with one another. Trust is damaged by excessive selfishness or opportunism."
FUKUYAMA, supra note 9, at 51.
61. SHAFFER, supra note 15, at 72.
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ment, and honor. Such principles have increasingly little weight
in modem societies that, while purporting to emphasize the indi-
vidual to an extreme degree, in fact have steadily enlarged the
power of institutions over people. Richard Sennett attributes
much of the decline in principled commitment to the conditions
generated by 20th century capitalism. Sennett considers capital-
ism to have eaten away at the loyalty, commitment and perspec-
tives of both workers and employers.
6 2
With the new social freedom and decline in principle and
loyalty Sennett describes, many lawyers-perhaps even a signifi-
cant number of those who teach in American law schools-are
finding the obligations created by the lawyer's oath unaccept-
able. There is also a growing movement in which judges and the
organized legal profession have mobilized to undercut the zeal-
ous advocacy to which clients are clearly entitled. Masquerading
as civility and professionalism, the dishonesty of a "kinder and gen-
tler" formulation of how advocates should behave ignores the
injustices and low quality of advocacy that is typical for many cli-
ents.63 I endorse Jerold Auerbach's observation regarding this
movement and its dangers:
The current enthusiasm for delegalization represents an
effort by legal professionals to put their system back
together again. Like the king's horses and men, however,
they are overwhelmed by the enormity, indeed the impossi-
bility, of the task. By now, alternative dispute settlement
primarily expresses the values of these professionals, who
are reluctant to relinquish their control over the disputing
process. Their rationale constantly sputters into the same
arguments for judicial efficiency that have been heard in
legal circles since the turn of the century.64
Some of the people who seek to alter the adversary system
see their own beliefs as paramount over all others or lack the
willingness to serve another to the degree required. Others sim-
ply put their own agendas first. Many more have an understand-
able difficulty with the morality of advancing interests they
consider morally wrong. This reflects the lawyer's intense moral
dilemma, and is very close to what Thomas Hobbes warned about
when he described six factors that lead to the weakening or disso-
62. See RICHARD SENNETr, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER: THE PERSONAL
CONSEQUENCES OF WORK IN THE NEW CAPITALISM (1998).
63. See Freedman, Ethical Danger, supra note 13 (warning of the potential
for judges punishing an "unseemly" lawyer by making discretionary rulings that
hurt not only the lawyer's present, but future clients due to the lawyer incurring
judicial disfavor).
64. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW?, supra note 25, at 142.
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lution of a political commonwealth. Hobbes' factors included
three that are central to the moral crisis felt by lawyers attempt-
ing to redefine the nature of the adversary system. If these three
factors are accepted, then the system of professional morality and
the obligation to serve the client must either be trumped by the
personal value systems or the individual acting against personal
principles on the client's behalf is thrust into a conflicting state
in which some duty is violated no matter what is done.65
Quite a large number of lawyers do not consciously face
such conflicts, at least not at the beginning of their careers,
because they simply do not understand what it means to be a
principled and moral advocate. This is not surprising because
neither law schools nor the legal profession have done the diffi-
cultjob of preparing new lawyers to understand what they will be
confronting-or of creating a system of values that allows law stu-
dents and new lawyers to understand its consequences.
III. THE LAWYER AS A "PRINCE OF DARKNESS" AND
"ANGEL OF LIGHT"
A. Confronting False Ideals
There are fundamental conflicts and contradictions between
the ideal and the real in the terms of what is involved in the
lawyer's principled professionalism. The ideal dimension the
legal profession has traditionally used to describe the nature of
principled lawyer professionalism is not correct. There are strik-
ing differences between who we are, who we want to be, and who
we pretend we want to be. The gap is captured with great pathos
in the response by the robot Radius, speaking to Alquist, in Karel
Capek's, R U.R-a play dealing with the theme of dehumaniza-
tion caused by technological "progress."
Radius: "Slaughter and domination are necessary if you
want to be like men. Read history, read the human books.
You must domineer and murder if you want to be like
men .... We have read books. We have studied science
and the arts. The Robots have achieved human culture."
6 6
The substance of Radius' comments concerning human nature
has power because they purport to be delivered from a different,
if not more objective perspective. The power also derives from
65. See HOBBES, supra note 25, at 125 (the three factors include: "The
belief that every private man isJudge of Good and Evil actions"; "The belief that
whatever a man does against his conscience, is sin"; "The belief that Faith and
Sanctity, are not to be attained by Study and Reason, but by Supernatural Inspi-
ration or Infusion.").
66. KAREL CAPEK, R.U.R. 105 (P. Selver trans., 1969) (1923).
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the juxtaposition of our being measured based on what humans
actually do rather than what we proclaim ourselves to be. Radius
damns us by his empirical observations that are not some Pla-
tonic ideal offered as a self-serving description of what we ought
to be, but a starkly revealing portrait of what we are. In the same
way, I am attempting to capture what lawyers are and must be if
they are to fulfill their oaths. The "ideal" offered here is that of
the mixture of light and dark. Being a "prince of darkness"
changes us from what we would otherwise be if we had not
become lawyers. We tend to be tougher, stronger, more ruthless,
precise and impatient. This is less a shift in our morality than in
our personalities-one that may lie latent within us but which
starts to emerge in law school and is fully manifested after several
years of law practice.6"
Regardless of rhetoric about collaborative approaches and
non-competitive trust-given lawyers' goal-driven behavior and
inevitable manipulation, it is wise in the practice of law to keep in
mind Machiavelli's admonition that "[a] man who wishes to
make a profession of goodness in everything must necessarily
come to grief among so many who are not good."6 Law practice
is in many ways a combination of Darwinian and Hobbesian
processes in which the most focused and ruthless survive. The
ruthless, goal-driven behavior may well be muted within the "vel-
vet glove" and even become more effective through such sub-
tlety, but always present are the toughness and client loyalty that
are the characteristics of all good lawyers.
There is an enormous gap between the theory and the real-
ity of the legal profession. The theory underlying the legal pro-
fession is the lawyer's oath-based obligation to provide a client
with "zealous advocacy" along with competence. The reality is
something far different for too many lawyers. The willingness to
do nearly anything legal on behalf of a client doesn't even seem
to be fairly distributed. Stephen Gillers comments on the differ-
ential system of law that applies to minorities and whites:
In theory, the Constitution guarantees indigent defendants
effective counsel. In reality, Supreme Court rulings have
allowed judges to treat lawyers as effective even when they
67. "The lawyer's approach to a problem . .. is argumentative." MAYER,
supra note 11, at 4.
68. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (1532), quoted in DANIEL COQUIL-
LETIE, LAWYERS AND FUNDAMENTAL MoRAL RESPONSIBILITY 28 (1995). Coquil-
lette's anthology offers a rich and diverse set of readings and questions to allow
the development of the most critical ideas of personal moral responsibility
within the legal system.
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conduct no investigation, fail to cross-examine crucial wit-
nesses, sleep during testimony or come to court drunk.6 9
The reality of constantly having to deal with tough, manipu-
lative and even dishonest people who see us as a means to an end
they desire-even if we personally prefer to "make a profession
of goodness in everything"-makes it impossible or at least
deeply irresponsible to be anything but strong and unrelenting
in what we do for our clients. Machiavelli's greatest sin was hon-
esty about how people and human institutions actually function.
As to his warning about coming to grief among people who are
not good-including the opponents you face, the institutions
they serve, and the clients they represent-as a lawyer represent-
ing a man convicted of murder, how would you feel about the
integrity of the prosecutor in a recently reported case where the
defendant was convicted more than fourteen years ago at a trial
at which even the prosecutor said he had doubts about the
evidence?
The convicted man served fourteen years in prison before it
was discovered that evidence in the possession of the police was
not given to the defense, even though the notation in the file
indicates the witness seemed credible and there was a legal obli-
gation to provide exculpatory evidence to the defense.7" The key
point here is not to ask why this was done-as if it is a rare aberra-
tion-but to accept that such behaviors do occur, and almost cer-
tainly with far greater frequency than we would like to believe.7 1
B. Yin and Yang
The concept of the dark skills, and that of the lawyer as a
prince of darkness and angel of light, are in some ways similar to
the mutually reinforcing nature of the qualities contained within
what Chinese philosophers have called the yin and the yang.
Darkness and light are neither inherently good nor evil-but
reflect the interplay of different qualities and powers within all
humans. The complex dynamic of the lawyer's life is comparable
to the alternation of light and dark qualities within nature and
69. Stephen Gillers, The Double Standard: Inequality in Criminal Justice May
Be a Good Thing for the Favored Classes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1999, at A13.
70. See Bill Sloat, Evidence May Clear Inmate on Death Row: Eyewitness Account
Not Given to Defense, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 8, 1999, at IA.
71. See, e.g., Flynn, infra note 208 (concerning Priscilla Chenoweth's tire-
less work to win the release of a wrongly convicted man in New York); Mike
Robinson, Chicago Teenager Jailed for Months Even Though He Had a Perfect Alibi,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, May 22, 1999, at 8A (describing such abuses in
Chicago).
2000]
HeinOnline  -- 14 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 397 2000
398 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
the human personality that is fundamental to Chinese thought.
Milton Chiu tells us:
The Chinese character of Yin .. . and Yang... signify the
shadowy and sunny sides of the same mountain, which
indicates the idea of two sides of the same existence ....
Polarity is part of all existence, and it divides and differenti-
ates, even creating tension between two poles, but it does
not necessarily conflict and tear apart the two poles. It
works like a swinging pendulum or an electric charge
between the plus and minus poles to create balance and
dynamism. In religious terms, realization of "diversity in
unity" and "unity in diversity" becomes the clue for produc-
ing creativity as well as harmony.
72
A similar theme of humans as mixtures of dark and light is
offered by Abraham Maslow in somewhat inelegant words: "Even
our most fully-human beings are not exempted from the basic
human predicament, of being simultaneously merely-creaturely
and godlike, strong and weak, limited and unlimited .... fearful
and courageous .... yearning for perfection and yet afraid of it,
being a worm and also a hero."73 My argument accepts the spirit
and dynamism of the qualities described by Chiu and Maslow,
and develops from the principle that "dark" is not automatically
bad, just as the yin/yang principle does not represent good and
evil but seeks to capture the idea of real and dynamically interact-
ing differences contained within the fully evolved person. These
themes run throughout our religious and intellectual history, but
our dominant philosophical system has always denied our real
nature.74
C. Prince of Darkness
Although the connection between Satan and lawyers is of
ancient lineage, my idea of the lawyer as a prince of darkness is
derived from one of the wonderful movies about law, The Ver-
dict.75 The Verdict is a film I often use when introducing law stu-
72. MILTON CHIU, THE TAO OF CHINESE RELIGION 147 (1984).
73. MASLOW, supra note 33, at 157.
74. See JOHN GARDNER, THE RECOVERY OF CONIDENCE 44 (1971) (telling
us that, while our intellectual and moral traditions demand an ideal in which
we should be "individuals, initiators, and creators, free and responsible," the
reality is increasingly different, and "[t]he conflict between that harsh reality
and our tradition of individual freedom and responsibility is severe and grow-
ing worse").
75. THE VERDICT (Universal Studios 1982). For other examples of the
historical fear and contempt in which lawyers are held, see ABEL, supra note 13
and sources cited therein, and MELLINKOFF, supra note 1.
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dents to some of the more troubling issues of law practice. It
tells a story about an alcoholic, down-and-out lawyer named
Frank Galvin who has plummeted from being a young partner in
a major law firm to a pariah who is wrongly thought to have tam-
pered with a jury. Galvin was framed by a senior lawyer in the
firm who was the actual culprit.
When the story opens, Galvin is reduced to pathetic
attempts to acquire new clients by approaching grieving widows
at funeral homes, pretending he had been a friend of their
deceased husbands. His only client is a permanently comatose
woman who was allegedly administered the wrong anesthetic by
doctors at a hospital run by the Archdiocese. Although he has
had the case for over a year, Galvin has never bothered to visit his
client, has sent a single letter to the sister who is acting as her
guardian, not interviewed witnesses, and failed to contact the
opponent for possible settlement discussions. At the point the
film begins, less than two weeks remain before the trial date.
Galvin even has to be reminded of this fact by his now retired
former law partner, Mickey Morrissey.
Most lawyers will not find their lives filled with benign inter-
actions with enlightened lawyers. This was brought forth strongly
in The Verdict when Galvin is talking to Morrissey about his oppo-
nent, Ed Concannon, a partner in a powerful Boston law firm.
Galvin remarks that he has heard Concannon is, "pretty good."
Morrissey replies: "Good? I'll tell you who he is, he's the Prince
of... ing Darkness, that's who he is.", Putting aside the satanic
aspect of the prince of darkness concept, what if, properly under-
stood, a variation of "the Prince of Darkness" is in some ways a
fair characterization of what lawyers ought to be? That ques-
tion-which I answer in the affirmative and then discuss the con-
sequences-serves as the central theme of this essay.
D. Angel of Light
The "angel of light" idea represents the lawyer's function of
helping another do something that is legally legitimate-with the
important realization that "legitimate" and "moral" are not the
same. The vicariousness of the lawyer's moral life helps us to
understand that, if "angel of light" meant only representing jus-
tice and there were a single and obvious 'justice" inherent in any
situation, the analysis would be easy. The line quickly becomes
murky when we try to fully analyze 'justice" on a system-wide
basis. On February 18, 1999, Ohio executed its first person in
over thirty years. He had been convicted of planning and carry-
ing out the murder of his employer, and there was no question
20001
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he had done the act. But there is rarely a neat equation to fol-
low, particularly in a complex society with so many different per-
spectives and interests. Members of the victim's family possessed
their own definitions ofjustice, as presumably did the relatives of
the killer. Those generally in favor of the death penalty had
their own more generalized interests, as did those opposed to the
death penalty. Each competing and distinct interest represents a
legitimate perspective on a critical point of action by the legal
"dispute resolution" system.
The fact that there are radical disagreements about others'
beliefs does not make those views wrong. The advocate who pro-
vides a legitimate interest with the opportunity to be heard is a
voice for light within that system.7 6 This concept has long been
recognized by the American Civil Liberties Union, an organiza-
tion that has often subordinated its members' individual beliefs
to the need to provide a voice to the most unpopular. This
includes Jewish lawyers representing Nazis and White Power
advocates who have described Jews as a "mud race," and African-
American lawyers representing the Ku Klux Klan.7 7 David
Baugh, a Virginia lawyer who happens to be black, responded to
those surprised at his representation of a KKK member. "'The
sole purpose of this statute is to suppress an expression of a
group despised by the majority,' Baugh said. 'I despise the KKK-
But if we are going to have a democracy we are going to have
dissent and we must tolerate political dissent.' "78
The easiest meaning of the "angel of light" is the doing of
things we would all consider obvious acts of what can be called
positive justice. 79 Representing a powerless and wronged person
against the abuse of power is one example.8 ° Obtaining the
release of a wrongly convicted person is another. Confronting
76. Consider the alternatives. See, e.g., Diana Jean Schemo, Political Battle
Threatens to Destabilize Paraguay, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1999, at 11. In the United
States we have the same kinds of pressures to use governmental power to abuse
disfavored interests, but we are usually relatively successful at blunting the
attacks. See, e.g., Flag Burning Spurs Debate About Access, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER,
July 3, 1999, at 5B ("Free speech is controversial. It's supposed to be. If we all
got along and toed the official line, we should just pack our bags and move to
Iraq."); cf. John Daniszewski, Egyptians Say New Law Muzzles Rights Groups, CLEVE-
LAND PLAIN DEALER, June 20, 1999, at 21A ("First it was the political parties.
Next, the news media. Now, say critics of Egypt's new law on associations, the
government is muzzling nongovernmental organizations.").
77. See Pam Belluck, Avowed Racist Barred From Practicing Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 10, 1999, at A12; David Reed, Black Lawyer Defending Klansman, 1999 WL
9736071 (Associated Press).
78. Reed, supra note 77.
79. See Peru's Endangered Dissidents, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1999, at 27.
80. But it may not be only the poor and powerless. Shaffer observes:
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abusive police conduct in which the New York police savagely
beat an innocent bystander and caused him to lose sight in one
eye-then charged him with disorderly conduct to try to cover
up their fault-is another. It appears, however, that the "code of
secrecy" that characterizes the police may be showing cracks. In
a case where a New York policeman sexually abused a person in
the bathroom of a police station, the United States Attorney's
Office successfully prosecuted the perpetrators, leading the New
York Times to comment in an editorial:
The United States Attorney, Zachary Carter, said it best yes-
terday as he stood outside the Brooklyn Federal Court-
house and assessed the latest verdicts in the Abner Louima
case. The most important lesson New York police should
learn from the Louima trial, he said, is that their "worst
betrayal" is not testifying against a fellow officer. It is
betraying their oath of office out of "a false loyalty" to
colleagues.
Mr. Carter's case was bolstered dramatically last
month by a series of police officers who broke the old code
of silence and testified against officer Justin Volpe. After
having protested his innocence for months, Mr. Volpe
then confessed to sodomizing Mr. Louima with a stick in a
police precinct house bathroom. A Federal jury in Brook-
lyn yesterday convicted Charles Schwarz as the officer who
held Mr. Louima down in the bathroom.
Whatever the outcome, it could help destroy the
code of secrecy to the benefit not only of the Police
Department brass but also of those honorable officers who
have long chafed at the unwritten rules that require
silence. The Louima case brings home the old warning
that silence about a bad police officer can make trouble for
the entire department."
[David Dudley Field] claimed a dispensation from having to answer
for what his clients did. "I shall, whenever I speak for them in the
courts of the country, stand between them and popular clamor, just as
I would stand between them and power, if they were menaced by
power of any kind, monarchical or republican."
SRAFFER, supra note 15, at 75.
81. The Louima Verdicts, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1999, at A28. But this result
was achieved not by the State of New York but by federal prosecutors after
bringing enormous pressure to bear on the various defendants. It unfortu-
nately characterizes a culture of limited accountability and coverup found
almost everywhere power and a protected system exist. It is less a breakthrough
than a glimpse of how power is abused and the responsibility of lawyers to chal-
lenge such abuses.
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The lack of understanding of the values of the principled
advocate in American society is reflected in the fact that one of
the lines virtually guaranteed to bring a laugh in America is the
Shakespearean quote, "let's kill all the lawyers." The punchline,
"First, let's kill all the lawyers," is usually offered as a condemna-
tion of the legal profession, followed by a joke. Lawyer jokes are
everywhere, even in countries without effective legal systems of
their own. Not too long ago I was in Colombia, returning on a
small boat from a trip to a farm along the northern coast. We
took the boat along the waterways and across the Bay of Carta-
gena rather than travel on the roads, because rebels were stop-
ping people at roadblocks. When one of the Colombians I was
with found out I was a lawyer, he immediately asked: "What do
you call 300 lawyers on the bottom of the ocean?" I smiled back
at him and he took this as encouragement and finished: "A good
start!" And then he laughed so hard I thought he would fall
overboard. We continued talking and he told me how someone
he knew was in an important government job involving interna-
tional trade in goods. This man had been approached by drug
lords and given an option. "We will pay you $4 million to look
the other way. If you do not, then we will torture and kill one of
your children each week. When there are no more children, we
will do the same to your wife. And if you still don't cooperate, we
will do it to you." This is the kind of situation where the rule of
law has broken down, and it has done so in many countries. It is
also a situation that helps me clarify and better understand the
important role of advocacy and law as one of the core conditions
that separate us from many other nations and cultures.
The irony of the "kill all the lawyers" proposition is that the
quotation actually reflects the system-preserving characteristics of
the legal profession and the knowledge that lawyers are a barrier
against insurrection. William Kovacic describes a very different
perspective on "kill all the lawyers" than exists in popular anti-
lawyer discourse. He relates the experience of listening to an
American speaker using the line unsuccessfully as a joke at the
beginning of his speech. The speaker wondered why the Eastern
European audience simply looked at him rather than laughing.
82
Kovacic tells what followed.
82. See William E. Kovacic, Recent Development, The Competition Policy
Entrepreneur and Law Reform in Formerly Communist and Socialist Countries, 11 AM.
U. J. INT'L L. & POL'V 437 (1996). Lawyers who are attempting to serve what
would normally be considered public interest ends are among the most vulnera-
ble targets. See Bishop's Eulogy Calls For Peace Mourners Who Gathered to Honor
Lauyer Killed By Car Bomb Receive Sermon Rebuking Retaliatory Actions, Augusta
Chron., Mar. 19, 1999, at A14 [hereinafter Bishop's Eulogy].
HeinOnline  -- 14 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 402 2000
PRINCES OF DARKNESS AND ANGELS OF LIGHT
A young Ukrainian lawyer immediately stood up and
spoke. He said that he read and enjoyed Shakespeare, but
doubted that this fragment of Henry VI, Part II was a suita-
ble prescription for Ukraine. To explain, the lawyer
recounted the context of the line. The famed proposal is
uttered by Dick the Butcher during the gathering of a gang
that wants to impose tyrannical rule by its leader, John
Cade. The gang seeks to seize wealth by force and redis-
tribute it, to have the state sell goods at a fraction of their
cost, and to hang those who can read and write. Killing all
the lawyers is only the first step toward liquidating anyone
whose obsession with rules and reason might block the
gang's ascent. After recreating the literary setting, the
Ukrainian posed a question. "In this century," he said,
"the Soviet Union did what Dick the Butcher wanted. We
killed many lawyers. We killed laws that disperse power.
We destroyed people with independent ideas. We elevated
tyrants. Why do Americans ridicule institutions that have
helped protect personal freedom and create economic
prosperity?" The businessman watched silently, swamped
by waves of nodding heads.
8 3
I don't want to overstate the case, because lawyers also serve
as the defenders and preservers of injustices and are frequently
apologists for corrupt political interests. Certainly this is too
often the situation. But it is equally clear that those who would
abuse peoples' rights within a system find it essential to deny
effective legal representation to powerless people who have been
abused. Lawyers who are attempting to serve what would nor-
mally be considered public interest are among the most vulnera-
ble targets. In a recent car bomb murder of an Irish lawyer it was
reported:
Bishop Francis Gerard Brooks said retaliation also would
be disrespectful to the memory of Rosemary Nelson, 40, a
human rights lawyer "who strove by political and legal
means to right a grievance."
Thousands of mourners packed St. Peter's Church in
Lurgan, 30 miles southwest of Belfast, to honor Mrs. Nel-
son, who died Monday when a bomb planted in her silver
BMW exploded just yards from her home. An outlawed
Protestant group claimed responsibility.
8 4
83. Kovacic, supra note 82, at 463.
84. Bishop's Eulogy, supra note 82.
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It is so very difficult for people to see how this works from
within the complacent comfort of our own system, so it may be
useful to consider a few examples of how things work in other
countries. DianaJean Schemo quotes a Paraguayan citizen bewil-
dered by what was happening in a recent government crisis in
which Paraguay's newly elected president ignored an order of
the country's Supreme Court: "How can people believe in
democracy? . . . How can they believe in anything when the
president simply decides to ignore an order of the court and
nothing happens?" 5 The article suggests that Venezuela, "now
has the trappings of democracy, with periodic elections, a consti-
tution and separate branches of government. But there is little
confidence in the independence of the courts and the Con-
gress."8 6 In Colombia, in an effort to destabilize the rule of law
in that nation, the drug cartels murdered prosecutors and judges
who would not take their bribes. In Turkey, lawyers representing
Kurdish dissident leader Ocalan resigned after protesting death
threats and the perceived unwillingness of the Turkish govern-
ment to provide adequate protection. In China, the government
conducted trials of political dissidents and denied them lawyers
prior to finding them guilty and sentencing them to lengthy
prison terms.
In Peru, a government intent on silencing an important
newspaper editor critical of its political activities went after his
lawyer in an effort to intimidate both press and lawyer. Baruch
Ivcher, former owner of a Peruvian television station is now
exiled in Israel after having his citizenship stripped away and
being convicted in absentia of customs violations and sentenced
to twelve years in prison. He describes his experience with Peru's
president Alberto Fujimori:
When Channel 2 in Lima, of which I was the majority
shareholder, broadcast reports on the use of torture by the
intelligence service, military involvement in drug traffick-
ing and-this was the pi&e de risistance-the million-dollar
income of the head of the intelligence service, the Govern-
ment of President Alberto Fujimori apparently decided the
station had to be silenced and I had to be punished....
[T] he Government is now prosecuting my defense lawyers.
The Government is deaf to appeals from Peru's Cardinal
and groups like the Inter-American Human Rights Com-
mission. Then there is the use of politically inspired prose-
cutions, like the trumped-up tax case against Delia
85. Schemo, supra note 76, at 11.
86. Id.
HeinOnline  -- 14 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 404 2000
PRINCES OF DARKNESS AND ANGELS OF LIGHT
Revoredo. She was dean of the Lima Bar Association and a
member of the Constitutional Tribunal; her troubles
began when she cast her vote there against a third term for
Mr. Fujimori.
To get away with these types of things, the Govern-
ment needs to control the entire judicial system. Today
two-thirds of Peru's judges have only temporary status,
meaning that they hold their positions at the pleasure of
the Government and cannot act independently. In addi-
tion, the National Magistrates' Council, an autonomous
body established in the Constitution to appoint and dis-
miss judges and prosecutors, has been largely gutted. 7
E. The "Bad" Lawyer Distinguished from the "Dark" Lawyer
Although many might automatically think to classify venal,
incompetent, or dishonest lawyers under the heading of the
"dark" lawyer, that is not at all what I intend.8 ' Being incompe-
tent and/or betraying one's obligation to the client through
greed, neglect, betrayal or some other variation is being a "bad"
lawyer as opposed to a "dark" lawyer. Such "bad" lawyers-and I
am using the term to include affirmatively bad, dishonest and
negligent lawyers-are an affront to the legal profession and
exist in considerably greater numbers than a principled profes-
sion ostensibly committed to zealous and competent client repre-
sentation should tolerate or allow. But lawyers who fit into the
above categories are irresponsible, unprofessional and bad law-
yers, not principled professionals committed to their clients' well-
being.89
Unfounded litigation is supposed to be an ethical violation,
and it takes a really nasty and immoral person to deliberately
accuse another of reprehensible and criminal conduct you know
they didn't do. This behavior not only occurs but seems to be
increasing. Eisler's survey reports, for example, that "[m]aking
a bad situation worse is the popular perception that hot-button
issues can drive a spouse into submission. Child abuse. Incest.
87. Peru's Endangered Dissidents, supra note 79.
88. See, e.g., Kim Isaac Eisler, The Truth About Divorce Lawyers: It's Hard to
Find Lawyers Both Civilized and Fair to Clients Who Need a Divorce. Here's Why,
WASHINGTONAN, Oct. 1995, at 128 ("Putting your divorce in the hands of an
honest counselor-at-law isn't easy. Divorce lawyers, as a class, have earned a
dismal reputation.").
89. The problems are not limited to the oft-maligned divorce bar. For an
exposure of abusive billing practices among some large corporate firms, see
NADER, supra note 16, at ch. 7.
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Adultery. Claims for all these are on the rise, and they are often
unfounded."9" A vicious conflict between a divorce lawyer and
his client was reported in Forbes magazine, in which Linda
Sarofim Lowe's former lawyer Earle Lilly worked with her to con-
coct "a nasty scheme against Fayez Sarofim [her now ex-hus-
band] to force a settlement in the divorce, including publicly
accusing the Egyptian-born investment whiz of fraud and rape."91
Kim Eisler's description of "bombers" and "sharks" is closer
to what I mean by the concept of legitimate though dark skills.
In describing Washington's top divorce lawyers, Eisler reports on
the results of a survey she conducted which identified forty law-
yers considered to be the best at handling a divorce in an effec-
tive but civilized manner. It also described ten others-ones
labeled "bombers"-who were regarded as the best at what they
do, stating, "[w]hat these ten others often do is torment the
spouses of their clients. They sometimes are referred to as
'bombers' or 'sharks.' Although contentious, the ten divorce
lawyers known as bombers are as admired by their clients, the
evidence suggests, as they are disliked, or feared, by
peaceminded attorneys. '"92 Each of these categories is close to
what I intend by the concept of principled and dark lawyers,
doing what is legal, while putting their clients' needs and allowa-
ble agendas first.
Eisler's survey also describes lawyers who waste client
resources under the guise of providing aggressive representation,
remarking, "[i]t's called churning. The beauty of it, from the
unscrupulous lawyer's point of view, is that although the client is
being fleeced, he or she thinks the lawyer is a fierce fighter for
the cause."9 3 Churning a case for personal profit, negotiating a
deal with an opposing lawyer that looks good but which the law-
yer knows is considerably less than could have been obtained or
more than was necessary to give up in payment, are examples of
bad lawyering. So are such behaviors as not responding to client
needs, not being professional in the preparation of a case, not
keeping accurate track of work actually done, and overbilling, all
90. Eisler, supra note 88, at 128. But the zealous advocate can go too far.
See NADER, supra note 16, at 134-57 (describing the increasing problems with the
destruction or spoliation of evidence).
91. John Gorham, Menagea Trois, FORBES, Oct. 12, 1998, at 350. Ms. Lowe
has now apparently sued lawyer Lilly, claiming that he "romanced her and,
while she was high on booze and prescription drugs, coerced her into signing a
contingency-fee-based contract to extricate her from her marriage." Id.
92. Eisler, supra note 88, at 128.
93. Id.
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of which represent unprofessional or bad lawyering designed to
serve the lawyers' interests rather than the clients'.
The problems of the bad lawyer who betrays his or her obli-
gation to the client are of course not limited to the divorce bar
that served as the basis of the Washington, D.C. area survey. Typ-
ical abuses of clients represented by large firms include billing
unworked hours, senior partners billing at their higher rates for
the work ofjunior personnel, advising clients not to accept settle-
ments that are reasonable so the firm can keep billing, taking
unnecessary depositions, and failing to provide detailed bills so
the clients can't accurately monitor what has been done.94 All
represent techniques through which bad lawyers cheat clients.
Many lawyers become too close to clients and begin acting as
the client rather than a professional. This proximity cost the law
firm of Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue $57 million when they were
found liable for helping clients in the S&L scandal in ways that
were considered over the line of counseling a client regarding
appropriate action and into the area of helping to advance the
illegal scheme. Inordinate closeness has been a recurring theme
in the widespread tobacco litigation where at least one law firm
representing tobacco interests operated as an integral policy and
managerial arm of the client. An Associated Press report in the
New York Times on February 18, 1999, relating to Florida litigation
against a tobacco company revealed the plaintiffs' efforts to
introduce a document demonstrating how a lawyer for the
tobacco company had attempted to convince a company scientist
to alter a report to make it more favorable to the company.95
IV. CORE ELEMENTS OF THE DARK SKiLLs: "TRUTH,"
MANIPULATION, AND POWER
A. The Advocate's "Truth"
The adversary system is many things-including preserver of
power and privilege, occasional righter of wrongs, a mechanism
through which we can pretend that justice is done, a callous
processor of people who have offended the law, a pressure
release valve, and a resolver of disputes through the application
of latent societal force. But it is not, has never been, and is
unlikely to be a search for truth for a variety of reasons. These of
course include the fact that the resources of the adversary pro-
cess tend to be seriously imbalanced on behalf of one side or the
other. But even if the resources were more equal, this would
94. See NADER, supra note 16.
95. See Florida Smokers' Lawsuit Buried, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1999, at A14.
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only lead to more deception rather than less. It also includes the
fact that juries clearly make decisions-just as do judges-on
grounds that have nothing to do with truth but with bias, polit-
ical considerations, physical appearance of the parties, emotion,
and numerous other factors unrelated to any strict understand-
ing of truth.96
Lawyers work within a culture of deception, manipulation,
and power. Aristotle captured this idea more than two millenia
ago in describing the role of the advocate: "[Y] ou must render
the audience well-disposed to yourself, and ill-disposed to your
opponent; (2) you must magnify and depreciate [make whatever
forms your case seem more important and whatever forms his
case seem less]."" Plato phrased it more poetically in saying the
advocate "enchants the minds" of the courts of law. The advo-
cate's role is inherently deceptive rather than truth-directed.
The dilemma is not of recent origin. Plato remarked, "rhetoric
[is] ... a universal act of enchanting the mind by arguments....
[H] e who would be a skillful rhetorician has no need of truth-
for that in courts of law men literally care nothing about truth,
but only about conviction."
98
The dynamic is inescapable and the overall system is not
going to change enough to affect the basic way of doing business.
Lawyers are immersed in a life comprised of manipulating peo-
ple and power. They do so in order to defend and assert incom-
mensurable and colliding value systems and claims on behalf of
their clients with the goal of gaining advantages from opponents
96. See Bob Van Voris, Jurors Do Not Trust Civil Litigants. Period., NAT'L L.J.,
Nov. 2, 1998, at A24.
97. ARISTOTLE, THE EPILOGUE, in THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE 3, 19 (L.
Cooper ed. & trans., 1932). The common law operates on a multiplicity of
levels that transcends the narrow limits of science. It shifts between these levels
at will and works through the application of political language to discretionary
situations. I explored this as a distinct system of knowledge in David Barnhizer,
Prophets, Priests, and Power Blockers: Three Fundamental Roles of Judges and Legal
Scholars in America, 50 U. PiTT. L. REv. 127 (1988).
98. THE WORKS OF PLATO 292, 306 (I. Edman ed., 1928). Sun Tzu sug-
gests approaches by the strategist that provide a flavor of how the legal strategist
must act deceptively and in a manipulative manner to achieve success. "All men
can see these tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy
out of which victory is evolved." BARNHIZER, supra note 58, at 73 (quoting Sun
Tzu's The Art of War). "In all fighting, the direct method may be used for join-
ing battle, but indirect methods will be needed to secure victory." Id. at 75.
"[W]hat enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer,
and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge." Id.
"By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, he keeps the enemy with-
out definite knowledge. By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he
prevents the enemy from anticipating his purpose." Id. at 100.
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who hold conflicting aims."9 It is an inherently competitive
undertaking with consequences for those caught in it. It has
become increasingly popular to criticize the perceived deficien-
cies of the adversary system and the lawyer's role within it. Anne
Strick has challenged the validity of the entire adversary process
by emphasizing the lawyer's commitment to winning through
advocacy over the attainment of truth. In her book, Injustice For
All, Strick called this "the treason of the adversary system," and
comments at length on how many lawyers attempt to falsely jus-
tify the adversary system as a mechanism for the effective deter-
mination of the truth of controversies. 100
B. Pecuniary Psuedo-Truth
Jules Henry has offered the concept of pecuniary pseudo-
truth to characterize our age, defining it as "a false statement
made as if it were true, but not intended to be believed.""1 1 He
applies the idea of pecuniary pseudo-truth to law through his
concept of "legally innocent prevarication" which is used to
"cover all statements which, though not legally untrue, misrepre-
sent by implication. '10 2 Henry argues that "[t]he heart of truth
in pecuniary philosophy is contained in the following three pos-
99. See Irma S. Russell, Cries and Whispers: Environmental Hazards, Model
Rule 1.6 and the Attorney's Conflicting Duties to Clients and Others, 72 WASH. L. REv.
409 (1997); Thomas L. Shaffer, On Living One Way in Town and Another Way at
Home, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 879 (1997); Nicholas Targ, Attorney-Client Confidentiality
in the Criminal Environmental Law Context: Blowing the Whistle on the Toxic Client,
14 PACE ENVT'L L. REv. 227 (1997).
100. ANNE STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL: How OUR ADVERSARY SYSTEM OFJUS-
TICE VICTIMIZES US AND SUBVERTSJUSTICE 124 (1977). But consider the remarks
of lawyer Jerome P. Facher, the defense lawyer in the case that provided the
basis for Jonathan Harr's A Civil Action:
And if a trial aspires to be a search for truth, the student must still ask
whose "truth" are we searching for, whose "truth" has been revealed
and whose "truth" do we accept? Is it the lawyer's truth? The plain-
tiffs truth? The defendant's truth? The witness's truth? The judge's
truth? The public's truth? The media's truth? Whatever the answers to
these philosophical puzzles, a trial confronts us with a real life contro-
versy which must be resolved by presenting evidence, finding facts and
applying the law. In light of this reality, a fair trial in a fair adversarial
system not only resolves the controversy, but, I believe, comes closest
to finding that elusive and undefined concept called "truth."
Jerome Facher, The Power of Procedure: Reflections on "A Civil Action" in A Docu-
MENTARY COMPANION TO A CVIL ACTION xvii (Lewis Grossman & Robert
Vaughan eds., 1999).
101. HENRY, supra note 9, at 50.
102. Id. at 51.
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tulates: Truth is what sells[;] Truth is what you want people to
believe[;] Truth is that which is not legally false." 103
Henry argues rather tellingly that the value systems and insti-
tutions of the twentieth century have somehow reversed the
truth-seeking spirit of several millenia-essentially resulting in a
culture of lies: "One of the discoveries of the twentieth century is
the enormous variety of ways of compelling language to lie."1 °4
C. "Truth" Is Most Abused in the Pre-Trial and
Non-Litigation Phases
As to the use of dark skills, those who fixate on the problems
with the trial process are missing the points where the real games
of abuse, deception, and injustice take place in the practice of
law. A trial is actually far more likely to approximate a fair out-
come based on the community's definitions of truth and fairness
than is a negotiation. Trials are public. Trials have clear rules of
competition. And trials have judges to run the process. Fairness
and truth are far more likely to be at least approximated in the
trial context than in negotiation.
Much of negotiation and case preparation are invisible in
terms of the clients' opportunities to participate and to evaluate
what is or is not being done on their behalf. This invisibility cre-
ates enormous potential for abuses of power on the part of the
lawyers. The invisibility of the negotiation processes also allows
lawyers to ignore the relative truth of claims and "truth-based"
outcomes in favor of ones based on the possession of the greatest
power and leverage. Negotiation, investigation, client counsel-
ing, and discovery behaviors frequently involve concealment,
innuendo, ambiguity, leverage, and manipulation. This is caused
by the invisibility, plausible deniability, and lack of a source of
formal authority to govern the behaviors of lawyers. Use of the
"dark skills" is at the core of the lawyer's life, and are far more
compelling, seductive and powerful in terms of their effects on
lawyers than are trials.'" 5
D. An Entire Social System Based on Lies and Misrepresentation
While lying and deception have always been with us, we have
taken a quantum leap in the sophistication, extent, intensity,
incessancy, presence, and depth of penetration of propaganda
and half-truths in a system designed to persuade and sell." 6
103. Id. at 50.
104. Id. at 91.
105. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUmAN CONDITION 159 (1959).
106. See ELLUL, supra note 43.
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Truth is one of the casualties in this process-indeed even fre-
quently an obstacle to be overcome. The problem is not that
there is dishonesty, but that there is so much of it, and that it is
now an accepted part of our cultural values rather than some-
thing to be disdained. It isn't only lawyers who are having
trouble with principle. Journalists, business people, politicians,
and physicians are all experiencing the dilemma of lacking a sys-
tem of honor in a deceptive world of telemarketers, public rela-
tions, media ratings frenzies, and "spin doctors.""0 7
Lawyers, after all, are people first and learn the values of our
society long before they come to law school and enter law prac-
tice. Lying, avoidance of responsibility, and slippery qualification
have become an increasingly large part of that system's values. 108
Michael Sandel describes the problem:
[Liberal and conservative debate] does not speak to the
two concerns at the heart of our discontent. One is the
fear that, individually and collectively, we are losing con-
trol of the forces that govern our lives. The other is the
sense that, from family to neighborhood to nation, the
moral fabric of community is unraveling around us. These
two fears define the anxiety of the age.
10 9
107. See, e.g., Salter, supra note 59.
108. See, e.g., Miles Benson, Making Lying Look Easy: Politicians Fine-Tune
the Art of Untruths, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 5, 1997, at I E; Ethan Bronner,
College Students Value Money Over Mind, Survey Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1998, at
A14; Eugene Kane, Survey Finds Brightest Students Often Cheat, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, Nov. 13, 1998, at 21A; Richard B. Schmitt, In U.S. Courts, the Whole Truth
Is Often Anything But, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1998, at B1. Sissela Bok has authored
two works that help illuminate the purposes and tension of concealment. Her
views of the responsibility of lawyers to keep potentially damaging client confi-
dences secret, even if they might endanger others, would not always agree with
my own. See SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE;
SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION (1983).
See also Van Voris, supra note 96 (analyzing the National Law Journal-Decision
Quest Juror Outlook Survey).
109. Michael J. Sandel, America's Search for a New Public Philosophy, ATLAN-
TIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1996, at 57. Krishnamurti's observation has much to tell us
in our attempt to determine the nature and function of the advocate and
whether it is either reasonable or realistic to assume we can become
cooperative:
The world is torn by conflicting beliefs, by caste and class distinctions,
by separative nationalities, by every form of stupidity and cruelty-and
this is the world you are being educated to fit into. You are
encouraged to fit into the framework of this disastrous society; your
parents want you to do that, and you also want to fit in.
J. KRISHNAMURTI, THINK ON THESE THINGS 12 (1964). This does not mean that
we must accept all the terms of this contentious and repressive world, but that
we must understand it and operate within its realistic limits and conditions.
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A particularly poignant irony is that lawyers have used the
skills of manipulation and deception for centuries, but have now
been passed by a deceptive society whose machinations put most
lawyers to shame and whose practitioners lack any sense of prin-
ciple and limit. Good lawyers, as I set forth in this work, neces-
sarily use manipulative and strategic "dark skills," but within the
legal profession there had traditionally been some sense of
appropriate limits and the need for principled constraint. Even
though this awareness of limits and constraint must become far
clearer and more central to the legal profession, we find that in
general society there are no limits other than what one is able to
get away with.
This was painfully obvious in the comments of the U.S.
women's soccer team goalkeeper after the team's recent victory
in the 1999 World Cup, won by the Americans 5-4 in a shootout
with the Chinese. While admitting she broke the rules by moving
both vertically and laterally prior to the opponent kicking the
ball, the goalie said, "It's not cheating if they don't call it." I have
no question that many if not most Americans would agree with
this "anti-principle" which means nothing more than nothing
you do is wrong if you don't get caught. This is consistent with
Anne Strick's description of the lawyer elevating winning over
truth."' The willingness to lie is also captured by Amitai Etzioni.
In offering an example of what some would call overzealous
behavior by lawyers, Etzioni recites a prominent lawyer's defense
of lying that implicitly justifies a system of professional values
many would consider unprincipled. Etzioni's lawyer concluded:
"in our current climate we should not be surprised when lawyers
state things that have nothing to do with truth because we should
know that they will say anything that might help a client."1"
Compare this with John Finnis' position that there is an absolute
duty not to lie.
112
E. The Lawyer's Obligation to Deceive
In many ways similar to the seminal work of Monroe Freed-
man, I argue that-consistent with the oath taken on entering
the legal profession-the lawyer's duty imposes the obligation to
110. See STRICK, supra note 100. David Luban challenged the claim that
the adversary system operates as a search for truth in Luban, supra note 24, at
93; see also WILLIAM SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS'
ETHICS (1997).
111. AMITAI ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE: COMMUNITY AND MORALITY
IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 157 (1996).
112. SeeJohn Finnis, What Is the Common Good and Why Does It Concern the
Client's Lawyer, 40 S. TEX. L. REv. 41 (1999).
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provide a "sovereign" client with zealous representation and con-
fidential, loyal, and effective counsel.' 13 Part of the process-
perhaps even the heart of the lawyer's work-involves deception,
legalized half-truths, and concealment of falsehoods and damag-
ing evidence on behalf of clients. Consider, for example, Strick's
recounting of a deception engaged in by Samuel Williston, one
of the legal profession's icons:
Once upon a time, [Samuel] Williston, called by a col-
league "One of the most distinguished and conscientious
lawyers I or any other man have ever known," was defend-
ing a client in a civil suit. In the course of trial, Williston
discovered in his client's letter file material potentially
damaging to the man's case. The opposition failed to
demand the file; nor did Williston offer it. His client won.
But, recounts Williston in his autobiography, the judge in
announcing his decision made clear his ruling was based in
part on his belief in one critical fact: a fact Williston,
through a letter from the file in his possession, knew to be
unfounded.114
I have long shared Williston's quandary. After I had won a
settlement in a consumer class action lawsuit based on alleged
fraudulent sales practices, a young married couple told me that
they really hadn't been cheated as the lawsuit had claimed. Of
course they waited until the settlement check was safely in their
hands. I had been naive enough to tell them during the intake
interview what other "similarly situated" clients had described,
and they simply adjusted their "facts" to fit the other clients' alle-
gations. I did not telephone the opposing lawyer and relate this
fact.
V. THE CULTURE OF LAW PRACTICE
"It is the way of heaven to take from what has in excess in
order to make good what is deficient. The way of men is
otherwise. It takes from those who are in want in order to
offer this to those who already have more than enough."
-Lao Tzu
For the lawyer, the culture of practice shapes us into differ-
ent people than we would otherwise be. The shaping is driven
primarily by five factors-the oath we take to represent our cli-
ents zealously and competently, the people we represent, the
113. See FREEDMAN, ADVERSARY SYsTEM, supra note 13.
114. STRICK, supra note 100, at 123 (he did not speak up at that time, and
felt it would violate his professional responsibility to the client to do so).
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goals they seek, the skills and language we use to achieve their
goals, and the effects on us of defending or facilitating the cli-
ents' past or intended acts. Taken together, these factors make
the practice of law in many ways a morally dangerous and Faus-
tian art in which its practitioners surrender a part of themselves
as the price of power.' 15 It is a necessary art because of the skills
we use, the people we represent, the institutions within which we
work both directly and secondarily, the types of problems we
help solve and create, and ourselves. It is a dark art because, in
helping one set of people we call clients, we hurt others. 16
A. The Machiavellian Nature of the Adversary System
While many people instinctively recoil from that connection
being asserted between principled behavior and being a "dark"
lawyer-and from the demands law practice imposes on those
who advance its processes-I argue that the dark side of the law-
yer's life is neither atypical nor exceptional, but reflects an inevi-
table and necessary component of being a good, i.e., effective,
lawyer. The idea that behaviors most people feel are calculating
and manipulative to an otherwise unacceptable degree can still
reflect a legitimate and principled system is something with
which many are understandably uncomfortable. Some will reject
the premise being offered out-of-hand. Yet, while many people
immediately recoil from even the idea of it being legitimate and
principled to manipulate others to achieve one's ends, it is in fact
a natural and inevitable element of how all people function. A
few examples might help illuminate the idea.
While we prefer not to think of ourselves as conspiratorial
seekers of ends even to the extent of using strategies we conceal
from our intended "targets," parents continually manipulate
their children in an attempt to help them mature into responsi-
ble people. Teachers use carefully designed methods based on
the psychological insights of learning theory to manipulate their
students with the purpose of enhancing their learning. Busi-
nesses manipulate the consciousness of employees to make them
115. See GOETHE, supra note 45.
116. Roscoe Pound tells us: "Conflict and competition and overlapping of
men's desires and demands and claims, in the formulation of what they take to
be their reasonable expectations, require a systematic adjustment of relations, a
reasoned ordering of conduct, if a politically organized society is to endure."
ROSCOE POUND, NEW PATHS OF LAW 3 (1950). In this competitive context: "The
ability to weigh two duties, and balance them against each other, is the measure
of human worth and dignity." WORLD TREASURY OF RELIGIOUS QUOTATIONS 257
(Ralph L. Woods ed., 1966) [hereinafter WORLD TREASURY] (quote from R.W.
CHAMBERS, LIFE OF SIR THOMAS MORE (1935).
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more productive, and through advertising, product design, and
packaging essentially subtly brainwash consumers to encourage
them to buy their products and services. Military trainers manip-
ulate the minds and emotions of recruits in order to prepare
them for war and killing. Without even understanding what we
are doing or calling it strategic manipulation, we have developed
an enormous range of processes and strategies intended to
achieve what are thought of as legitimate ends-effective child-
rearing, improved education, more efficient workers, consumers
willing to buy our products. We justify such activities based on
some kind of higher or at least important purposes either tacitly
or explicitly accepted as vital or at least legitimate.
Jerold Auerbach describes several seemingly less than desira-
ble aspects of the adversary system lawyers serve, even while
admitting that he would view with some trepidation a system that
attempted to function without providing disputants with resort to
lawyers to represent competing interests, as well as judges to
mediate and compel decisions that serve to resolve otherwise
endless disputes:
[L]aw and litigation have their darker side. The legal pro-
cess can be threatening, inaccessible, and exorbitant-usu-
ally it is all of these for the least powerful people in society.
It is more likely to sustain domination than to equalize
power. Litigation expresses a chilling, Hobbesian vision of
human nature. It accentuates hostility, not trust. Selfish-
ness supplants generosity. Truth is shaded by dissembling.
Once an adversarial framework is in place, it supports com-
petitive aggression to the exclusion of reciprocity and
empathy. 117
Among the most critical of the factors is the consequence of
using what I am calling "dark skills" to achieve the client's goals.
Use of a metaphor of darkness as neutral or positive rather than
representative of something invariably evil has proved difficult.
It has sometimes felt as if there were an invisible shield around
the concept of "dark" skills that caused my mind to slide around
it rather than directly grasp the full meaning. Yet, I am con-
vinced that in the multi-dimensional world of the kind lawyers
experience, the darkness metaphor is a vital step to learning who
we are. I contrast the power and richness of the interacting com-
binations of light and dark-often, but not always falling into
patterns of "light" ends and "dark" means-with the much more
ethereal and simplistic world of the rarified ideal which is so
117. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW?, supra note 25, at vii.
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unattainable that it is an "impossible dream" that can exist only
when out of touch with the real.11
Consider, for example, Machiavelli's observation that the
individual must be cunning and deceptive, and that the prince
must combine the talents of beast and man in order to survive in
a harsh and deceptive world:
One must be a fox in order to recognize traps, and a lion
to frighten off wolves. Those who simply act like lions are
stupid.... [A] prudent ruler cannot, and must not, hon-
our his word when it places him at a disadvantage.... If all
men were good, this precept would not be good; but
because men are wretched creatures who would not keep
their word to you, you need not keep your word to
them.
1 9
Machiavelli continues: "[O]ne must know how to colour
one's actions and to be a great liar and deceiver. '120 And that
the prince, "should appear to be compassionate, faithful to his
word, kind, guileless, and devout. And indeed he should be so.
But his disposition should be such that, if he needs to be the
opposite, he knows how."
12 1
Machiavelli recognized that certain positions demanded
behaviors that might harm the reputation of the individual while
benefiting the community. Lawyers are made Machiavellians by
the terms of our professional oath, and by the realities of dispute
resolution. Many of the ends we seek-either directly for our
clients or indirectly for the integrity of our political system-do
justify the means we use, and those means are inevitably manipu-
lative. The result is what Thomas Shaffer has termed "compro-
mised morality."'
122
118. See BOORSTIN, supra note 40, at 60 ("Have we been doomed to make
our dreams into illusions?... An illusion ... is an image we have mistaken for
reality. We cannot reach for it, aspire to it, or be exhilarated by it; for we live in
it. It is prosaic because we cannot see it is not fact.").
119. NICCoLo MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 99 (George Bull trans., 1961).
One might hope that the angels would be found in government service, but
reality contradicts that piece of wishful thinking. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note
71.
120. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 119, at 99. Machiavelli tends to be misun-
derstood and certainly undervalued as a thinker and strategist relevant to our
time. See, e.g., MICHAEL LEDEEN, WHY MACHIAVELLI'S IRON RULES ARE AS TIMELY
AND IMPORTANT TODAY AS FIvE CENTURIES AGO (1999).
121. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 119, at 99.
122. SHAFFER, supra note 15, at 83.
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B. The Culture Defines the Lawyer, Not the Reverse
We are created by what we do, not by our utterance of moral
platitudes-no matter how lofty. Caroline Whitbeck has traced
the growing realization among ethical philosophers that moral
rules must be tied to the context within which we function rather
than left to float as abstractions in a sea of general theory.12 3
Camus reminds us of the dangers of relying on overblown ideal-
izations and urges on us the importance of understanding the
functional limits to our human capabilities. He warns of the
inevitability of personal and political failure unless we become
more aware of the realistic extent of our power and devise realis-
tic strategies and behaviors that allow us to be effective in our
actions: "There does exist for man .. .a way of acting and of
thinking which is possible on the level of moderation to which he
belongs. Every undertaking that is more ambitious than this
proves to be contradictory.
124
I argue that Camus and Whitbeck offer a vital reminder of
the need to be affirmative but realistic-or at least what I have
always called pragmatically idealistic-in defining the system of
moral obligation to which we lawyers owe allegiance. The cul-
ture of law practice works according to a specific set of rules and
values, and the culture of law practice defines us far more than
we do it. Professional responsibility and morality simply can not
be usefully understood when left abstract or cut adrift from the
context within which we act. And one of the aims in this essay is
to describe several of the most compelling aspects of law practice
that combine to create the culture that shapes the soul of the
American lawyer.
The effects of the culture of law practice and our use of dark
skills are inescapable. Hannah Arendt tells us that we are mani-
fested through our acts, which-for lawyers-will often mean we
become manifest through our words because to a great extent
our words are our acts. Arendt describes the connection
between our acting and speaking:
123. See CAROLINE WHITBECK, PROBLEMS AND CASES: NEW DIRECTIONS IN
ETHICS (1996).
124. ALBERT CAMUS, THE REBEL 303 (Anthony Bower trans., 1956).
Camus reminds us of the limits to our human capabilities:
Politics is not religion. Or if it is, then it is nothing but the Inquisition
.... Even by his greatest effort man can only propose to diminish
arithmetically the sufferings of the world. But the injustice and the
suffering of the world will remain and, no matter how limited they are,
they will not cease to be an outrage.
20001
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In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal
actively their unique personal identities and thus make
their appearance in the human world, while their physical
identities appear without any activity of their own in the
unique shape of the body and sound of the voice. This
disclosure of "who" in contradistinction to "what" some-
body is-his qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings,
which he may display or hide-is implicit in everything
somebody says or does.'
25
This thought runs together with the observation by Ruth
Anshen that humans are linguistic constructs. 126 The issue then
becomes that of if humans are language in the way Anshen sug-
gests, and the lawyer language is in large part one of deception
and manipulation-then a lawyer is something very different
from a person constructed of a different "language act."
While the degree and nature of how our acts define us
depends in part on the individual person, as well as the exper-
iences and types of practice in which the lawyer works and the
institutions dealt with, we are all affected to some extent. If you
lie too much, you become a liar. If you argue too much, you
become an arguer. If you deceive too much, you become a
deceiver. And if you seek out others' weaknesses and use them
against them to achieve your goals, you are a lawyer. We deceive,
we argue, we seek to undermine, and we use the advocate's skills
to persuade. These behaviors are inevitable even though we
attempt to pretend they are not. They represent what lawyers are
required by oath to do for their clients and they define who we
are. Nor are these intrinsic moral problems of the lawyer's life of
recent vintage. In words that must penetrate the lawyer's soul,
Plato described the consequences he perceived as becoming
manifested in the personality of those who practice law:
[The lawyer] has become keen and shrewd; he has learned
how to flatter his master in word and indulge him in deed;
but his soul is small and unrighteous ... from the first he
has practiced deception and retaliation, and has become
stunted and warped. And so he has passed out of youth
125. ARENDT, supra note 105, at 159.
126. The lawyer is caught between two fundamental opposites-the lan-
guage of ambiguity and the language of ultra-specialized and detailed tech-
nique. Neither contributes to in-depth understanding of principle or moral
substance. Each is a language of power, control, and manipulation depending
on the particular goals being sought. See McLuHAN, supra note 23, at 276 (quot-
ing Ruth Anshen, "For man is that being on earth who does not have language.
Man is language.") (emphasis added).
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into manhood, having no soundness in him; and is now, as
he thinks, a master in wisdom.
1 2 7
Plato's description strikes close to the heart of lawyers. We
do practice deception, we do flatter when it is to our clients'
advantage, and we are necessarily keen and shrewd if we are at all
effective in what we do for our clients. But have we "passed from
youth into [our maturity] having no soundness" to us? This
strikes me as a profound accusation, and one that must be
addressed honestly to assess its truth. Certainly it would be very
easy for lawyers to be nothing else but the pathetic and con-
temptible creatures Plato describes-beings in possession of
power and some degree of influence but full of conceit and
empty of soul. In fact many lawyers seem to fit the description
far too well. This is not surprising because the dark skills are
sources of power for those who exercise them.
C. Power Disconnected from Principle Inevitably Corrupts
As with all power, the dark skills possess no intrinsic morality
of their own and are subject to being abused while corrupting
the person who uses them. Power, without a firm grounding in
principle, makes us like the soulless golem, that in Jewish folklore
had to be destroyed because it lacked a soul to give it the ability
to know the difference between good and evil.' 28 Power is at the
core of what lawyers do and must be grounded in principle in
order to at least mitigate its abuse. Whether a lawyer engages in
a diverse civil, criminal, administrative, and political practice or
specializes in a more limited field, the nature of the professional
process offers numerous situations with questionable moral
options. Lord Acton's insight that "all power tends to corrupt,
and absolute power corrupts absolutely" is particularly applicable
to law practice.
129
Acton's warning about the consequences of wielding power
is central to this essay because unaccountable and invisibly exer-
cised power over the lives of others is at the core of what lawyers
do. But the situation is not so inevitably bleak as Acton's idea of
127. MAYER, supra note 11, at 4 (quoting Plato).
128. Most people may be more familiar with the concept of the golem
than they realize. In J. R. R. Tolkien's book, The Hobbit, and subsequent Ring
Trilogy, the sad and vicious creature who chased Frodo in order to recover the
ring of power continually muttered "gollum" to the extent that Frodo began to
refer to him in that way. The ring he called "his precious" was one of power
linked to the Dark Lord, and its use affected those who activated it to such a
degree that it incrementally seduced them and stole their souls.
129. WORLD TREASURY, supra note 116, at 100 (stated in a letter from Lord
Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton, dated April 5, 1881).
2000]
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corruption suggests. There are different kinds of power and they
generate different outcomes. Rollo May describes some of
power's diverse qualities:
In Nietzsche's proclamation of the "will to power," it is
important that we remind ourselves that he meant neither
"will" nor "power" in the competitive sense of the modem
day, but rather self-realization and self-actualization. If we
are freed from thinking of power only in the pejorative
sense, we are better able to agree with Nietzsche.
130
He continues: "Indeed, the chief reason people refuse to
confront the whole issue of power is that if they did, they would
have to face their own powerlessness."' 31 For lawyers, the exer-
cise of power is absolutely inevitable-and is something for
which we have no preparation to guide our use. But it is the
principled exercise of power that we are seeking to understand,
and part of this requires an understanding and acceptance of
who we are as people.
The problem with lawyers and power derives in large part
from the invisibility of what lawyers do on behalf of clients, and
their general lack of accountability. Here, I am using the lack of
accountability in a way that highlights the lawyer's work as abus-
ing the responsibility to the client by not doing what is needed.
This is distinct from the "principle of non-accountability" for
which Luban cites Murray Schwartz.' 32 Schwartz's principle
stands for the proposition that lawyers acting in their clients'
behalf are not accountable to those other interests they harm in
order to legally advantage their own clients. This principle is one
of responsible law practice rather than being able to escape
accountability to one's client even though you have done a sub-
standard job. Consider, for example, the lawyer's accountability
in the following situations:
[C]harges were dropped against a man who had been on
death row for a 1985 murder-rape. DNA evidence cleared
Ronald Jones, who became the 12th death row inmate to
be freed since capital punishment was reinstated in Illinois
in 1977.
And in April, ajudge acquitted a 16-year-old boy who
spent more than a year behind bars awaiting trial for mur-
der. The teenager had confessed to stabbing a woman
who, it turns out, was never stabbed at all. The judge sug-
130. ROLLO MAY, POWER AND INNOCENCE: A SEARCH FOR THE SOURCES OF
VIOLENCE 21 (1972).
131. Id.
132. See Luban, supra note 24.
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gested that the zeal of police and prosecutors clouded
their judgment."'
Such all-too-common events are only the tip of the iceberg.
Virtually all of what lawyers do is invisible from the perspective of
the client and of the formal institutions of the bar and govern-
ment. In this invisible system the duty to provide zealous and
competent advocacy is continually betrayed by the reality of the
legal system. In fact, much of the nation's dispute resolution sys-
tem is designed to function in ways that reward half-hearted
efforts on a client's behalf and even punish zealous advocacy.
Even if that were not the case, few clients can afford the cost of a
private attorney's fully zealous representation. Zealousness,
therefore, becomes the luxury of the law firm representing a
wealthy client, the government attorney who has the power of
the state or federal government behind him, or the personal
injury lawyer who has her sights on a "deep pocket" defendant
and is already supported by a substantial litigation budget. For
most private lawyers, zealousness-defined as the ability, time,
and resources required to see a contested matter through-is
only a dream.
In such a context, the standards of quality and commitment
we profess to meet on our clients' behalf are far beyond the level
at which we actually perform. Lawyers are, however, hidden in
the shadows of their offices, well away from the oversight of their
clients. Not being visible, not being monitored, having enor-
mous discretion, practicing the "mysteries" of law, operating in
an environment characterized by extremely weak systems of over-
sight and accountability, and with little probability of being
caught-is a powerful recipe for professional irresponsibility. In
such a context, as one philosopher has told us: "Power can be
invested with a sense of direction only by moral principles. It is
the function of morality to command the use of power, to forbid
it, to limit it. "134 Lawyers possess a great degree of power over
their clients' welfare, but very little principle and almost no real
accountability. Power both enables and corrupts, and many of
the most troubling issues within professional responsibility relate
to the use and abuse of power that is not anchored in principle.
Few of us know how to handle power well, and if we are not held
to a strong standard of performance we, like flowing water, take
the easiest path.
133. Robinson, supra note 71, at A8.
134. WORLD TREASURY, supra note 116 (quoting John Courtney Murray).
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D. The Lawyer is the Client's Instrumentality
It is impossible to understand the morality of the lawyer and
legal profession outside the context of law practice. Of course
part of this context is created by the function of lawyers in soci-
ety, the goals sought by clients, the values of general society from
which lawyers emerge, and the institutional demands placed on
lawyers by employers and legal constructs. But the understand-
ing of the culture of law practice begins with the awareness that
much of what we do as lawyers requires working with situations in
which our clients have been harmed, will be harmed, fear being
harmed, want to harm, or at least get even in some way with
other people they feel have hurt or offended them.
135
Law practice involves dealing with people who want to come
out ahead on a bargain, or make more money at the expense of
the persons against whom they are negotiating. Lawyers work
with and against people who are in conflict and/or seeking to
avoid responsibility for past, present, or future actions. This
doesn't mean a client's goals are unjust or undeserved. But for
most lawyers the answer to such questions doesn't matter. Simp-
son defense team lawyer Gerald Uelman states:
Our purpose was to employ every advantage the law per-
mits to enhance the prospects of our client's acquittal.
Our purpose was to utilize every device and stratagem the
law allows to weaken and discredit the prosecution's case.
The vindication of our client was the beginning, the end,
and the substance of our every effort. Anything less would
have been a violation of our ethical responsibility to faith-
fully perform the duties of an attorney-at-law.136
135. See AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHoUr LAW?, supra note 25 (explaining the
current approach in American society as one involving continual game playing
and maneuvering for competitive advantage). Eulau and Sprague liken the law-
yer to the people's tribune. See HEINz EuLAU &JOHN SPRAGUE, LAWYERS IN POLI-
TICS: A STUDY IN PROFESSIONAL CONVERGENCE 96 (1984):
Of the roles that were identified . . . as peculiarly characteristic of
advocacy, one was characterized as "tribune." The tribune is the peo-
ple's advocate in the political domain. The role is historically rooted
in the representative's function to fight the people's battle against the
Crown.... The lawyer as advocate and the politician as tribune are
roles that seem to be functionally equivalent.
136. Albert W. Alschuler, How to Win the Trial of the Century: The Ethics of
Lord Brougham and the OJ Simpson Defense Team, 29 McGEORGE L. REV. 291, 293
(1998) (quoting Gerald Uelman); cf. Janeen Kerper & Gary L. Stuart, Rambo
Bites the Dust: Current Trends in Deposition Ethics, 22 J. LEGAL PROF. 103 (1998);
Harry I. Subin, The Lauyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidence to Prevent
Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1091 (1985). See also Charles B. Rosenberg, The Law After
0.1., A.B.A. J., June 1995, at 72 (indicating that some of the fallout from the
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Uelman's statement as to his duty helps make clear that we
are servants of Machiavelli's prince. Our client is our primary
sovereign, and we take a solemn oath to work on our sovereign's
behalf within the limits of the law.' 3 7 Of course there are other
allegiances, including those to self, general society, and the legal
system. But those allegiances are of a thinner character than that
owed to our client. This fact has become clouded in a dialogue
where many are seeking intuitively to avoid the commitment that
becoming a lawyer imposes on those who accept the responsibil-
ity for a client's wellbeing.' 3 8 Acceptance of responsibility for
another's fate does not necessarily mean one likes the person or
institution being represented, or that the lawyer agrees with the
client's agenda. One lawyer comments in words that could be
public's exposure to the O.J. criminal trial include doubts about the fairness
and efficiency of the criminal justice system; the perception that justice can be
bought; the awareness that lawyers on both sides are engaged in "tricky behav-
ior," and the jury system is flawed). Rosenberg writes:
[Viewers' comments indicate] that most people do not understand the
adversary system. Or at least they do not understand that, within cer-
tain ethical boundaries, lawyers are permitted or even required to
advance arguments for their clients even though the arguments may
be less than fully persuasive.
Indeed, many people seem to view the justice system as a pristine
search for truth, where lawyers on both sides ought to serve as assistant
truth seekers. Many people's comments appear to suggest that they
would be more comfortable, at least in theory, with an inquisitorial
system based on the European model.
Id. at 74.
137. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
138. As to that obligation, see Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The
Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
Being a professional friend is far from easy in many instances. The business
world that provides some of law firms' most powerful and lucrative clients has
its own problems with achieving ethical behavior. Increasing attention has
been paid in business schools to the development of business ethics. See Wil-
liam Bole, Excesses Shame Business, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 10, 1991, at 6E;
William Briggs & Thomas Bernal, Validating the Code of Ethics; International Associ-
ation of Business Communicators' Code of Ethics, COMM. WORLD 40 (May, 1992);
Charles M. A. Clark, Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Business,
REV. Bus., Mar. 22, 1994, at 41 (book review); Tenisha Mercer, Evaluating Val-
ues: Biz Schools Make Students Think About Ethics of Their Actions, CRAINE'S DETROIT
Bus., Aug. 4, 1997, at 9; Edward Schumacher, 49% of Americans Polled Say Busi-
nessmen Less Ethica WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1977 at C8; Max M. Thomas, Class-
room Conundrum: Profits + Ehics = ?, Bus. MONTH, Feb., 1990, at 6; HarryJ. Van
Buren III, Business Ethics for the New Millenium, Bus. & Soc'v REv., Mar. 22, 1995,
at 51; Patricia H. Werhane & HenryJ. Wirtenberger, The Business of Ethics, HARv.
Bus. REV. Nov.-Dec., 1993, at 198; John Wilcox, The Ethics of Business Face Chal-
lenge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1982, 11 at 18; Art Wolfe, We've Had Enough Business
Ethics, Bus. HORIZONS, May, 1993, at 1; How to Be Ethical, and Still Come [Out on?]
Top, THE ECONOMIST, June 5, 1993, at 71.
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uttered by a majority of attorneys: "After a while, . . . the lawyer
grows cynical, coming to believe that clients are not friends but
enemies. Not only do you not want to become their champion,
you don't believe a word they say."
1 3 9
Lawyers are others' instruments of action in matters that fall
within their sphere of professional knowledge and responsibility.
Part of the moral angst lawyers feel is the unwillingness to accept
the fact of their instrumental nature. This operates on at least
two distinct levels. One is the dislike of anyone having the ability
to control your actions-essentially giving up a part of your inde-
pendence in service to another. While this is an increasing obsta-
cle in a culture preoccupied with self, a distinct but serious issue
is also created when the client needs the lawyer to do something
that violates the lawyer's sense of right and wrong. This obviously
depends on the type of issue and behavior involved on the cli-
ent's part and on what the lawyer would have to do.
Dealing with this situation may be more difficult at this point
in our history than ever before because our general culture has
elevated one's individual preferences and wants to a level of
semi-divine importance that trumps almost any other relation-
ship. The problem with this admittedly discordant proposition
that the lawyer is the client's instrumentality of action, for those
who prefer neater moral systems than the one I am suggesting, is
that lawyers often operate in a zero-sum situation in which one
client's good is the opposing client's bad. 4° A critical distinction
between lawyers and other helping professions is that much of
lawyers' work tends to be in a zero-sum context where, by achiev-
ing specific justice for our client, we deprive another of justice
either as an intended consequence or an inevitable side-effect.'
This, however, is consistent with the nature of the American
adversary system and the responsibility of the lawyer within it.
Mayer describes the system's essence:
139. Eisler, supra note 88, at 128 ("Putting your divorce in the hands of
an honest counselor-at-law isn't easy. Divorce lawyers, as a class, have earned a
dismal reputation.").
140. For a detailed discussion of "burnout" and "compassion fatigue,"
see Anne Ferguson, Career Burnout: Causes and Cures, MGMT. TODAY, July 1989, at
122.
141. Our clients often want something just because the opponent has it,
or aren't even aware of their best interests because they are operating under
stress and in the short term. We often think only in economic terms, but must
include the other "coinage" of value to our clients and our opponents. This is
often money or freedom, but the desire for vengeance, dignity, power, fair
treatment and so forth are powerful motivators. If a client desires a certain
kind of outcome, our responsibility is to try to achieve that end for that per-
son-with some limits obviously.
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[U] nder an adversary system of law the lawyer is not sup-
posed to see the resolution of these disputes as a question
of what might be best for the society as a whole. He is an
advocate; his function is to see the possible resolution of a
controversy in terms of his client's best interests (though
he is not obliged to accept his client's view of what these
best interests may be). Nobody knows, anyway, what might
be best for society; such knowledge can come, if at all, only
a fortiori, after the dispute has played itself out, rather
than a priori, as part of the terms of reference.
1 4 2
The fact that we can argue lawyers are required to be their
clients' advocate and as part of that responsibility are not
required, obligated or even much permitted to focus on consid-
erations that are not in their clients' interests does not mean law-
yers are ignorant or oblivious to the effects of what they or their
clients do to others. While there are numerous methods for
rationalizing, ignoring, or obscuring those inevitable direct and
secondary effects of what they do, that does not mean lawyers can
escape a sense of moral accountability for the consequences.
The tendency to cause harm when being a successful advocate-
and I do include counseling within advocacy-makes the conflict
worse for us than for other professions. The rules are that in the
competition to gain advantage in what lawyers and clients tend to
see as a zero-sum environment where material desires and power
dominate, we are responsible for our client, and someone else is
responsible for the "good" of other clients. This sounds terrible
in some ways-but within limits it is the best way for the system to
work out its disputes. Otherwise, there is an impossible blurring
in which perceived obligations to "society," "future generations,"
the "opposing client," "the other lawyer," and so on-conflict
with the clarity of our obligation to our client.
14 3
This point can easily be taken too far as a rationalization of
what lawyers do, but it is a strong principle for grounding the
lawyer's actions. The burden should not be on the legal advo-
cate to make what are in fact society's political and policy judg-
ments at their clients' expense. In any event, in most situations
where the calculus of social good is operating on a grand scale,
there are a variety of legitimate positions being advocated by
competing or inconsistent interests. Imposing some form of
unguided and amorphous responsibility on the legal advocate
requiring the subordination of one position to another would
142. MAYER, supra note 11, at 76.
143. See, e.g., id. ("we really can't know what is good for general society
anyway").
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destroy the adversary system and that would also be a profound
social decision with enormous impact. This is why Lord
Brougham described his responsibility as one to his client rather
than to England, recognizing that the adversary system was cre-
ated to benefit the country by ensuring the ability to stand up to
abuses of power.
144
There could of course be situations described in which a law-
yer should put others' interests ahead of the client's. One of
these is already covered by the rules of ethics-involving the
right to disclose a client's intention to harm someone in the
future.145 I have absolutely no problem with this and even might
create it as more of a duty than the privilege to go outside the
limits of confidentiality as the responsibility is currently struc-
tured. But even this just tends to show the reality of the system,
one where major corporate clients are counseled about behav-
iors that will unquestionably result in harm to large numbers of
people in the future and while some lawyers might suggest other
paths that eliminate or reduce harm, few would question that if
the client desires a particular action the lawyer very quickly con-
centrates on advising how it can be achieved with the least expo-
sure and risk for the client. Nor is the lawyer going to
144. Henry, Lord Brougham, acting as counsel for Queen Caroline in
1820, described the role of the advocate:
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all
the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all
means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons,
and amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty....
MELLINKOFF, supra note 1, at 189 (quoting Lord Brougham). As I have sug-
gested, while Queen Caroline might have the resources needed to fund such
zealous advocacy, very few people can actually afford the ideal of the advocate.
There is a shortage of the effective advocates and resources required to make
this system work as it is theoretically designed. The solution is not to give up
and try to pretend we are something other than we are, but to expand the
quality and availability of advocates as a balance against the advocacy of those
who can afford the best lawyers.
145. Model Rule 1.6 contains a privilege by which the lawyer can reveal
information confidentially gained from the client in order to prevent serious
future harm to another. Traditionally the exception was something the lawyer
could do but was in no way required to do. At present, the system is shifting
more toward an expectation of the lawyer revealing privileged information if
there is a threat of significant harm. Take as an example the possibility that a
future defendant in the Oklahoma City bombing case came to a lawyer and in
some way revealed his plan to blow up the federal building. Assuming the law-
yer believed him, is he entitled to reveal the information? The answer is yes,
but how much of it, how detailed, how close to enough to identify his client,
and how serious must the potential harm be? For a state-by-state analysis of how
confusing this rule is in operation, see 1999 STANDARDS, supra note 14, at app.
A.
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demonstrate "disloyalty" to the client by reporting the planned
behavior in a way that might result in protecting those who
would otherwise be harmed. Again, the clever distinction
between the lawyer as counselor and as advocate helps protect
the lawyer.
Being another's instrumentality can, and often does, exact a
heavy price. It has been described as the price of conflict
between personal values and a client's interests:
[F]ew attorneys admit to what is for many of them an
equally important source of discontent: hypocrisy. The
hypocrites are the lawyers in the elite firms who think of
themselves as liberals. Not surprisingly, these lawyers use
their lavish salaries to make sizable donations to various
left-of-center groups, such as the American Civil Liberties
Union, the National Organization for Women and the
environmentalist organization Greenpeace. But how do
these self-described liberals get the huge salaries from
which the huge contributions are made? They defend oil
shippers whose spills have poisoned pristine ecosystems,
companies that like to keep the "girls" below the glass ceil-
ing, and school districts that dismiss gay, lesbian or HIV-
positive teachers. However "neutral" most firms' work may
be, sooner or later "liberal" lawyers learn not to think twice
about representing clients whom they consider politically
incorrect. I even know a lawyer who has, in a single day,
written a brief opposing a suit by the Natural Resources
Defense Council, and then gone home to renew his NRDC
membership. 146
E. An Unhealthy Profession? The Prevalence of Burnout and Abuse
There are consequences of such an instrumentalist system
for lawyers who inevitably live the terms of a quasi-Faustian bar-
gain. Understanding the quality of those consequences requires
a deep awareness of the nature of the legal system in America,
developed in the context of the skills lawyers must use. It also
requires an awareness of these considerations in accord with the
146. Lyskowski, supra note 24, at A19. There obviously is some hypocrisy
present, but the interesting point is that the conflicted liberals described in the
quote are making some accommodation to their situation and are attempting
to do their job professionally and live their lives responsibly as professionals. It
is hypocrisy-but that isn't necessarily nearly as bad as we generally think. In
other words, the conflicted liberals are doing a whole lot better than is sug-
gested. Part of my princes of darkness argument is that they should understand
that they have to develop coping mechanisms for a life that imposes inherently
incompatible responsibilities.
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values, dynamics, incentives, and structure of the culture of law
practice. While the cumulative effect of the contract between
lawyers, clients and society in many ways creates significant goods
for a disputatious society that would otherwise be unable to
resolve its fundamental disagreements-it also generates signifi-
cant bads for the specific individuals who lose out in the adver-
sary process.
1 47
Hazel Johnson observes that "[i]n an ever-changing legal
world, it has become more difficult than ever before to find 'hap-
piness' in lawyering." 148 Beck concluded:
The dangers of psychological distress among members of
the legal profession arise, at least in part, from two of the
very elements that are traditionally associated with effective
litigation strategy-directed anger and hostility. Both of
these factors may often be counter-productive to one's
overall well-being. Posed differently, the environment sur-
rounding lawyers is conducive to the creation of substantial
psychological distress.'4 9
Other scholars have analyzed the characteristics and person-
alities of lawyers-including those who enter law school and the
effects of the educational process.
15 0
Working to achieve a client's good in a helping relationship
would seem to offer a formula for emotional wellbeing and satis-
faction rather than disillusionment, "burnout," and moral crisis.
Aristotle, for example, described justice as the highest virtue pre-
cisely because the doer of justice seeks to achieve benefit for
others, rather than self.15 1 It can easily be said that lawyers fill
147. See Goldberg, supra note 38 and sources cited therein. See also
Anthony Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J.
955, 959, 964 (1981):
The most important skill the law teacher imparts is the skill of advo-
cacy.... [The problem is that, t]he indifference to truth that all advo-
cacy entails is likely.., to affect the character of one who practices the
craft for a long time and in a studied way.
148. Hazel L. Johnson, Life, Law and the Pursuit of Balance: A Lawyer's
Guide to Quality of Life, L. PRAC. MGMT., Nov./Dec. 1997, at 60 (book review).
149. Beck et al., infra note 209, at 2.
150. See Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research
on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1337 (1997);
Kenneth Lasson, Lauyering Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Fees and Justice, 74 B.U.
L. RiEv. 723 (1994).
151. Aristotle says:
Justice is often thought to be the greatest of virtues .... And it is
complete virtue in its fullest sense, because it is the actual exercise of
complete virtue. It is complete because he who possesses it can exer-
cise his virtue not only in himself but towards his neighbor also ....
For this same reason justice, alone of the virtues, is thought to be
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this role of helping others. So why is the legal profession in such
a state of self-doubt and moral condemnation? It cannot be as
simple as the fact that clients often want things with which their
lawyers do not agree. The lawyer's obligation is to use his or her
professional talents on the client's behalf to achieve the client's
wishes, not to advance the lawyer's. This submergence of self in
another's interest is at the heart of the lawyer's oath-bound obli-
gation. Not all people can accept this obligation. Few are
trained to understand it or to understand its necessary limits.
They may go too far and sell their soul, or not far enough and
betray their client.
Others find they can achieve the required subordination of
self-interest in some kinds of situations and with some types of
clients but not with others. In many instances the conflicts
between the lawyer's values and the clients and their goals are
subtle and incremental without any obvious signs. The lawyer's
experiences build up over time, and the lawyer comes only very
slowly to realize how the experiences are changing his or her per-
sonal identity. This realization can result in a moral crisis that
brings a spiritual erosion after a lengthy period of law practice.
By that point, however, it is too late and most lawyers are already
trapped in the particular practice environment that creates the
problems and lack effective options for escape.
The problems many lawyers experience arise from the diffi-
culty we face in compartmentalizing our personal moral selves,
and the depersonalization and other costs involved in objecti-
fying or dehumanizing opposing clients, as well as the innocent
casualties of the professional actions we undertake on behalf of
our clients. The fact that lawyers serve a vital social purpose does
not and should not fully protect them from the moral impacts of
their actions. The professional obligation does provide some
protection but beneath the professional mask many lawyers
struggle with the fundamental conflict created by the act of
doing-harm-through-doing-good that characterizes much of our
work. Lyskowski's description of conflicted liberals in large law
firms and the hypocrisy they act out in their personal and profes-
sional lives captures some of the pain our failure to understand
the need to balance competing compartments of belief and value
generates within us. We should have little wonder at the stresses
such a complex life can create, particularly for those who are the
most thoughtful, self-aware and compassionate. This is, however,
"another's good," because it is related to our neighbor; for it does
what is advantageous to another, either a ruler or a copartner.
ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, ch. 1 (W.D. Ross ed. & trans., 1925).
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part of the price we pay for being lawyers-and it may even be an
emotionally healthy though likely irresolvable pain. Those who
are not affected by this conflict are often people who are much
too unquestioning in their sense of duty and who go too far for
clients, or people who operate without a real moral dimension to
their character. The lawyers most in danger of what has been
called an "erosion of the spirit" are those most vulnerable
because they possess a soul in the first place.
But it is also important to note that lawyers are not alone.
Practitioners of helping professions other than law also suffer
from what have been called "burnout" and "compassion
fatigue."152 The nature of even the entirely benign "helping"
professions is such that eventually we tend to dehumanize even
our own clients and often reach a condition of emotional and
moral burnout. Bettina Martin states that "the best definition [of
burnout] thus far [is] 'a progressive loss of idealism, energy, and
purpose experienced by people in the helping professions as a
result of their work conditions.'"153 She cites other researchers
in describing the consequences of professionally induced
burnout: "Pines and Kafry . . . identify three stages: physical
fatigue and feeling drained; psychological fatigue with alienation
from clients and work; and spiritual fatigue, which involves self-
doubt. Alienation from clients, and spiritual fatigue, reflect a
loss of commitment and moral center."'
54
The impact of the culture of law practice on each lawyer
depends in part on the character, values, vulnerability and resili-
ence of the specific individual-and on the intensity and type of
law practice. The conditions of a particular practice, the charac-
teristics of individual lawyers, and the types of cases and clients
dealt with are all part of the environment from which the "stuff'
is created. Different types of law practice will have different
effects. Even with the varying qualities of practice, lawyer distress
is widespread.
Law practice is not monolithic. It can be thought of in
much the same way as the functional structure of medical serv-
ices. In medicine we find generalists, diagnosticians, surgeons,
family practice, lab support, hospitals, outpatient treatment, sys-
temic diseases, emergency care, trauma, stabilization, chronic
diseases, incurable diseases, aging problems, structural, dietary,
digestive, brain, speech, hospices, wellness and homeopathic
152. See Ferguson, supra note 140.
153. Bettina G. Martin, Burnout in the Lab: Symptoms, Stages, Strategies, MED.
LABORATORY OBS., Mar. 1986, at 26.
154. Id.
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approaches. Each function requires a different kind of approach
and each contains within it different levels of experience and
intensity that will lead to distinct impacts on those who perform a
particular function. Emergency room doctors and nurses and
those working in trauma centers find themselves subject to a
unique and pressurized environment that requires special skills
to handle. Plastic surgeons who do tucks and facelifts presuma-
bly operate under different levels of anxiety than do brain or
heart surgeons.
This may help to provide a sense of the wide variety of prac-
tice structures, problems, functions and services in law prac-
tice.' 55 Similarly, just as with medical personnel, not all lawyers
are affected the same way or to the same degree. Some lawyers
possess a heightened "hardiness" by which they can' better with-
stand the effects of the practice environment.'56
Lawyers possess different degrees of tolerance and hardiness
regarding the kinds of disputes and clients they are either willing
or capable of handling. The degree of the effects of being an
advocate depends on a variety of factors. These include the
kinds of clients and cases dealt with; the institutional structure
within which the lawyer operates, as well as that against which the
lawyer must work on behalf of the client. These institutions also
produce great pressures on those under their control to conform
to rules of behavior. This produces a culture powerful enough to
mold those who practice law into patterns acceptable to legal
institutions and powerful clients.' 57
F. Choosing One's Personal "Mephistopheles"
Much of the thinking about a lawyer's moral responsibility
assumes the lawyer has freedom of choice about which clients to
accept or reject. Such analysis is done in the context of clear
value conflicts between the lawyer's core beliefs-religion, being
pro or anti abortion, representing people who committed terri-
155. The practice of law is not monolithic, either by structure of practice,
clientele, or case-type. See MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 13 and sources cited
therein.
156. See Linda Schwab, Individual Hardiness and Staff Satisfaction, NURSING
ECON., May 15, 1996, at 14 ("There are three dimensions to personal hardiness.
These include (a) a sense of commitment, (b) a perception of control, and (c)
the ability to view change as a challenge.").
157. The nature/nurture debate has never been adequately pursued in
the context of the effects of law practice on lawyers. But the work culture has
great power and ability to affect us over time. Any trial lawyer would immedi-
ately admit that in selecting ajury one of the most important criteria is the work
and resulting experiences of the prospective jurors. Nor does it require a great
period of time in which its effects are felt. See, Beck et al., infra note 209.
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ble crimes-and the potential client's values, agendas or prior or
planned bad acts as seen from the lawyer's perspective. This
analysis places the lawyer, as person, at the center of the equation
and argues that the lawyer's value system trumps the client's
needs. In such a scenario, for example, the Christian lawyer owes
a duty to herself to not represent a pornographer either as a
charged criminal defendant or through serving as a counselor to
assist in the business operation of the "evil scheme" through legal
advice. Similarly, it might be considered morally legitimate-or
even morally essential-to reject a potential client who wants to
picket an abortion clinic because the lawyer is pro-choice.15
While this situation is certainly not unimportant for lawyers
who have complete freedom of choice regarding what clients to
represent, it avoids the far more difficult and much more typical
conflict most lawyers face in law practice. For a variety of legiti-
mate reasons most lawyers' freedom to make value-based choices
of desirable clients grounded on the lawyers' personal beliefs is
either constrained or effectively eliminated by the specific con-
text in which the lawyer is operating. In other words, most law-
yers lack the option of rejecting potential clients or withdrawing
from the service of existing clients because they do not agree
with what the client has done or wants to do. Although my prem-
ise is that even lawyers who represent only those clients with
whom they are in moral accord also use the dark skills in service
of their clients and are shaped by their use, I am also concerned
with those lawyers who find themselves with limited effective
choice over whom they represent.
The ideal situation would of course seem to be one where
the lawyer represents only those clients with whom he or she is in
moral synchronization. That is not even close to how the process
actually works for most lawyers who are part of large organiza-
tions or are "captured" by large organizations due to an eco-
nomic dependency relationship.' 59 Nor is it how the system is
158. See, e.g., Benjamin Allison, A Person or a Lawyer, 72 NoTRE DAME L.
REV. 1723 (1997); Teresa Stanton Collett, Speak No Evil, Seek No Evil, Do No Evil:
Client Selection and Cooperation With Evil 66 FoRDHAM L. Rv. 1339 (1998); Bruce
A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 19 (1997).
159. Insurance companies are attempting to control the private lawyers
who do work for them, by dictating the outcomes of cases rather than the cli-
ents. This has always been a hidden problem of who runs the litigation in
which an insurance company is potentially obligated by contract to an insured,
but the companies are now coming out and publicly demanding control.
One legal battleground across the country that is attracting wide inter-
est here is a fight between lawyers and insurance companies over the
costs of litigation. Some insurance companies have recently begun to
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supposed to work. In any event, there are relatively few legal jobs
in which lawyers have complete control over client selection.
Law firms, government agencies, corporations and other bureau-
cracies-all select clients according to their agendas and criteria
and then assign the legal tasks to the lawyer. The individual law-
yer's freedom of choice in such situations-particularly new law-
yers-is greatly constrained to the point of non-existence. Even
in situations where lawyers operate on a smaller scale of practice,
such as in solo practice or very small firms and where there is no
powerful and controlling institution making the selection deci-
sions, it is increasingly difficult to turn cases away in a competi-
tively harsh environment. 1
6 0
Justice Powell's A.B.A. Committee on Economics of Law
Practice could have had no idea of the monster it was part of
creating and its eventual impact on professionalism. Instead of
creating greater professionalism among lawyers, the committee
helped set in motion a process that has done much to under-
mine the legal profession. The stunning contrast between the
culture of practice existing at the time ofJustice Powell's commit-
tee and the magnitude of the changes in the overall culture and
conditions of law practice that have taken place since the publi-
cation of the Lawyer's Handbook are reflected in its words con-
cerning the potential level of feasible "fee-earning" hours the
audit the way lawyers handle the cases of the insured clients, some-
times requiring advance approval of decisions that have traditionally
been lawyers' alone, like how many depositions to conduct or which
expert witnesses to hire. Although malpractice insurers, for example,
theoretically save money when they do not have to pay verdicts, some
lawyers say insurers sometimes decide that some cases are not worth
the investment required to win. That, the lawyers say, puts them in the
position of being pressured to forfeit the interests of the person they
are defending to satisfy an insurance company that is paying the bills.
Insurance companies argue that they have a right to control litigation
they are subsidizing.
Glaberson, supra note 2. Compare what the insurance companies are seeking
with the requirements of ABA Model Code EC 5-1 in which the lawyer is not
permitted to allow any conflicting loyalties and influences in seeking to advance
her client's interests. See 1999 STANDARDS, supra note 14.
160. See LAWYER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 208. Ralph Nader relates
"The Case of the Black-Balled Lawyer," in which Robert Baker, a medical mal-
practice defense specialist whose firm had represented the medical insurance
establishment for more than twenty years. Baker provided written testimony to
the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives suggesting that
"reform" efforts in California had benefited insurance companies and doctors
but harmed people injured by medical malpractice. Baker and his firm were
then boycotted by insurance companies and Kaiser. See NADER, supra note 16, at
295-98.
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lawyer should take into account in determining the possible
earnings:
There are only approximately 1300 fee-earning hours per
year unless the lawyer works overtime. Many of the 8 hours
per day available for office work are consumed in personal,
civic, bar, religious and political activities, general office
administration and other non-remunerative matters.
Either 5 or 6 remunerative hours per day would be realis-
tic, depending on the habits of the individual lawyer or the
practices of the particular office.
16 1
Compare this 1300 hours with the 2000-2200 billable hours
now typically. required of many law firm associates-which trans-
lates into seventy-eighty hours per week that must actually be
worked to achieve the required level of billable hours. Even sixty
hours per week of work-which is very conservative-for a
period of fifty weeks means the associate is putting in 3000 hours
per year of time to achieve 2000 billable hours. The pressures on
family, emotional well-being, reflective thought, devotion to
doing the highest quality work possible, and other important ele-
ments of a truly professional culture are virtually impossible.
Practice becomes nothing more than a highly stressful rat race
for survival in a Darwinian system.
162
Unsupervised discretion that can be exercised invisibly is
one of the serious problems in law practice. Discretion is power,
and power is easily abused. It was often a problem created by a
lawyer's inadequate skill or professional laziness, but financial
pressures that require shuffling, churning, and mass-production
and standardization of client problems are now having signifi-
cant impacts. Much the same situation is found in the HMO
medical field where the quality of diagnosis and the traditional
caring doctor-patient relationship fall victim to abbreviated con-
sultations and fast turnover of patients. Tough cases require
more time and thought and that gets in the way of profit. It is
worse in the medical area because of the existence of insurance
systems that create the incentives to maximize income by doctors
and large medical corporations while reducing needed treat-
ment services but at the same time expanding testing and labora-
tory services.
161. LAWYER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 287.
162. The lure of the money is incredible for those who are successful. See
Glaberson, supra note 2 ("According to The American Lauyer magazine, the gross
revenues of the country's 100 largest firms more than doubled to $23.1 bil-
lion .... The 1,467 p artners of the largest 13 law firms made annual profits of
more than $1 million per partner.").
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Ideally, each lawyer must understand the limits he or she
must place on the nature of representation so that the lawyer's
essence is protected. Theoretically the advocate must set moral
tolerance level high once the obligation to represent a client is
accepted. The point of moral qualms should precede represen-
tation, not come during the interaction in ways that reduce the
quality of the advocacy provided the client. Of course this is
often not possible when one is only a part of a powerful and self-
interested institution in which such value judgments have already
been made and the lawyer is brought into a pre-existing relation-
ship. Nor is it particularly likely when a lawyer works for a gov-
ernmental bureaucracy or even for a public interest organization
that has an already developed agenda the lawyer is responsible
for advancing. Public and private organizations have lives and
cultures of their own. The new lawyer coming into such a pre-
existing context is not a free agent. The problem between the
ideal and the reality is that most lawyers are thrust into a context
someone else has already created and never face the issue of
what they would do if they were free to make their own screening
and policy decisions. Their freedom of choice is enormously
constrained by institutional choices that predate their involve-
ment or by policy decisions and economics over which they have
little or no control.
This means that serious issues of moral responsibility are far
less likely to be individual decisions under a lawyer's personal
control than some might prefer. The system is a structure and it
has great power. The problem with this from a responsible
moral perspective, is that economic institutions as well as polit-
ical and social ones-lack anything that could fairly be consid-
ered a soul. Those that serve these institutions therefore are in
most instances little more than bureaucratic cogs serving inter-
ests other than their own and rarely anguishing over deep moral
conflicts. In the context of legal institutions the situation is
much the same: "The horrible thing about all legal officials, even
the best, about all judges, magistrates, detectives, and policemen,
is not that they are wicked (some of them are good), not that
they are stupid (some of them are quite intelligent), it is simply
that they have got used to it."'
63
An example of such institutional behavior is readily pro-
vided by the state of Texas. Texans seem to have become very
accustomed to a limited form of criminal justice. Bob Herbert
discusses proposed "reforms" in Texas, reporting: "The state of
Texas is not big on protecting the rights of the accused. And
163. MAYER, supra note 11, at 149 (quoting G. K. Chesterton).
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when it comes to providing lawyers for indigent criminal defend-
ants, it is one of the most backward states in the Union."164 He
offers several examples, including: indigent defendants who lan-
guish in jail for months before a lawyer is appointed to represent
them; the lack of a procedure for the appointment of counsel
before an indictment; a lawyer who failed to present evidence
during the trial that the man was incarcerated at the time he was
supposed to have raped a child; a mentally ill man accused of
punching his grandfather in the arm spent four years in jail
awaiting trial; a man convicted of murder spent ten years on
death row before an attorney investigated his alibi and won his
release.
1 65
Many lawyers love the life of law practice. A recent survey of
law firm partners by The American Lawyer suggests, for example,
that successful partners are at least reasonably happy with their
careers. The survey results highlight contentment with the part-
ners' niche within the legal profession, including their levels of
compensation [a range of $555,000 to nearly $1 million annu-
ally] and the challenging nature of their task.16 6 They typically
found the "rainmaking" function in which they were responsible
for attracting paying clients for their firms, among the least
attractive parts of their responsibilities.' 67
Associates, however, tend to have a very distinct view of the
life and culture found within large law firms. Shaffer reminds us
of "[Stewart's] picture of the associate in a large firm [1983] is
the picture of a lawyer who feels exploited by an amoral if not
corrupt institution."'68 Part of the conflict is seen as generated
by "[t]he failure of a profession to [any longer] be a moral
teacher [and this] seems to show up in one of two ways-as a
failure to aspire and as self-deception."' 69 Although the degree
to which the profession generally ever actually served as a moral
guide for all young lawyers in what is a very diverse profession is
open to question, there does seem to have been a cultural
164. Bob Herbert, Defending the Status Quo, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1999, at
A31.
165. See id. (pointing out that "for some folks in Texas the idea of provid-
ing even minimal constitutional protections for poor defendants is going a step
too far... [, including] George W. Bush").
166. See Partner Survey: The View From the Top, Am. LAw., June 1999, at 79
[hereinafter Partner Survey].
167. See id.
168. SHAFFER, supra note 15, at 137.
169. Id. at 143.
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change that has altered the lawyer's environment in both large
firms and law practice generally.17 °
G. At Grave Risk of Selling Your Soul
"We've got a form of brainwashing going on in our country,"
Morrie sighed. "Do you know how they brainwash people? They
repeat something over and over. And that's what we do in this
country. Owning things is good. More money is good. More
property is good. More commercialism is good. More is good.
More is good. We repeat it-and have it repeated to us-over
and over until nobody bothers to even think otherwise. The
average person is so fogged up by all this, he has no perspective
on what's really important anymore."17
Alexander Hamilton observed that "[a] power over a man's
subsistence amounts to a power over his will."1 72 The likelihood
of a lawyer's soul being bought by clients depends on several fac-
tors. One of course is the degree of inner strength of character
and principle a person possesses in the first instance. An obvious
problem is that principle is most easily exercised in a context that
places few competing demands on the individual. While individ-
ual character is therefore quite important, the context within
170. I say this because the practice of law is a diverse environment. Shaf-
fer, for example, like many of the lawyers who have remarked on the moral role
of the large law firms in past generations, could even be accurate about the
decline in principle and values-based mentoring in those firms, and still be una-
ware of the conditions that had characterized many other forms of law practice
for many years. For descriptions of the differences between types of law prac-
tices, see AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, and MAYER, supra note 11.
See also ABEL, supra note 13 (offering an excellent set of excerpts on many of the
issues, as well as numerous citations to relevant works); JOHN P. HEINZ &
EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR
(1994).
The differences relate to size and profitability of practice, law schools
attended, and even ethnic background. Criminal defense and divorce practice
have long tended to be ranked at the "unsavory" bottom in terms of reputation,
along with personal injury plaintiffs. See MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 13 (pro-
viding very helpful information in its introductory chapter regarding the struc-
ture of law practice; firm size, types of practices, distinct cases, and the
profession's changing demographics); id. at ch. 2 (clarifying the great diversity
of practice structures, including such organizational forms as solo and very
small scale (up to 6 lawyers); middle-sized and large firms; in-house counsel,
government lawyers, legal clinics, prepaid legal service plans, criminal and civil
representation for indigent clients, and new forms of providing legal services).
See also Robert L. Nelson, The Futures of American Lawyers: A Demographic Profile of
a Changing Profession in a Changing Society, 44 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 345 (1994).
171. MITCH ALBOM, TUESDAYS WITH MORRIE 124-25 (1997).
172. WORLD TREASURY, supra note 116, at 748 (quoting THE FEDERALIST
No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton)).
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which we function and the values of that culture are of enormous
importance. The lone individual who thinks he or she is capable
of transcending the environment within which the daily work
unfolds and which offers rewards and incentives for success in
activities that serve its needs, is doomed to fail. That means law-
yers who work in a variety of practice settings are at risk of suc-
cumbing to the amoral and self-interested value systems of the
institutions they serve.
The factors creating that risk relate to such considerations as
financial need, dependency on a limited number of clients for
the income needed to sustain a practice, and dependence on the
continuing "good will" of a category of clients such as insurance
companies who demand loyalty from the lawyers they frequently
retain. Financial dependence buys allegiance, and allegiance
purchased as if the lawyer is an employee is considerably differ-
ent from the kind of allegiance offered in the professional rela-
tionship. The approach to avoiding such dependency
relationships in which the legal professional becomes submerged
in the dependent-employee relationship and dominated by the
client is similar to the concept of diffusion of power that under-
lies the American democracy. The lawyer who is able to build a
relatively diverse "stable" of clients in which their degree of con-
tribution to the particular law practice's well-being is relatively
limited in relation to the scale of practice retains some degree of
ability to act in a manner that would be considered principled.
As a particular client or cluster of clients comes to dominate
the specific practice, the ability to make sound moral and profes-
sional judgments is decreased. Even here there are dangers,
because as with the insurance companies, there is a chance that a
lawyer's principled action will offend a particular client and that
the group of similarly situated clients will decide to punish the
lawyer or firm for "disloyalty." At that point, a lawyer who has
carefully constructed a specialized client base may find it has dis-
appeared overnight.
One of the areas of law practice where clients have great
power over the souls of their lawyers, is in the large-scale corpo-
rate law firms. This heightened impact is produced in large part
because-unlike every other client group in which the lawyer
tends to control the client rather than the reverse dynamic that
characterizes most relationships between client and lawyer-the
financial incentives and enormous power and knowledge of
larger and wealthier corporate clients increases those clients'
ability to corrupt the lawyers and law firms who represent them.
New lawyers become fodder for the machines of the private
employers. I don't know what we in the legal profession can do
HeinOnline  -- 14 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 438 2000
PRINCES OF DARKNESS AND ANGELS OF LIGHT
to change these conditions, but without a change in the use of
institutional power and behavior the rhetoric of independent
professionalism based on the strength of character and values of
the individual lawyer rings hollow.'7 '
The culture of commercialism and its assault on principle
involves not only lawyers but our entire society. This was made
strikingly evident by a recent report involving medical ethics and
the widespread attempts by companies to prevent the dissemina-
tion of research findings that might harm their financial inter-
ests. Hotz reports:
When Dr. Nancy Olivieri at the University of Toronto
wanted to warn patients about the toxic side effects of a
drug she was testing, the company supporting her research
tried to quash her findings, citing a nondisclosure agree-
ment. When she alerted her patients anyway, the company
suspended the clinical trial and canceled her research con-
tract. Even so, she published her misgivings in the New
England Journal of Medicine. The Hospital for Sick Chil-
dren, where she worked, sided with the company and dis-
missed her, triggering an international protest earlier this
year.' 
74
Another researcher suffered a similar fate. It was reported
that when Dr. David Kern, an occupational health specialist at
Brown University, discovered a new and deadly disease at an
industrial facility, the company sought to restrain the findings
through a secrecy agreement. Kern went ahead and reported
the discovery at a professional conference and to the United
States Center for Disease Control. Officials at the hospital where
he worked then announced his contract would be allowed to
lapse, the occupational health program in which he worked was
closed, and his position on the medical school faculty was elimi-
nated. 175 This situation caused a response by a leading scientist:
The commercialization of science has led to a new regimen
of secrecy that is of great concern to the scientific commu-
nity . . .secrecy of an entirely new scope and scale," said
physicist Irving A. Lerch, who is spearheading an effort by
the American Association for the Advancement of Science
to combat the trend.
1 76
173. See Lyskowski, supra note 24 (comments of Geoffrey Hazard).
174. Robert Lee Hotz, Scientific Researchers Irked by Sponsors' Secrecy Clauses,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, May 19, 1999, at 14A.
175. See id.
176. Id.
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Those who become infatuated with the power of the mind-
particularly their own-are the most fertile targets for corrup-
tion. Because they think themselves able to withstand the seduc-
tions of avarice and ego they become its most pathetic victims.
This situation was described decades ago by Jacques Ellul, when
he observed that " [t]he intelligentsia will no longer be a model, a
conscience, or an animating intellectual spirit for the group....
They will be the servants, the most conformist imaginable, of the
instruments of technique." '177 This is what happens in regard to
many lawyers in powerful law firms who think they are annointed
to dispense wisdom to some of the most powerful forces in soci-
ety and that they will somehow be able to overcome the influ-
ences of power and wealth. Instead they become the most
coopted workers in the legal profession.
For lawyers, powerful clients are capable of exercising such a
degree of control over our value systems that it results in stealing
the souls of the lawyers who represent them and who depend on
their continuing largesse and good will. The problem involves a
combination of the desire for security, our need to become part
of a community such as a law firm represents, and fear of rejec-
tion by the primary professional community within which we
work. An important way of ensuring our successful niche within
that community is adopting and absorbing the values, allegiances
and behaviors that are part of that community. Those are power-
ful motivations to become fully absorbed servants of our most
powerful employers.178 One of the problems is that we prize
financial security and status much more than real freedom. Real
freedom is not co-extensive with license. It carries within it a per-
sonal responsibility and accountability that we instinctively avoid.
Peter Berger concludes that "most of the time we ourselves desire
just that which society expects of us. We want to obey the rules.
We want the parts that society has assigned to us."' 7 9
We also become hostages to our careers and the obligations
we owe our families. Obviously, the debt loads we have when we
enter law practice, as well as the burden we assume with mort-
177. ELLUL, supra note 44, at 349. This was also Hexter's point when he
described the "doppleganger" to which all intellectuals were subject-which
was the enormous and seductive attraction to the service of political power and
the inevitable submission of ourselves to advancing its ends rather than those
we knew were the best. See HEXTER, supra note 54.
178. See, e.g., BERGER, infra note 179; supra note 172 and accompanying
text. See also Glaberson, supra note 2 (noting that 1,467 partners in the 13 larg-
est law firms have annual incomes above $1 million); Partner Survey, supra note
166.
179. PETER BERGER, INVITATION TO SOCIOLOGY: A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE
93 (1963).
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gages, spouses, children and lifestyle costs add significantly to the
ability of institutions to own us. But of equal significance is that
most people are not ground breakers or adventurers. Most of us
want to settle into a secure niche and have a decent life.'8 ° Con-
sider the black-balling episode reported by Ralph Nader in which
an entire industry shut off dealings with a firm that had provided
representation for two decades because of the perceived disloy-
alty of honest testimony provided a Congressional committee.,,'
The money involved is too great for law firms or individual law-
yers dependent on the continuation of referrals and retainers on
which their economic survival is based to make waves or fail to
"go along with the program." In a market economy, values are
based on financial considerations.
We profess to admire heroes like Doctors Olivieri and Kern,
who lost their jobs as a result of their principled actions in
reporting medical dangers revealed by their research even
though the private companies attempted to suppress the
results."8 2 But in our system such courage exacts a price in terms
of lost financial opportunities, reputation among colleagues who
are threatened by your values, and career itself. We may write
about such people and admire their courage, but just as with
"whistleblowers" reporting government fraud, we tend to look
the other way when they are shunted to distant outposts or fired
for other reasons. Human institutions-public and private-are
capable of a wide range of inhumane behavior. Consider the
recent report of the "shunning" behavior that is apparently gain-
ing increased prominence in Japanese companies, behavior in
which co-workers participated in the exclusion of the hapless vic-
tim from the work community. "Under extreme pressure to sur-
vive, Japanese companies are relying more and more on a
perverse form of restructuring-bullying and isolating their
workers-at a time when outright layoffs are still unacceptable,
legally cumbersome and expensive."183 One victim reports: "All
my co-workers became cold. They wouldn't greet me. They
refused to talk to me."
1 8 4
180. Compare this with Krishnamurti's observation regarding how we
seek to fit into the comfortable but inhuman world of our parents. See
KRISHNAMURTI, supra note 108.
181. See NADER, supra note 16.
182. See Hotz, supra note 173.
183. See Mark Magnier, Japanese Companies Use Silent Treatment to Force
Workers Out, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, July 25, 1999, at 4A.
184. Id.
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H. Counselor v. Advocate: Which Activity is More Morally Harmful?
In using the concepts of darkness and light I am not equat-
ing what are normally thought of as public interest activities with
"the good," or classifying private representation of "evil" clients
such as tobacco companies with "the bad." '18 5 My central theme
is that all clients are entitled to be represented by good lawyers
who are excellent advocates and provide committed and zealous
representation to their clients. The problem in this society is not
that there are too many good advocates but that there are far too
few and that they are distributed poorly. Lawyers' clients have
often done reprehensible things-or are seeking to do things
that are reprehensible from at least someone's perspective. One
of the most obvious limits lawyers confront is that between help-
ing clients do reprehensible things as opposed to helping them
after they have arguably been caught for doing those things.
185. See Harry Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34 (1992). For sources that touch on
many of the most profound aspects of the conflict between an individual's sys-
tem of values and the nature of the adversary system and its demands, see
Allison, supra note 158; Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role Morality for Lawyers, 51
MD. L. REv. 853 (1992); Robert P. Bums, Legal Ethics in Preparation for Law Prac-
tice, 75 NEB. L. REv. 684 (1996); Collett, supra note 158; Stephen Ellmann, The
Ethic of Care as an Ethicfor Lawyers, 81 GEO. L.J. 2665 (1993);James R. Elkins, The
Moral Labyrinth of Zealous Advocacy, 21 CAP. U. L. REv. 735 (1992); Heidi Li Feld-
man, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers be Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL.
L. REv. 885 (1996); Jennifer A. Freyer, Women Litigators in Search of a Care-Ori-
ented Judicial System, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 199 (1995); Bryant Garth, From
Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at War With the Profession and Its
Values, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 931 (1993); Green, supra note 158; Leslie Griffin, The
Lawyer's Dirty Hands, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 219 (1995); Susan G. Kupfer,
Authentic Legal Practices, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 33 (1996); Robert P. Lawry,
Cross-Examining the Truthful Witness: The Ideal Within the Central Moral Tradition of
Lawyering, 100 DICK. L. REv. 563 (1996); Reed Elizabeth Loder, Moral Truthseek-
ing and the Virtuous Negotiator, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 45 (1994); Reed Elizabeth
Loder, Out of Uncertainty: A Model of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 2 S. CAL. INTER-
DISCIPLINARY L.J. 89 (1993); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in
the Modern Corporation: An Enquiry into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 TEX.
L. REV. 477 (1995); Thomas D. Morgan & Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Representation
in a Pluralist Society, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 984 (1995); Kenneth L. Penegar, The
Five Pillars of Professionalism, 49 U. Pr-r. L. REv. 307 (1988); Robert Eli Rosen,
Ethical Soap: L.A. Law and the Privileging of Character, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1229
(1989); Thomas Shaffer, The Profession as a Moral Teacher, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 195
(1986); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41
VAND. L. REv. 697 (1988); Norman W. Spaulding, The Prophet and the Bureaucrat:
Positional Conflicts in Service Pro Bono Publico, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1395 (1998); Paul
R. Tremblay, Practiced Moral Activism, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 9 (1995); Fred C.
Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1303 (1995).
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This purported dichotomy between the lawyer's role as
counselor and as advocate is, however, often a false or impossibly
gray line. Far more evil is likely to be done when a lawyer is act-
ing as a counselor than as an advocate in litigation. It is perhaps
easiest to draw and recognize the line in the street crime context
such as a robbery or murder when the lawyer comes to the case
only after a specific bad act has been committed. Although many
might consider the criminal defense lawyer to represent one of
the most unsavory aspects of law practice because of the situa-
tions and people dealt with, that situation is actually much
cleaner and more obvious than where the representation is more
a mixture of advocacy and counseling. As tragic and vile as the
person and act might be, the criminal defense lawyer has not
been a part of its commission in any way. This is far less likely to
be the case in corporate practice where the lawyer often plays an
integral role in advising clients how to do things that result in
widespread harm.
It is easy, for example, to determine that a lawyer who helps
a drug lord plan and implement his illegal schemes has gone
beyond what is professionally allowed and is facilitating a crimi-
nal conspiracy. But what about lawyers who council General
Motors that, from an economic and legal perspective, it would be
appropriate to conceal dangers of the placement of a gas tank on
1979 Chevrolet Malibus because the cost of fixing the problem
would be $8 per car while the cost of settlements-once people
were harmed or burned to death-would be slightly more than
$2 per vehicle? 8 ' There is a very thin moral line between one
situation and the other, assuming that when GM's lawyers pro-
vide this advice it is an accepted statistical premise that people
will be harmed in the future due to the failure to recall affected
vehicles. And that is the kind of world within which many lawyers
work.
As to the power and values of the corporate culture and the
demands of its decision-makers for unquestioning loyalty to the
"community," consider the situation described by Bennett S.
LeBow, CEO of the Liggett Group, who broke ranks with other
tobacco CEOs and testified against them in various stages of the
massive tobacco litigation efforts. LeBow described his relation-
186. General Motors was hit with a $4.9 billion verdict in favor of six
plaintiffs who were all badly burned when their 1979 Malibu burst into flames
after being struck in the rear by another car in 1993. The California jury ver-
dict followed a 10 week trial and included $107 million in compensatory dam-
ages and $4.8 billion in punitives. Many lawyers think the verdict will be either
reversed or reduced. See Bob Van Voris, Short Life Seen for Big GM Verdict, NAT'L
L.J., July 26, 1999, at A4.
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ship with the other CEOs as one in which: "They all hate my
guts.... They don't write. They don't send cards. And when
they see me they just walk away."187 LeBow said he hired his own
lawyers rather than use those typically relied on by the industry,
and that his new lawyers discovered that the industry had been
lying and hiding information about tobacco concerning its addic-
tiveness, health effects, and the deliberate targeting of young
people-all areas about which industry representatives had lied
to the public and in the course of Congressional hearings.
188
There are numerous issues in such a situation, including the
fact that some of the lawyers for the offended CEOs were almost
inevitably aware of the cover-ups and may even have facilitated
them as some have suggested. Yet, just as are murderers, rob-
bers, and rapists-tobacco companies are entitled to be repre-
sented by lawyers and are among the kinds of clients with whom
we must deal. They are not, however, entitled to commit perjury,
destroy evidence, or illicitly ruin the lives of those who dare to
oppose them. Yet once becoming part of a culture in direct ser-
vice to such powerful interests, how does the lawyer resist the
pressures to do almost anything asked?
The problem goes considerably beyond the bounds of zeal-
ous advocacy based on professional principle into the Faustian
realm of having sold your soul. Nor should we deceive ourselves
into thinking we can win our bargain with the Devil. One should
always keep in mind Sun Tzu's admonition that "there are some
roads that should not be, taken, some cities that should not be
besieged, and some battles that should not be fought."1 9 In the
same way, once within certain situations, anyone who thinks he
or she is immune from being influenced beyond professional
limits by interactions with such clients and opponents is engag-
ing in self-deception.
187. James F. McCarty, Tobacco CEO Airs Rock-the-boat Views, CLEVELAND
PIIN DEALER, Feb. 26, 1999, at 2B.
188. See id.
189. BARNHIZER, supra note 58, at 73 (quoting Sun Tzu's, The Art of War).
Sun Tzu suggests approaches by the strategist that provide a flavor of how the
legal strategist must act deceptively and in a manipulative manner to achieve
success. "All men can see these tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can
see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved." Id. "In all fighting, the direct
method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed to
secure victory." Id. at 75. "[W]hat enables the wise sovereign and the good
general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary
men, is foreknowledge." Id. "By altering his arrangements and changing his
plans, he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge. By shifting his camp
and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the enemy from anticipating his pur-
pose." Id. at 100.
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The effective performance of the advocate's function
involves the inevitable use of the dark skills of law practice. But,
unlike the example from the tobacco companies in which it
seems almost certain the lawyers sold their souls beyond legiti-
mate professional limits, use of the lawyer's dark skills is not
synonymous with doing anything or with being owned by the cli-
ent. Once the lawyer has gone beyond the exercise of independ-
ent professional judgment on a client's behalf any claim to
principled behavior has disappeared. Even this line is difficult to
recognize and follow in practice in a system based on zealous
representation, but we actually tend to have an intuitive moral
sense that tells us about what is right or wrong in difficult situa-
tions. Our problem is that we tend to be moral cowards who
deny the existence of problems and rationalize away the dilemma
until it is too late. 190 Francis Bacon captured the influence of
wealth on our moral identity:
I cannot call riches better than the baggage of virtue. The
Roman word is better, impedimenta. For as the baggage is
to an army, so is riches to virtue. It cannot be spared nor
left behind, but it hindereth the march; yea, and the care
of it sometimes loseth or disturbeth the victory. Of great
riches there is no real use, except it be in the distribution;
the rest is but conceit.1 9 1
VI. SOME FURTHER IMPACTS OF USING DARK SKiLLS
A. The Dehumanizing Impact of Goal-Oriented Zealousness
Zealousness-including not allowing ourselves to be
deflected from achieving our client's "good" due to concerns for
the effects of our actions on the opposing client or on society
190. See MASLOW, supra note 33 (reminding us that we avoid true knowl-
edge of troubling situations for fear of what that knowledge would require us to
do-or to avoid having to confront our true state of cowardice or helplessness.
It is a form of self-deception in which we all commonly engage). Ernest Becker
has written of the "delicately constituted fiction" of human aspiration in ways
that I suggest apply to our delicately constituted fiction of trials as a search for
truth as opposed to outcome:
The world of human aspiration is largely fictitious and if we do not
understand this we understand nothing about man.... Man's free-
dom is a fabricated freedom, and he pays the price for it. He must at
all times defend the utter fragility of his delicately constituted fiction,
deny its artificiality.
ERNEST BECKER, THE BIRTH AND DEATH OF MEANING 139 (2d ed. 1971). Erving
Goffman would go even farther and suggest that our very selves and everyday
actions are a kind of fiction that we offer to the world. See ERVING GOFFMAN,
THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LirE (1972).
191. BACON, supra note 47, at 92.
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generally-is one of the most difficult aspects of what we do.192
As loyal and zealous advocates, the opponents are almost inevita-
bly dehumanized and tend to become objects, cases, statistics, or
some other "thing" for which we have no moral or professional
responsibility. This is the essence of an adversary system in which
the other is an "opponent," "enemy," or "object" rather than a
person. I note that the increasingly reduced commitment to the
obligation of zealousness that Shaffer has described as occurring
each time the American Bar Association reformulates its princi-
ples of practice, presumably to reflect a "kinder and gentler"
world of disputes, may well be a key factor in accelerating and
justifying a shift toward a view of law practice as a business rather
than a calling.193 Competence by itself is such a low-level ideal
contrasted with zealous representation on a client's behalf, that it
basically trivializes the relationship to a client. What profession
should expect to be taken seriously that proclaims "competence"
as its central tenet? Left unstated, would that mean there was no
obligation to provide competent service to the client or patient?
There must be more. Similarly, placing the fundamental rela-
tionship with the client in a four-part and apparently mutually
equivalent hierarchy of responsibilities such as is done in the
MacCrate Report diminishes and blurs the obligation to the
client.
194
The impact of using the advocate's skills is heightened
because the focused processes and rules of law practice create a
powerful lens that concentrates the effects of the application of
power, manipulation, greed, meaninglessness, ambiguity, coping
with legal institutions operating in ways that contradict and
demean their claims to principle as well as our ability to act in a
principled fashion. This led Strick to conclude:
[T]he goals of winning on one hand and truth on the
other are mutually exclusive, indeed irreconcilable contra-
dictions between which the lawyer is caught-in a flat con-
flict of interest. But in that conflict, winning must take
precedence over truth. Winning . .. is the profession's
"honor, duty, as well as profit.
1 95
192. See 1999 STANDARDS, supra note 14.
193. See SHAFFER, supra note 15.
194. See MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 13.
195. ANNE STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL: How OUR ADVERSARY SYSTEM OF
LAw VIcrIMIZES Us AND SUBVERTS JUSTICE 124 (1977).
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B. Dehumanization Through Technology
Technology creates capabilities but it also alters us and con-
structs new barriers between us. Among those barriers, for peo-
ple who lack inner principles that set limits on activities, is the
reorganization of activity according to the new capabilities that
have been granted. Amazingly complex information and data
management systems have, for example, allowed us to track and
subdivide things into ever more discrete bundles and we have
learned how to package these bundles and charge fees for them.
Information is power and since we can do it, we do it. In a system
whose only principle is money, only fools give things away or
charge less than the "market will bear." This is having a terrible
impact on professionalism, just as assembly lines and Taylorism
had unforeseen dehumanizing effects on people with the rise of
mass production. I don't mean to romanticize, but the carving
up of what we do into increasingly finite "task bits" is undermin-
ing our profession and making it more likely that those who see
law as only a business will win the debate by default.
Health care has been turned into an extremely profitable
but professionally bankrupt set of soulless institutions.16 It is
also undeniable that technology for information acquisition and
management can also be extremely important in overcoming
some of the time management problems in law practice. It can
save money, and help link lawyers working on similar cases into
more efficient problem solving and collaborative networks that
help less economically advantaged clients compete on a more
equal footing with wealthy clients. Technology can help in so
many ways to improve certain aspects of law practice that on bal-
ance it is positive.
Dr. Stephen Harlin warns of the potential harm of a finan-
cially-driven system that possesses great technological capability
and lacks humane values:
196. For insights into the unanticipated consequences of the information
society, see GENE ROCHLIN, TRAPPED IN THE NET: THE UNANTICIPATED CONSE
QUENCES OF COMPUTERIZATION (1997). As our power to manage our lives in
micro-detail increases exponentially, so does others' ability to insist that we use
that power to increase our efficiency and productivity. What is billed as an
incredible technology for human freedom instead becomes one in which free-
dom is lost, intrusiveness is increased beyond imagination, and the human is
further submerged in the technology. Dr. Stephen Harlin, infra note 197 indi-
cates that the rise of HMOs has resulted in an extreme commercialization of
the medical profession and that it was sold as an effort to increase efficiency
and productivity with the espoused purpose of improving the quality of service.
Harlin warns: "Under the guise of cost-efficiency and accountability, dangerous
constraints are being placed upon doctors and their patients." Id.
20001
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But patients are patients; not commodities. Patients need
medical care; not management. The complexity of clinical
reasoning makes it virtually impossible to link medical eth-
ics with business ethics. Conflicting obligations are certain
if clinicians deliberate resource allocation. Physicians have
a moral duty to make clinical decisions based upon the bio-
logical, the empirical, the empathetic, the ethical; not the
fiduciary. Ethical dilemmas in the profession of medicine
have long been inseparable from its practice. Notwith-
standing, recent problems raise extraordinary concerns. A
revised code of ethics now permits third party insurers to
refuse treatment. On behalf of their patients, physicians
have a moral obligation to lodge explicit protest.
1 97
C. A "Tired Wisdom" and Gradual Erosion of the Spirit
One burden of the dark skills is that their effective exercise
demands that the lawyer know things most people prefer to
avoid. This results in the acquisition of knowledge people may
be better off not possessing. For those raised in the Judeo-Chris-
tian tradition, our deepest belief systems emphasize the corrup-
tion of knowledge as a tool of Satan.19 8 Too much experience
and knowledge caused us to be expelled from Eden. If those
who gain too much knowledge are inevitably tainted-particu-
larly in a society where knowledge is power-what can be said
about those who use knowledge to help implement and defend
the plans and schemes of people who are continually seeking to
gain advantage over others or to avoid responsibility for their
actions? Even more morally problematic are those who know the
face of evil and work to advance its ends.
1 99
197. Stephen Harlin, Physician Protest and The Hippocratic Oath, N.Y. TIMES,
June 15, 1996, at A14.
198. In both Christianity and Buddhism, there has long been a split
between those who seek enlightenment by retreat from the world and those
who feel that the depths of understanding and compassion are to be found in
the struggle to improve the world. In Buddhism, the bodhisattva, or one who
had attained enlightenment, is honored because even though it was now possi-
ble to leave the earthly turmoil behind, the person rejected that path and
remained on earth in order to offer the chance for enlightenment to others.
Throughout our history we find this thread that seeks to reject the physical and
emotional realities of humans and proclaim that perfection required the
repression of the biological characteristics.
199. Laws create and allocate legal and political benefits and responsibili-
ties. Lobbyists are expert in attempting to obtain allocations that benefit their
clients. Ironically, that quest to shape the laws on behalf of their clients' "gen-
eral interests" may frequently violate Canon 8, which states that lawyers should
pursue reform and justice in the legal system-including the legislative-even if
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The tired wisdom and knowledge of the lawyer is not
acquired for itself but to better serve the client. It is used to
obtain advantages. 200 The advocate who does not use this
greater knowledge to manipulate people to achieve the client's
goals is a dishonest advocate and an oath-breaker. This starkly
worded description of the lawyer's obligation strikes me as some-
what chilling, but I remain convinced it is an honest statement of
what we are responsible for doing on behalf of our clients. Its
implications are clear, however, in terms of the potential conse-
quences on those who engage in such behavior.
One price lawyers pay is that people implicitly fear and
resent those who have knowledge greater than they themselves
possess. Martin Mayer tells us that "[m]uch of the unpopularity
of the lawyer simply reflects his proprietorship of a mystery-all
professions, as Bernard Shaw once put it, are conspiracies against
the layman, and are perceived as such. '20 1 When that knowledge
is one of power, such as is possessed and wielded by lawyers, the
resentment is greatly heightened. Just as the tax collector is
feared and ridiculed because of the power wielded over our fates,
the lawyer has become the equivalent of the bogeyman in a sys-
tem that has shifted from a society based on the rule of law-at
least for some-to one dominated by technical and intrusive laws
governing virtually every sphere of our activity. The contempt
for lawyers and the barbed humor that has grown exponentially
are the equivalent of people whistling in the dark to keep their
spirits up and fend off the lawyers.
The impacts of being a lawyer are also increased because
new lawyers are not adequately mentored in the practice of law.
Many employers and institutions have incentives to keep the
truth of law practice masked until it is too late for new lawyers to
alter the terms of their bargain. One result can be a gradual
"erosion of the spirit" Susan Davis describes as "burnout" of the
kind many lawyers are experiencing:
20 2
the general interests and desires of their clients conflict. If a lawyer advocating
for "tort reform" designed to cap their clients' financial risks were challenged
for activity that arguably advanced a client's interests but was demonstrably
unfair by under-compensating numerous injured parties, the entire legal world
would be amazed and bemused.
200. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); see
also Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM L.
REV. 116 (1990) (book review).
201. MAYER, supra note 11.
202. Susan Davis, Burnout, AM. HEALTH, Dec. 1994, at 48. See also Cary
Cherniss, Job Burnout: Growing Wory for Workers, Bosses, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.,
Feb. 18, 1980, at 71 (relating impact of finding out one's ideals and commit-
ment to helping others were at odds with the reality of clients' behavior).
20001 449
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True burnout doesn't occur suddenly, as the result of
trauma or short-term deadlines, and it doesn't disappear
after a good night's sleep. Rather, it's a chronic condition,
what one researcher has called "a general erosion of the
spirit," that can have severe consequences: loss of enthusi-
asm for work or family, trouble concentrating, reduced
creativity, depression, alienation, even paranoia or psycho-
sis. Burned-out workers may lose all sense of meaning in
their lives and begin drinking or using drugs. Marriages
suffer and careers erode.
20 3
Although they are in an impossible situation, responsible
criminal defense lawyers have my eternal respect. They are on
the front lines of the conflict between state power, community
indignation, and ensuring governmental power is held to some
standard of accountability. 2 4 After a decade of handling crimi-
nal cases I reached the end of my willingness to work in criminal
defense. A public defender asked me to help defend an individ-
ual I became convinced was guilty of repeatedly sodomizing a
young boy before inflicting more than 60 knife wounds and stab-
bing him to death. It does no disrespect to the vital social task
performed by criminal defense attorneys to recognize that I had
given up as much of my humanity as I could afford. The need to
cope with human evil and to check the power of the state was
never more obvious than in reaction to a recent report relating
how the defendant married his former girlfriend, planning to
make her pregnant, allow her a period of time to fully bond with
their child, and then murder the infant in revenge for his wife
not having cut short a 1996 cruise when the defendant's father
had died. He waited till seven months after his son was born,
and then smothered him to death with plastic wrap to simulate
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS).2°5
Unfortunately, the nature of the clientele and the opposi-
tion tends to erode defense lawyers, and the overall quality of
service is often inadequate due to lack of resources. Consider,
for example, the resources available to the public defender in
the "Chicago teen" case in which the defendant was in school
several miles away from the site of the killing when the crime was
committed, and still remained in jail for two years. His defense
lawyer had 25 cases at any one time, with 12 of them murder
203. Davis, supra note 202, at 51.
204. See Robinson, supra note 71. See also, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Suit: Death
Defense is a Sham: Claim in Fla. Provides Lawyers But Makes It So They Can't Save
Inmates, NAT'L. L.J., Dec. 21, 1998, at Al.
205. See Cops: Man Fathered Baby To Kill It, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1999, at Al.
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defenses where prosecutors were asking for the death penalty.
There was a single investigator who was shared with four other
lawyers with similar caseloads. 20 6 As someone who has done a
considerable amount of litigation, I strongly assert it is impossible
to do a competent, much less zealous job in that situation. Com-
pare this with the level of assistance for death row inmates in
Florida who are appealing their convictions, a system described
as a sham.
20 7
There are many instances in which lawyers do very good
things and protect helpless people against injustices in a fully
real sense. Rectification of injustice, as well as its prevention, are
critical elements of this professional mission. Priscilla Read Che-
noweth obtained the release of a man wrongly convicted of mur-
der after establishing that he wasn't even near the scene of the
crime at the time of the killing.2 8 In arguing for the morality of
the oath-based legitimacy of all responsible advocates I am not
proposing that all types of practice are the same. Although the
responsible advocate is fully principled in representing tobacco
and asbestos companies that covered up knowledge of the dan-
gers of their products and lied repeatedly, or murderers, toxic
waste dumpers, defrauders, that doesn't mean such cases don't
have significant moral and psychological impacts on the lawyers.
Being principled and acting in a legitimate professional
manner in the service of ends and dispute resolution processes
that can be demonstrated to be in the ultimate interest of our
society still does not insulate a lawyer from the effects of helping
clients whose behavior harms innocent people. Many attorneys
who reach the end of their ability to cope with advancing the
interests of clients whose actions have or will harm others none-
theless lack viable escape options. They are forced to continue
to a point far beyond where they are able to deal with the
demands of practice. Even with the principled defenses created
by the advocacy role, and our true commitment to the client, we
still cannot escape the reality of ourselves and the hypocrisy of
the system we serve. This produces emotional and moral crises
generated by the inner dissonance we experience in our souls.
This dissonance often results in emotional and moral ailments
that include job-related depression, professional burnout, drug
206. See Robinson, supra note 71.
207. See Coyle, supra note 204.
208. See Kevin Flynn, Lawyer's Crusade Ends in Man's Liberation From Prison,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1998, at B4.
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and alcohol addictions, and the loss of ideals and sense of per-
sonal significance and meaning.
20 9
Such symptoms are commonly thought of as aberrant. But
what if many of the symptoms of emotional trauma, stress, inade-
quate performance, ambiguous and confused ethical behavior
and the like are natural consequences of law practice that inevita-
bly come to a far too significant number of those who practice
law? And what if they are even most intensely felt by lawyers who
are among the most moral and sensitive members of the legal
profession? It might be useful to think about such phenomena
as a variety of battle fatigue or post-traumatic stress syndrome.
Certainly this pattern has been identified by researchers in other
professions who have found the more idealistic and caring peo-
ple to be those most vulnerable to burnout and cynicism.210
D. "Burnout" Through the Impact of Intellectual and
Moral Ambiguity
One result of a life spent confronting or ignoring difficult
moral dilemmas and using the "dark skills"-many of which
involve choices between two or more bads of various intensity
rather than between obviously good and evil alternatives-is that
the cumulative pressure of the experience alters the nature of
who we are. The effects take many forms. Some are manifested
in lawyers' emotional states, their values, and in how they deal
with the world. Since lawyers have never been trained to under-
stand the moral implications of what they do, but still possess an
intuitive moral sense of the limits of right and wrong, the tension
undermines the spiritual strength of many who practice law.
They become trapped in a confused environment in which their
actions and principles are in conflict in ways that can never be
made harmonious. One report concluded, for example, that
lawyers were the most emotionally depressed group among those
studied-reasoning that the poor emotional health of many law-
yers, "might be the result of operating in moral ambiguity. They
209. See Goldberg, supra note 38. See also MICI-AELJ. KELLY, LIvEs OF LAW-
YERS: JOURNEYS IN THE ORGANIZATIONS OF PRACTICE 5 (1994). A comprehensive
analysis of the impact of law practice on lawyers is found in Connie J.A. Beck et
al., Lawyer Distress: Alcohol-Related Problems and Other Psychological Concerns Among
a Sample of Practicing Lawyers, 10J.L. & HEALTH 1 (1995-96).
210. See Ferguson, supra note 140, at 122 ("The people most likely to
burn out are those who start their careers orjobs filled with idealism and enthu-
siasm. Most vulnerable are those men and women who spend a large part of
their time dealing with other people, whether they are subordinates, clients,
customers or patients.").
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might be representing positions they may not like or believe
in.,,211
A fascinating aspect of this observation about the effects of
law practice is that the reasons given for the depressed emotional
state of numerous lawyers-functioning in a climate of moral
ambiguity, and representing people or positions with which the
lawyer might not be in agreement-merely restate the intrinsic,
morally ambiguous essence of a major part of law practice.212
Ambiguity is everywhere for the lawyer.213 It is present in the
very fabric of the law.214 It exists in the advocate's rhetorical
211. Excerpts: The Betrayal of the Legal Profession, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 28, 1994, at
36 [hereinafter Betrayal] (discussing SOL LINOWITZ & MARTIN MAYER, THE
BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(1994)). It isn't only the law where ambiguity is found. Briggs and Bernal offer
a context by writing:
Tom Peters, business management's answer to Indiana Jones, has
characterized capitalism and democracy in society as 'messy' and says
that anyone not perpetually confused about ethical issues is out of
touch with the richness of the world. From ancient times forward, one
way-perhaps the only way-out of this behavioral temple of doom is
the study of ethics.
Briggs & Bernal, supra note 138.
212. Service to another can, and often does, exact a heavy price. It has
been described as the price of conflict between personal values and a client's
interests.
[F]ew attorneys admit to what is for many of them an equally impor-
tant source of discontent: hypocrisy. The hypocrites are the lawyers in
the elite firms who think of themselves as liberals. Not surprisingly,
these lawyers use their lavish salaries to make sizable donations to van-
ous left-of-center groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Union,
the National Organization for Women and the environmentalist
organization Greenpeace. But how do these self-described liberals get
the huge salaries from which the huge contributions are made? They
defend oil shippers whose spills have poisoned pristine ecosystems,
companies that like to keep the 'girls' below the glass ceiling, and
school districts that dismiss gay, lesbian or HIV-positive teachers.
However 'neutral' most firms' work may be, sooner or later 'liberal'
lawyers learn not to think twice about representing clients whom they
consider politically incorrect. I even know a lawyer who has, in a sin-
gle day, written a brief opposing a suit by the Natural Resources
Defense Council, and then gone home to renew his NRDC
membership."
Lyskowski, supra note 24, at A19.
213. See McLuHAN, supra note 23, at 276 (quoting Ruth N. Anshen as say-
ing, "For man is that being on earth who does not have language. Man is lan-
guage.") (emphasis added).
214. For lawyers, however, it is important we understand the kinds of lan-
guage which come to define us. Civil lawyer Rene David observes that "English
law (common law) is not an educating or moralizing law, but an esoteric, tech-
nician's law." RENE DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURES, SOURCES AND METHOD-
OLOGY 76 (Michael Kindred trans., 1972).
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need to persuade judge, jury, and opponent. Ambiguity is con-
tained within the fundamental concepts of the American legal
system-including due process, reasonableness, mens rea and
intent, as well as the terms used in many other basic doctrinal
categories. The shadow of ambiguity penetrates and infiltrates
most of what lawyers do, and is an inescapable aspect of law prac-
tice. When we become immersed in a culture of ambiguity,
many of us lose the ability to draw clear moral lines of right and
wrong.2 15
Part of the ambiguity results from the fact that our most
important legal terms are open-textured and malleable. They
offer the ambiguous frameworks within which lawyers think and
work. They shape lawyers' minds and modes of perception. The
elasticity and plasticity of our legal language is both a strength
and weakness. Since our very language is plastic, it should not be
surprising that the best lawyers are those most adept at manipula-
tion of the inherent ambiguities-on the one hand muttering
incantations that produce a sense of solidity when it is in our
clients' interests, and on the other expanding the uncertainty
and situational ambiguity when it is not. The expectation that
the entire American society will be able to agree on specific out-
comes and directions as a matter of shared rational principles
derived from a common set of values ignores that we hold very
different beliefs based on our individual points of departure pre-
mised on our distinct systems of valuation. Sometimes it is better
to know our limits-just as Justice Blackmun observed in Roe v.
Wade when he deliberately avoided the question of judicially
determining when human life begins, stating: "We need not
resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those
trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary.., is
not in a position to speculate as to the answer."
216
I argue that the conflicted state in which ambiguity thrives is
an inevitable, appropriate, and morally dissonant state that none-
theless captures the essence of being a lawyer. The dilemma was
captured in Jesus' admonition: "Render unto Caesar what is Cae-
sar's and to God what is God's." The problem is that Caesar and
God don't always agree as to the appropriate allocation and enti-
tlements, and "Caesar's" rewards and punishments tend to be
215. Roger Cramton captured the effects of the legal method in his clas-
sic essay, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 247
(1978). See also Lawrence M. Friedman, AMERICAN LAW 257 (1984) ("The legal
system is a structure. It has shape and form. It lasts. It is visible. It sets up
fields of force. It affects ways of thinking.").
216. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
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much more obvious and immediate. Our lives are filled with fun-
damental conflicts based on obligations owed to different centers
of power, loyalty, and values. This necessarily results in our
developing compartments of valuation within ourselves in order
to tolerate the inconsistencies and incommensurate categories of
behavior.
But to the extent that it requires us to separate into a variety
of selves spread across our categories of important activities and
belief, there will be some overlapping and leakage between the
compartments. This creates an emotional dissonance that results
in various degrees of stress because some part of us intuitively
understands at least some of the inconsistencies and hypocrisy
involved in the process. I want to emphasize that we are dealing
with multiple compartments that are not only tied to the per-
sonal and professional selves, but operate according to inconsis-
tent clusters of values and ty es of action according to their
degrees of importance to us.
The error is on the part of those who want a neat and simple
moral system worked out on a coherent and fully rational level.
They need the comfort of a system without contradictions, but
that simply isn't found in the real world. One of the most diffi-
cult aspects of legal analysis that troubles new law students
involves the tension and complexity of dealing with the intellec-
tual ambiguity that characterizes legal thought. But for the law-
yer that is only the beginning, and perhaps the easiest part of the
process.
One critic argued that the hypocrisy inherent in advocacy
was a cause of the legal profession's morally ambiguous profes-
sional culture. He suggested that the source of lawyers' dissatis-
faction with their job was that, "seeing shades of gray may signify
intellectual maturity, but it's also somehow impoverishing." 2 18 I
am uncertain as to whether impoverishing is the correct word
because in some ways the experience is empowering. But there is
no question that a life lived in that fashion is sufficiently powerful
to alter who we are. Too much direct experience in the darkness
of the human soul-and helping others avoid responsibility for
the consequences of their actions or to gain advantages from
others-may produce a kind of tired wisdom, but also destroys
much of our innocence and idealism.
2 19
217. See ROLLO MAY, MAN'S SEARCH FOR HIMSELF 46 (1953) ("This com-
partmentalization of values and goals leads very quickly to an undermining of
the unity of the personality, and the person, in 'pieces' within as well as without,
does not know which way to go.").
218. Lyskowski, supra note 24, at A19.
219. See id.:
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Kevin Lyskowski quotes a young lawyer as saying, "I wish I
could still commit to an idea or cause with abandon; often I feel
I've lost what made my life meaningful. '"22  But Lyskowski
describes part of our dilemma. We prefer to think of virtue or
goodness in terms of actions that create what might be called
unilateral positive benefits in which everyone is pleased and lives
"happily ever after." But when a lawyer functions as an advocate,
someone or some aspect of the social system is harmed or signifi-
cantly distressed through the outcome. Others are helped. As
advocates we engage in corrective and allocative actions between
people and human institutions in which we win or lose our cli-
ents' rights, freedom, money, piece of "the pie," power. It is very
much a kind of "invisible hand" situation that to a significant
degree must be taken on faith, while the worst abuses are identi-
fied and mitigated through the system's regulatory mechanisms,
legal doctrines of accountability, and legislative fiats. Most of
these mechanisms are inadequate in holding the legal profession
up to any responsible level of accountability.
VII. Is BEING A PRINCIPLED LAWYER AN IMPOSSIBLE DREAM?
THE FLIGHT FROM FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY
At the end of one millenium and the start of another, we
have lost our ideals and substituted base material and illusions.
When clearly and powerfully articulated, our most central moral
principles reflect ideals of the kind we need to keep our society
intact. Daniel Boorstin brings this forth.
"Ideals are like stars," observed Carl Schurz on April 18,
1859, the anniversary eve of Lexington and Concord; "you
will not succeed in touching them with your hands. But
like the seafaring man on the desert of waters, you choose
them as your guides, and following them will reach your
destiny."221
Few lawyers are so candid; most deny any paradox exists. Almost every
law firm liberal claims there's no conflict between his conscience and
career because of the "role of the lawyer": At work, a lawyer must sim-
ply represent his client (bad actor or not) and not his conscience.
Only at home can a lawyer put his conscience first: At home, he's act-
ing on his own behalf, not his client's. Law firm liberals must stop
drawing this non-existent line between their personal and professional
selves and confusing schizophrenia with well-being.
But Lyskowski is wrong. The line does exist. It is not schizophrenic. But it does
and should produce a degree of emotional discontent. My point is that a lawyer
is not promised a "rose garden" and some problems of stress are completely
proper in a healthy and moral person.
220. Id.
221. BOORSTIN, supra note 40, at 182.
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Boorstin goes on to ask:
Have we been doomed to make our dreams into illusions?
... An illusion.., is an image we have mistaken for reality.
We cannot reach for it, aspire to it, or be exhilarated by it;
for we live in it. It is prosaic because we cannot see it is not
fact. 2 2 2
Given all the problems that characterize the legal profession
and the intrinsic nature of law practice, is it possible for a lawyer
to be a principled person and still practice law? The play, Man of
La Mancha, contains a wonderful song of great power called The
Impossible Dream. Its words project eloquent imagery of courage,
purity, individuality, and selfless grace.
To dream the impossible dream. To fight the unbeatable
foe. To bear the unbearable sorrow. To run where the
brave dare not go. This is my quest. To follow that star.
No matter how hopeless. No matter how far. To fight for
the right. Without question or pause. To be willing to
march into hell for that heavenly cause. And the world will
be better for this. That one man, scorned and covered
with scars. Still strove with his last ounce of courage. To
reach the unreachable star.
2 2 3
Compare this "impossible dream" with the life of the lawyer.
The conflict between the competing systems of valuation
involved in being a good person and a good lawyer is unavoida-
ble. Nor is either system necessarily wrong from a moral perspec-
tive-as opposed to being different to the degree they are largely
incompatible and in inevitable conflict. This occurs not only
between the lawyer and the general value systems of society, but
also within the lawyer. Achieving justice, defined narrowly as
legal benefit, for one to whom the lawyer has accepted a deep
obligation and responsibility can be virtuous and just in Aristote-
lian terms. But it is a form of real life virtue and justice that for
many people feels darker and more troubling than the angelic or
ideal virtue we normally associate with principled moral behav-
ior. Aristotle defined practical wisdom in the following way: a
"true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the
things that are good or bad for man."224 Practical wisdom is Aris-
totle's attempt to describe human abilities and knowledge
applied to the earthly activities of people in political society
rather than the ideal realm postulated by Plato's Cave in which
people mistook shadows for reality. Our approach to profes-
222. Id. at 239.
223. MITCH LEIGH, MAN OF LA MANCHA: A MusicAL PLAY 49-50 (1966).
224. ARiSTOTLE, supra note 151, at bk. 6, ch. 5.
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sional responsibility has remained in the shadows because we
have not examined ourselves and the masters we serve with a suf-
ficient degree of honesty.
Aspirations and ideals can create standards toward which we
strive and improve the. quality of our actions, or they can repre-
sent unattainable expressions of overly grand ideas or values that
are disconnected from the conditions they purport to reflect and
influence. This is the situation I am arguing exists in the context
of ideal professionalism and real professionalism-one in which
the ideal bears virtually no relationship to the real-and there-
fore generates unproductive tangents, contempt, or cynicism-
rather than a forward looking impetus for improvement.
225
Shaffer describes how American culture was traditionally
defined by religious principles and then asks:
I wonder if the reason biblical morality has been periph-
eral, in this interpersonal view of what American profes-
sional ethics is, is that the Bible speaks too clearly and too
plainly. Maybe the reason biblical morality has been left
out is that it is both insistent and unpleasant; it demands
too much.226
Certainly it is fair to consider the fact that we have become
increasingly embedded in the webs of powerful systems that
either dictate our principles or punish us for even visibly possess-
ing principles that conflict with their own desires. The myth of
the strong and principled individual standing up heroically
against a corrupt society carries extremely slight weight in an
American society that has many idols and celebrities and virtually
no heroes. The conditions that now surround us contradict cen-
turies of development in which we attempted to define the terms
of an evolving human species. John Gardner captured an impor-
tant aspect of the situation:
Our tradition tells us that we should be individuals, initia-
tors, and creators, free and responsible. It tells us that
every person is important. But the trend ... transforms
individualists into specialist-links in larger systems, locked
into their roles, increasingly incapable of autonomous
functioning.
225. See CAMuS, supra note 124, at 302-03 (observing the frustrating limits
on what we can really accomplish in solving the ills of the world, contrasted with
the scale of the challenges we want to overcome).
226. SHAvER, supra note 15, at 61.
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... The conflict between that harsh reality and our
tradition of individual freedom and responsibility is severe
and growing worse.
22 7
Contrast Don Quixote's "impossible dream" and Camus' rec-
ognition of human limits with Abraham Maslow's description of
the human dilemma as struggling under the burden of simulta-
neously being "worms and gods" where we are frustrated by the
knowledge that we are capable of reaching the greatest heights
and most sordid depths of human behavior. 228 Compare the
impossible dream of striving to be a more highly evolved being
reaching toward perfection, with the chained and highly ordered
life most lawyers and other professionals confront after years of
law school or other professional education.
The farther we move through our society's educational insti-
tutions the wider the gap between ideal and real becomes, and
the more obvious it is that we are caught up in a process of fall-
ing from grace rather than one in which we ar6 evolving into
more enlightened and "godlike" beings. As we begin law school
and enter the legal profession, for example, powerful institutions
immediately begin to shape and direct our actions in ways both
overt and subtle. The institutional "hands" that mold the clay of
our being use the power of ambition, status, fear, and economics.
Lawyers are not uniquely the objects of this process that
makes a mockery of individual growth and development.
Numerous social philosophers have lamented what they perceive
as an emptiness at the heart of humanity, arguing that it is
caused in part by the enormous power, complexity, and contra-
dictory forces of modern society. 2 29 Walter Lippmann tells us
that modern men "are, as Karl Jaspers says, men dissolved into
"an anonymous mass" because they are "without an authentic
world, without provenance or roots," without, that is to say, belief
and faith that they can live by."'23 ° In two classic and prescient
works, The Technological Society and Propaganda, Jacques Ellul
warned of an inexorable movement toward technique-even to
the level that we have created a "technological society" that
molds human behavior and results in a progressive loss of our
227. JOHN W. GARDNER, THE RECOVERY OF CONFIDENCE 44-45 (1970).
228. MASLOW, supra note 33.
229. See BUBER, supra note 42, at 158. The power and scale of institu-
tional structures is part of the economic technique, which Jacques Ellul
describes as shaping modern society. See ELLUL, supra note 44, at 180 ("propa-
ganda seeks to induce action, adherence, and participation-with as little
thought as possible").
230. WALTER LIPPMANN, ESSAYS IN THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 87 (1956).
20001
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humanity.2" 1 Albert Schweitzer described the rise of institutional
control over our lives as one of the most critical challenges
humans have faced, suggesting that, while institutions have
always played such controlling and defining roles, the sheer mag-
nitude of what we are now experiencing has resulted in a unique
change:
About the struggle which must needs ensue no historical
analogy can tell us much. The past has, no doubt, seen the
struggle of the free-thinking individual against the fettered
spirit of a whole society, but the problem has never
presented itself on the scale on which it does today,
because the fettering of the collective spirit as it is fettered
today by modem organizations, modem unreflectiveness,
and modern popular passions, is a phenomenon without
precedent in history.232
Confronted by complexity and power beyond imagining,
and feeling completely incapable of individually mastering the
world, the person seeks refuge in powerful institutions that offer
a kind of security and legitimation.233 But, for many, institu-
tional control and the loss of free choice of the kind we have
been raised to consider an essential element of human develop-
ment generate fundamental and irresolvable tensions of suffi-
231. ELLUL, supra note 44, at 132:
Technique is of necessity, and as compensation, our universal lan-
guage. It is the fruit of specialization. But this very specialization pre-
vents mutual understanding. Everyone today has his own professional
jargon, modes of thought, and peculiar perception of the world....
The man of today is no longer able to understand his neighbor
because his profession is his whole life, and the technical specializa-
tion of this life has bound him to live in a closed universe.
232. ERICH FROMM, THE SANE SOCIETY 201, 202 (1955).
233. A fascinating possibility in regard to the inhumanity of the global-
ized economy where there is no longer any real security for anyone, is that we
may already be seeing a counter revolution in terms of people awakening to
their own responsibility. See, e.g., Teresa Dixon Murray, Many Workers Have Lost
Trust as Firms Close Unexpectedly: Corporate Loyalty is Replaced by Corporate Suspicion,
Distrust, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEAlER, July 11, 1999, at ID. In a situation in which
the Builder's Square Company enticed employees to stay on the job during
reorganization by promising benefits and severance pay, the company reneged
on its promise and declared bankruptcy while leaving the workers unpaid and
bitter. "Tales of corporate betrayal like the Builders Square shutdown have had
a ripple effect on all companies, fueling greater cynicism among a work force
that already distrusts employers who seem capable of any degree of ruthlessness
or inhumanity, as long as the bottom line is protected." Id. Even if we want the
security and ignorance of comfortable institutions to act as our "mothers" for
life, they basically have disappeared in the modern world. How we are going to
adapt to the loss of institutional security is still an open question.
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cient intensity to result in what has been called an "existential
vacuum":
[T]he individual ceases to be himself; he adopts entirely
the kind of personality offered to him by cultural patterns;
and he therefore becomes exactly as all others are and as
they expect him to be. The discrepancy between "I" and
the world disappears and with it the conscious fear of
aloneness and powerlessness.
234
Fromm continues: "The person who gives up his individual
self and becomes an automaton, identical with millions of other
automatons around him, need not feel alone and anxious any
more. But the price he pays, however, is high; it is the loss of his
self."
2 35
I argue that much of the problem with the professionalism
and principles of lawyers derives from such conditions. The exis-
tential vacuum is created when the principles we have been
taught to honor-or which we know intuitively-are very differ-
ent from those we are required to apply in our lives. Ironically,
tragically, this contradiction between ideal and reality may be sig-
nificantly lessened in a society-such as now exists in America-
that has so blurred, trivialized, and ignored traditional principles
and ideals that most of its members no longer even possess the
conceptual vocabulary that allows them to be consciously aware
of the issues. One rather base solution to values-grounded con-
flicts is simply to avoid the unpleasant confrontation by redefin-
ing and discarding the troubling values, and this has happened
on many levels throughout the United States.
Hannah Arendt reminds us, however, of the importance of
the conceptual language of principle, and given the rapid
decline in our secondary and university systems' interest in teach-
ing concerns of value, it may well be that teachers who were
trained only a few decades ago find themselves operating accord-
ing to a set of beliefs that are not in any way shared by current
students and recent graduates-and in a way far beyond what
can be explained away by the old idea of a generation gap.236
When an idealized system of asserted human values or character
traits has very little to do with the obligations that we accept, the
cultural reality we inhabit, and the actions we take to fulfill our
234. FROMM, supra note 232, at 208-09.
235. Id. at 209.
236. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE MIND Vol. 1, 5 (M. McCarthy
ed., 1978) ("Could the activity of thinking as such... be among the conditions
that make men abstain from evil-doing or even actually 'condition' them
against it?").
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responsibilities, the result is a state of either moral dissonance,
hypocrisy, or simply a blind emptiness.
Our economic system has become almost wholly dependent
on the continuous expansion of material desires and human
insecurity in order to drive economic activity. Overweight,
imperfect, in need of artificial breasts so you will be "attractive,"
neurotic, hyperactive?-nearly all are market phenomena that
both create and prey on our insecurity. When we speak of decep-
tion we should step back and understand that deception in one
form or another has become the defining characteristic of our
culture. The irony may well be-even though I have no empiri-
cal basis-that lawyers as a group might be more honest than the
overall society. Lawyers have a code of behavior, albeit weak.
Lawyers know that at some point promises count. For too many
people there has been a fading of integrity and honesty with the
result being that everything is seen as fluid and negotiable
regardless of any exchange of promises.
As to where we people of the end of the twentieth century fit
in this process, Paul Tournier offers a description:
[People] have become merely cogs in the machine of pro-
duction, tools, functions. All that matters is what they do,
not what they think or feel. In any case their thoughts and
feelings are similarly moulded by propaganda, press, cin-
ema and radio. They read the same newspaper each day,
hear the same slogans, see the same advertisements.
23 7
Jules Henry made a similar distinction between "drives" and
"values," when he wrote that "[o]urs is a driven culture. It is
driven on by its achievement, competitive, profit, and mobility
drives, and by the drives for security and a higher standard of
living."238 "If you are propelled by drives, the culture offers innu-
merable opportunities for you; but if you are moved mostly by
values, you really have to search, and if you do find ajob in which
you can live by values, the pay and the prestige are usually
low."'239 "Values are merely ideas about good human relations,
and though they do give people direction, they lack the compel-
ling power of drives because they do not have institutional
support.
240
At the end of the twentieth century the ideal of the coura-
geous principled individual seeking self-actualization and full
237. PAUL TOURNIER, THE MEANING OF PERSONS 40 (Edward Hudson
trans., 1957).
238. HENRY, supra note 9, at 13.
239. Id. at 14.
240. Id. at 15.
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knowledge seems to be an increasingly false ideal-at least as
measured by how we behave and what we value. As with most
false ideals, we pretend to aspire to such a state because it some-
how makes us feel more satisfied with being human. But offered
the choice of freedom to pursue a life of principle, we run from
it because we intuitively understand its dangers 'and perhaps even
its impossibility. Maxine Greene tells us that, although our ideals
would cause us to think it is important to pursue the goal of oper-
ating as a "man of principle," she warned that any person who
attained this level of clarity in thought, values, and action would
be tragically estranged from other humans who would not be
able to cope with the person's qualities and who were threatened
by the contrast between themselves and this "higher being."
241
The most poignant sadness in the loss of nearly any deep princi-
ple in the last part of the twentieth century is that our response
has been to substitute the "man of celebrity" as our cultural icon
and to worship at the empty altar of name recognition rather
than moral quality.
Ideals are aspirational targets that play roles in shaping per-
sonal and societal behavior, both by telling us what is prohibited
and by pulling us toward desirable actions.24 2 Nonetheless, if an
ideal is false or impossible to attain even as an approximation, it
will produce conflict and cynicism, or invoke scorn which, unlike
the somewhat out-of-touch Don Quixote, many lack the courage
to withstand.243 An illusory ideal is a cynical device that attempts
to allow us both our "cake" of being as we wish and our "dessert"
of self-deception.
In many areas of life-and being a lawyer is one of these-a
moral system is needed that more fully and honestly incorporates
the conditions of human reality, rather than offering a pretty
facade erected on a foundation of sand that presents no legiti-
mate standards to guide our decisions. We haven't sought to
develop a real system of professionalism and professional moral-
ity because the process and knowledge we would necessarily
develop is likely to force us to face aspects of ourselves with which
we feel uncomfortable. Greater honesty would impair our well-
developed ability to rationalize what we do. While we therefore
lament the decline of professionalism, the truth may simply be
that most people want little more than to be given direction and
241. See GREENE, supra note 26.
242. The Golden Rule and Ten Commandments offer simple examples
of principled rules that are aimed at encouraging positive behavior (the Golden
Rule), and ones intended to block dangerous behavior of the kind capable of
undermining a community (the Ten Commandments).
243. See LEIGH, supra note 223.
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be cogs in the machine. New lawyers fill this role in the machin-
ery of their employers, whether private or public. I don't know
what we in the legal profession can do to change these condi-
tions, but without a change in the use of institutional power and
behavior, the rhetoric of independent professionalism based on
the strength of character and values of the individual lawyer rings
hollow.
In understanding just how difficult a meaningful return to
real values and deep professionalism will be, consider, for exam-
ple, the following observation:
Most people do the job they have to do regardless of what
they want to do; technological driveness has inexorable
requirements, and the average man or woman either meets
them or does not work. With a backward glance at the job-
dreams of his pre-"labor force" days the young worker
enters the occupational system not where he would, but
where he can; and his job-dream, so often an expression of
his dearest self, is pushed down with all his other unmet
needs to churn among them for the rest of his life.
2 4 4
Nor is the power of institutions to mold us to their needs
something to be taken lightly.2 45 That power over an employee's
will has grown dramatically over the past two decades. Consider
that for a Harvard Law School student, annual costs are esti-
mated to be in excess of $40,000 per year. Many students gradu-
ate Harvard owing over $100,000 in principal plus accumulated
interest of $10-15,000. Even public law schools regularly see stu-
dents graduating who enter the profession more than $60,000 in
debt. This enormous debt load forecloses public interest options
for many new lawyers, and causes them to be extremely depen-
dent on their employer's goodwill. The situation goes beyond
the graduates' debt load.
For even the most idealistic (or wealthy) graduates there are
problems with the reality of the professional experience in con-
trast with what they anticipated the life of the professional to
involve. Cary Cherniss explains:
People who go into the professions, research has shown,
are often motivated by a strong need for autonomy. And
they go into a particular field because they think they will
be able to call their own tune. But increasingly, profession-
als work in either public or private organizations where
244. HENRY, supra note 9, at 25
245. See supra note 172.
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they don't have that much control over their own
destinies.
24 6
The idea of having "control over their own destinies" must
seem laughable to associates who describe the conditions of large
firm practice as involving "groveling at the feet of clients and
senior partners. ' '2 4 7 Former Yale President Kingman Brewster
once described the lawyer in the following words: "The lawyer is
not going about his own affairs: he is on a mission for someone
else. Of all mankind, he is the most removed from being 'that
happiest figure in the law, a servant on a frolic of his own.' "248
Compare the great power through which our large organiza-
tions shape the people who operate within them with J. K.
Krishnamurti's description of the ideal function of education:
[S]hould not education help you to find out what you
really love to do so that from the beginning to the end of
your life you are working at something which you feel is
worth while and which for you has deep significance?
Otherwise, for the rest of your days, you will be miserable.
Not knowing what you really want to do, your mind falls
into a routine in which there is only boredom, decay and
death.24 9
Alan Watts warns that in the epoch of Nietzsche's "God is
dead" we have discovered no comparable substitute to guide us,
stating: "Once there is the suspicion that a religion is a myth, its
power is gone. It may be necessary for man to have a myth, but
he cannot self-consciously prescribe one as he can mix a pill for a
headache."25 ° Watts goes on to conclude:
Consequently our age is one of frustration, anxiety, agita-
tion, and addiction to "dope." Somehow we must grab
what we can while we can, and drown out the realization
that the whole thing is futile and meaningless. This "dope"
we call our high standard of living, a violent and complex
stimulation of the senses, which makes them progressively
less sensitive and thus in need of more violent
stimulation.
2 5 1
Watts continues: "To keep up with this 'standard' most of us
are willing to put up with lives that consist largely in doing jobs
246. Cherniss, supra note 202, at 71. Compare this with Maslow's listing
of the characteristics of the healthy human, see supra note 33.
247. Betrayal, supra note 211, at 36.
248. MAYER, supra note 11, at 16.
249. KRiSHNAMURTI, supra note 109, at 16.
250. ALAN WATrS, THE WISDOM OF INSECURITY 19 (1951).
251. Id. at 21.
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that are a bore, earning the means to seek relief from the tedium
by intervals of hectic and expensive pleasure.1
252
CONCLUSION
Gaining a full understanding of the limits and nature of
principled professionalism is difficult because we-academics,
lawyers, and judges-are in a state of denial or disingenuous
ignorance concerning the intrinsic nature of much of law prac-
tice. This situation is caused partly because the truth is more
than we feel comfortable facing, and partly because maintaining
the deceptive hypocrisy of what we prefer to think of as ajust and
fair legal system is an integral aspect of preserving our democ-
racy. Too much truth can be destructive-both of legitimate and
illegitimate interests. Selective ignorance allows us to rationalize
our behavior in ways that protect our self-concept and preserve
critical ego defenses. This ensures that the image we see in our
subjective mirrors-of self and system-reflects the one we want
to see.
A substantive reconceptualization of the lawyer and legal
profession will be particularly difficult to achieve because we
need to alter how we typically think about ourselves. We will also
need to concede we are considerably less noble than we like to
envision. The tension between these seemingly lesser ideals and
the more grand ideals (or myths) upon which many of our most
basic human self-deceptions are grounded makes it extremely
difficult to see the situation with a satisfying degree of clarity.
Certainly I feel as if I am laboring to develop what is offered
here-even to the limited extent I have been successful in
explaining the concepts.
Am I ready at this point to say I fully understand the implica-
tions of the issues I am describing? Absolutely not. But if we do
not come to terms with the nature and power of what we lawyers
do and the limitations on what we can do for those we serve, then
the legal profession will continue its steady degeneration into
nothing more than a form of hyper-competitive economic activ-
ity with nothing other than the profit motive and power at its
core. This is not an attack on the reasonable economic necessi-
ties of private law practice. It is an honest recognition of its
impacts and the need to limit the more extreme effects of the
drive for profit. It is also an affirmation of the need for a core of
strong, non-economic principles around which to orient the
legal profession.
252. Id.
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A. The Legal Profession as Part of the Solution?
Those who seek to focus the reform of the legal profession
on changes in the law schools' curricula and teaching methodol-
ogies have at best offered a strategy that will alter the profession
only slightly and then only over a lengthy period. Regardless of
what occurs, there are no quick fixes for what ails the legal pro-
fession. Even slowly paced solutions of any consequence are,
however, extremely unlikely because of the power and intracta-
bility of the system into which new lawyers are sent.
The scale and institutional realities of the entrenched legal
system and the interests its most influential participants serve-
both in their private and public aspects-are simply too powerful
and massive to be much affected by the thousands of neophyte
lawyers the law schools send forth each year to be morally slaugh-
tered. This inadequacy is exacerbated by the law schools' contin-
uing failure to provide instruction of the kind that might prepare
students for what they will confront in the profession. It is fur-
ther ensured by the fact that law graduates are spread thinly
across many positions of employment and cannot realistically
achieve any critical mass. It is intensified by the competitive pres-
sures in practice and graduates' need to prove themselves to
employers to achieve advancement. Rather than launching cru-
sades against the behaviors and values of those who have the abil-
ity to determine their long-term success or failure in their
careers, the new lawyers are willingly-if not eagerly-drawn into
the system.
The forces against change are so massive, pervasive, and vir-
tually impenetrable that pretending that law schools can respon-
sibly educate and send out humanistic and civil new graduates
who will be able to successfully compete against, much less
change the behavior of ruthless lawyers who are operating as
aggressive and calculating advocates, will simply result in sending
lambs to the slaughter house. It is therefore much more impor-
tant to devise means for helping the mass of existing lawyers to
become better and more professional advocates than it is to con-
centrate primarily on what law schools can do for current law
students.
The effort to better prepare law students is not irrelevant,
however, because law schools are likely to provide the organiza-
tional and institutional impetus for some positive change. But
incremental improvement in the skills and values of existing law-
yers should become one of the most important targets for the
schools' efforts-one which law schools are currently ill-
equipped to undertake. Nor should the difficulty of such a mis-
20001
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sion be understated. Such lawyers are not easy to influence. It
takes little time for economics to affect what lawyers think and
feel. Law practice is capable of producing cynicism and mistrust
of both clients and opponents-as well as suspicion of judicial
and other decision-makers-in a very brief span.
In theory, continuing legal education requirements for prac-
ticing lawyers were intended to play an important role in
reforming the profession, but as most lawyers will admit, many of
the CLE programs are very marginal and the professional
responsibility requirements tend to be almost laughable. Part of
the reason for the failure of CLE to reform the profession is,
however, that the profession does not really want to change.
Another reason is economic. CLE programs have become lucra-
tive sources of revenue where the larger the number of lawyers
attending the session and the fewer teachers required, the
greater the profit. In nearly all instances, this ensures superficial-
ity and limited impact on the participants. Such factors add
greatly to the difficulty of changing the legal profession.
Bar disciplinary committees could do something about the
most severe cases of lawyer inadequacy and excess. But the pro-
fession's disciplinary processes are simplistic, and self-protective.
Lawyers do not want to sanction other lawyers unless the behav-
ior is something close to felonious. Lawyers on the disciplinary
boards are essentially sitting in judgment on themselves and are
not going to treat other lawyers harshly when they know "there
but for the grace of God, go I." Nor is the bar's formal discipline
applied even-handedly. The misbehaviors of lawyers in the most
powerful firms rarely are handled by bar disciplinary committees.
But one of the greatest problems is that the system is incapable of
dealing with the invisible behavior of lawyers operating within
the "black box" of practice. This invisible behavior makes up
well over ninety-nine percent of what lawyers do. There are
rarely witnesses to the behavior since so much of it is omission
and nuance. When it is witnessed by an opposing lawyer who
benefits from or participates in the resulting unprofessional
behavior, that lawyer is not going to come forward and complain
about another lawyer's breach.
B. The Judiciay as Part of the Solution?
An important part of the answer to perceived problems of
both excessive zealousness and inadequate quality of representa-
tion by lawyers lies in the hands of the judiciary. This responsibil-
ity is even more important in a chaotic and conflicting society of
the kind we inhabit. The law schools can have some positive
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impact through improving legal education about the profession
and better preparing students in the skills needed to practice
law. But this is an entirely inadequate strategy because there are
already a million lawyers in the U. S. "Retrofitting" a million law-
yers to become kinder and gentler is not a viable or realistic
option.
Some frustrated efforts to improve the performance of law-
yers have most recently come through judicial rule rather than
disciplinary decision.25 1 In theory, judges can be the key to a
higher level of lawyer professionalism, at least for those cases that
are taken very far into the litigation process. But efforts by
judges to regulate the invisible behaviors of lawyers by rules such
as Rule 11 relating to sanctions for egregious activities, and now
Rule 26 requiring voluntary disclosure in discovery, have ironi-
cally tended to increase the problems rather than cure them. In
keeping with their "dark" nature, lawyers have learned to use the
"reforms" as weapons in their litigation arsenals.254
Another obstacle to the judiciary playing a significant role in
improving the behavior of lawyers is that riding lawyers is a labor-
intensive and thankless task-one that judges understandably
don't want to accept. To do it effectively would be expensive,
requiring significantly more judges and other administrative
resources to police the legal profession. Ultimately it might pro-
duce a quasi-Germanic model of the kind described by John
Langbein in which the judge directs and conducts the factual
inquiry.
This judicially-driven model would necessitate a dramatic
shift in the processes of American law and practice, one unlikely
to occur in part because of the dramatic nature of the change
and also because it is out-of-sync with the American culture and
character. We are such a contentious society of non-homogene-
ous and competitive high-stakes players-and lawyers are an even
more concentrated group of contenders-that judges forced to
cope with the disputes among lawyers would soon be candidates
for institutionalization. The second obstacle to such reform is
that very little of what lawyers do ever makes it into formal litiga-
tion to the extent that a court would be involved. If most of the
real abuses occur in the invisible behavior that comprises virtu-
253. See Amy E. Black & Stanley Rothman, Shall We Kill All the Lawyers
First?: Insider and Outsider Views of the Legal Profession, 21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLICY
835 (1998); Craig Bradley, The Rule of Law in an Unruly Age, 71, IND. L.J. 949
(1996); Rogelio A. Lasso, Gladiators Be Gone: The New Disclosure Rules Compel a
Reexamination of the Adversary Process, 36 B.C. L. REv. 479 (1995); Georgene
Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 589 (1998).
254. See Vairo, supra note 253.
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ally all lawyers do, then the ability of judges to influence and
supervise such behavior is almost nil.
Beyond the largely theoretical topic of what a reformed,
empowered, and expanded judiciary could or should do, is the
need to be honest about what judges most likely would do.
There is, for example, an inherent conflict between the perspec-
tives of most judges and those of zealous advocates representing
unpopular causes. The American judiciary already has an enor-
mous amount of discretionary power. Granting judges greater
discretion than they currently possess creates a significantly
increased opportunity for political abuse of that discretion. The
image of a judicial bench filled with black-robed "philosopher-
judges" bears little relationship to the reality of the judiciary.
Too many judges simply want cases settled regardless of concerns
of fairness and justice, and they don't want to put up with
unpleasant and "uncivil" lawyers in their courtrooms.
Another serious problem is judicial self-interest. On the
state level, too many judges depend on lawyers' contributions to
their campaign funds. They aren't going to come down very
hard on lawyers who are capable of causing them serious political
trouble within the relevant political party or who can deny them
campaign financing and political support. Even federal judges
tend to be people who have very carefully exploited the political
patronage system to achieve favor with whatever political party
happens to be in power. The fact of life tenure and somewhat
higher credentials than are often found on the state level may
buffer the political nature of the federal judiciary but should not
cause us to forget the highly political way in which federal judges
are selected.
The ability and willingness of judges to lead a real move-
ment toward improving the legal profession is quite limited. The
American judiciary represents an incestuous old-boy network,
even with the addition of women to the bench. Judges are part
of the system and not reformers, no matter what they profess.
Nearly all judges depend on the support of political parties and
have carefully worked their way through the party system to
obtain support for initial candidacy and retention. They have
also practiced law in the same manner as that which they would
now have to sanction in order to create serious momentum to
clean up the system. So even though judges have some legal
power to manage the litigation process in ways that would
improve the level of lawyers' professionalism and performance,
they generally find it far safer to lament the decline of profes-
sionalism in Law Day speeches than to confront the problem. I
have always found it ironic to listen to both state and federal
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judges attack the lack of competence of lawyers who appeared
before them, and then ask how many of those incompetent law-
yers those same judges referred to disciplinary committees.
C. Law Schools' Contempt for the Legal Profession
While I am not writing a direct critique of legal education, a
few useful points can be made because law schools possess the
ability to do much more to increase and deepen the awareness of
aspirants to the legal profession concerning the trust they are
accepting for another's fate.255 It might be hoped that the con-
certed energies and intellect of the more than 6,000 faculty who
populate American law schools might somehow be productively
brought to bear on helping improve the legal profession. This
essay is not directly about what law schools can do to fulfill their
higher responsibility in educating law students, but it is useful to
remember management guru Peter Drucker's warning:
Education that does not strive for the "good man" is igno-
ble and cynical. Anyone as highly equipped with knowl-
edge, with ability to learn, and with ability to do-and with
income-as is the [modern] educated man... is equipped
with so much power as to be a menace, if not a monster,
unless he have virtue.256
Nothing in legal education prepares the prospective law
graduate for the responsible use of power or the need for
accountability. Indeed, people who can escape the pressures of
being held accountable are happy to do so. The legal profes-
255. Law schools, however, tend to be populated with people who have
contempt for the legal profession. The stress between the real and the ideal is a
constant factor for those who would change the world. J.H. Hexter, writing
about Thomas More and the decision whether to become a King's councilor or
offer his insights from outside the seat of power, speaks to questions nearly
every intellectual must address at some point.
In his moments of doubt and despair he [More] was but suffering the
inevitable lot of the unattached intellectual innovator. Rarely can
such men altogether free themselves from the persistent and ungentle
ministrations of a Doppleganger, who measures the state of things as. the
innovators envisage them against the state* of things as they are, and
notes the peculiar disparity between their ideal and a reality not per-
ceptibly altered by the spate of words they have poured forth.
HEXTER, supra note 54 at 124.
256. DRUCKER, supra note 32, at 137. He adds: "Education is for some-
body, not for something. The product of education is not knowledge or learn-
ing; it is not skills, ability or virtue, jobs or success, dollars or goods. It is always
a person . . . ." Id. But what kind of person is it realistic to expect will develop
through the combination of the experiences, obligations, and culture of law
practice?
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sion's monitoring, disciplinary, and sanctioning institutions pro-
vide very little oversight and guidance for lawyers. Nor do they
create the fear of apprehension and sanction that would be
needed to make lawyers responsible actors from concern for
their continuing ability to practice law if they fail to honor their
obligation to their clients. This means that if we are to increase
the chances of a responsible and principled use of power by law-
yers, the profession and law schools must confront much more
directly and vigorously the questions of how to educate aspiring
lawyers to accept greater accountability, how to refashion legal
institutions in ways that encourage greater accountability on the
part of lawyers, and how to improve the quality of legal represen-
tation generally.257
The goal of producing the "good person" through educa-
tion seems one worth pursuing, but there are serious problems
with the ability and willingness of law faculty to make real contri-
butions. One reason is that many faculty have sold out to the
system. In an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal, Arthur Schles-
inger described several functions served by intellectuals. They
included servicing the controlling power system to help it
advance its aims; becoming an "agent and apologist" for the sys-
tem; becoming "irrelevant" by hiding away in the ivory tower of
academia; or by engaging in "prophetic confrontation" through
speaking "truth to power.
2 5 8
The failure of law faculty to add some kind of positive virtue
to the lives of lawyers is, however, further exacerbated by the fact
that many law teachers have contempt for the practice of law and
those who engage in it. The combination of many law profes-
sors' typically slight experience in actual private practice, and the
desire not to have the "stuff' of practice intrude too greatly into
the law schools, has created among many law faculty a contempt
for law practice and for the work of lawyers. This means there is
limited understanding and appreciation of the conditions of law
257. I discuss some of the options in the concluding sections of this essay,
and have made some suggestions in other works. See David Barnhizer, Of Rat
Time and Terminators, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49 (1995).
258. Schlesinger, supra note 52. One problem may be caused by the per-
ceived contrast between use of the mind in law practice and academia. Richard
Hofstadter observes that "[iln most professions intellect may help, but intelli-
gence will serve well enough without it." RiCHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLEC-
TUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE 26 (1970). He continues: "The work of lawyers ...
though vitally dependent upon ideas, is not distinctively intellectual.... The
heart of the matter ... is that the professional man lives off ideas, not for them.
His professional role, his professional skills, do not make him an intellectual.
He is a mental worker, a technician." Id.
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practice and has too often led to the belittlement of the func-
tions and importance of law practice and lawyers. 59
The importance of understanding this situation is that pro-
nouncements on professional morality and ethics delivered from
the dizzying heights of academia by refugees who have fled the
world of law practice tend to lack a sufficiently strong connection
with reality to be either accurate or useful. While law schools
have become the "gateway" to the legal profession for a million
graduates, practicing lawyers have been left with an inherently
contradictory system of beliefs and internally inconsistent moral
systems. Part of their confused belief system requires them to
commit their lives to the service of interests whose behaviors and
goals are ones with which they often may not agree. Another
part requires them to be subtly ashamed of the actions they must
take to serve those interests.
Rather than help lawyers who are caught in a conflicted
moral state to more fully understand the terms and conse-
quences of their neo-Faustian bargain, neither legal scholars nor
the intellectual leaders of the organized legal profession have
ever come to grips with the reality of law practice.26 The schol-
ars have not adequately grappled with the reality and morality of
law practice because they intuitively perceive the lawyer's reality
as "dirty" and don't want to be tainted by the knowledge. The
organized legal profession has avoided honest treatment of the
nature and consequences of ordinary law practice because the
truth is more than it wants to admit, either to itself or the public.
The desire to avoid such knowledge and not be responsible
for taking the actions required to deal with intense human dis-
putes explains a phenomenon such as religious monasticism and
other "retreat from the world" strategies. We are unquestionably
living in a world that increasingly overwhelms us. The connect-
ing values of community have largely evaporated to the extent
that, as described by Daniel Boorstin: "Perhaps what ails us is not
so much a vice as a "nothingness." ... What is remarkable is not
only that we manage to fill experience with so much emptiness,
but that we manage to give the emptiness such appealing vari-
ety." '61  This world is so amorally harsh that many seek
academia-the modern equivalent of the cloistered life-in an
attempt to shut out the world and insulate themselves against the
effects of its "impurities."
259. See MAYER, supra note 11, at 118.
260. David Riesman's observation, though almost 35 years old, still carries
considerable force. See id. at 119.
261. BOORSTIN, supra note 40, at 60.
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For legal scholars and many other university faculty, the
flight to the academic ivory tower is an attempt to be free of the
confusion, chaos and temptation of the everyday world. But
flight from the world often renders the academic irrelevant and
self-indulgent.262 J.H. Hexter, writing about Thomas More and
the decision whether to become a King's councilor or offer his
insights from outside the seat of power, speaks to questions
nearly every intellectual must address at some point:
In his moments of doubt and despair he [More] was but
suffering the inevitable lot of the unattached intellectual
innovator. Rarely can such men altogether free themselves
from the persistent and ungentle ministrations of -a Dop-,
pleganger, who measures the state of things as the innova-
tors envisage them against the state of things as they are,
and notes the peculiar disparity between their ideal and a
reality not perceptibly altered by the spate of words they
have poured forth.
2 6 3
The stark cultural and experiential contrast between the aca-
demic and real worlds produces a harsh tension. between legal
academics who have absented themselves from the cacophony of
real life, and practitioners who cannot escape it or who even
thrive on its stresses and opportunities. Lawyers develop a variety
of coping mechanisms and rationalizations that allow them to
deal with its demands. This has changed little over the past thirty
years. "With a few exceptions," says UCLA's Murray Schwarz,
"people are law professors because they tried practice and didn't
like it. You can't expect them to orient their teaching toward the
practice of law."264 Mayer adds, "At bottom, the problem of the
law school is that startlingly little is known systematically about
the real world of the lawyer, and even less is known about the
purposes the society wishes the lawyer to serve in the latter years
of the twentieth century. '265 David Riesman still "despises the
childishness of the law schools-the joking about Yale and
Harvard-the self-preening complacency of the law school
professors. But there's a nice thing about law schools: I was a full
professor of law at the age of twenty-seven."266 I would note that
Plato's philosopher king required a lengthy period of real world
experience in human affairs before reaching the point of
wisdom.
262. See Schlesinger, supra note 52.
263. HEXTER, supra note 54, at 124.
264. MAYER, supra note 11, at 117 (quoting Schwarz).
265. Id. at 120.
266. Id. at 117 (quoting Riesman).
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There are few positions in the world more privileged than
that of the American law professor. With the great freedom the
position allows, and the fact that the law schools have been
allowed to become the exclusive gateway to the legal profes-
sion-comes responsibility. While this responsibility has several
elements, perhaps the one that has been fundamentally
breached by the law schools has been that owed to the profes-
sion. Whether the obligation is "to" the profession directly, or to
the profession "on behalf of the society" the profession claims to
serve is irrelevant-because the schools have failed both. Rather
than run from the complexity and concerns the issues raised in
this essay represent, legal scholars are responsible for pursuing
the answers, even if the answer may well be that not much can be
done. Discussions of ethics and professional responsibility that
avoid the nature and depth of the reality of human nature as it
unfolds in the context of law practice are simply too thinly tex-
tured to be of much use to lawyers who strive to preserve their
integrity in a challenging and contradictory environment.
267
Law students who are sent out into this dark world without any
understanding of what awaits them are easily overcome by its
power.
Most students-particularly those who go to law school
straight from college-have virtually no preparation for what
awaits them. Mayer relates:
"I'm always wary about sending students out just to get
exposure," says Howard Sacks of Northwestern, director of
the . . . "professional responsibility" project. "They get
upset, confused, disillusioned." But there may be some-
thing to be said for giving students a chance to become
upset, confused and disillusioned before rather than after
they leave law school. What the law professors offer in
their courses is the best quality of education in America-
but in a professional school educational excellence may
not be enough.268
Law students are in far too many instances like butterflies
emerging from a cocoon completely altered from their crawling
caterpillar forms to what they hope will be the elegant butterfly
existence of the professional. Instead of elegance, they find a
dirty world of conflict, argumentation and power, balanced
against one of helping people advance, get their lives in order,
solve problems, and many other positive activities from which
one can derive a feeling of reward and contribution. The law
267. See WHITBECK, supra note 123.
268. MAYER, supra note 11, at 118.
20001
HeinOnline  -- 14 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 475 2000
476 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
can be a rewarding career, but it is also one that rewards certain
kinds of behaviors while shaping who we are as people. Cherniss
explains:
One source of those [idealized professional] expectations
is something that I've come to call "the professional mys-
tique"-a set of beliefs that we as a society or culture have
about professionals and their work. We expect, for
instance, that once a professional finishes training and
earns credentials, he or she is going to be competent.
2 69
Preparing students to understand enough about the culture
they will be entering after admission to law practice is not easy.
Many of the most difficult issues of professional responsibility
can and should be raised intellectually, but cannot be really
learned unless and until the person confronts them and is
required to deal with their demands. 27 ° After law school, for
example, I started work in a legal services office in Colorado.
Like virtually all law schools of that long-ago era the school from
which I received my law degree offered no instruction in profes-
sional responsibility. There were virtually no courses that would
be considered skills-based. The curriculum and methods were
ones that would have been familiar to Christopher Langdell a
century earlier.271 Consequently, when I entered the practice of
law less than three months after graduation, I can objectively say
that I was almost completely unprepared for what I confronted.
Perhaps my law school wanted to spare me a too-early expo-
sure to the taint of law practice. Or perhaps dealing with mate-
rial that represented virtually all that I and other graduates
would predictably be doing on behalf of clients during our pro-
fessional lives simply was not regarded as sufficiently intellectual.
Of course I do not actually believe that, and it is somewhat amaz-
ing that law schools are still struggling to work out the nature of
their obligation to educate students for the profession of law.
The problem with my lack of preparation for the role, skills,
and dilemmas of law practice is that the situations were not hypo-
thetical. Numerous clients depended on me for the successful
conduct of their cases. I was twenty-five years old and largely
"clueless" about being a lawyer. I knew a great deal of subject
matter of the kind studied in law school, and was well-versed in
269. Cherniss, supra note 202.
270. See, e.g., WHITBECK, supra note 123; Kenneth Kreiling, Clinical Educa-
tion and Lawyer Competency: The Process of Learning to Learn from Experience Through
Properly Structured Clinical Supervision, 40 MD. L. Rxv. 284 (1981).
271. See David Barnhizer, The University Ideal and the American Law School
42 RUTGERS L. REv. 109 (1989).
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the methods of doctrinal analysis. A month and a half of study-
ing for the Colorado bar examination provided some knowledge
of legal variations peculiar to that state. But while in law school I
had performed only one fifteen minute direct examination of
another law student who was serving as an expert witness in a
poorly run law school course on trial advocacy. I knew nothing
about client or witness interviewing; and was completely ignorant
about counseling, negotiation, case evaluation and diagnosis,
drafting, strategy, evidence development, local procedure, inves-
tigation, real discovery, or professional responsibility. My level of
knowledge was not unusual for law graduates of that time.
The problem with this degree of inadequacy is that many of
the most important problems of professional responsibility are
ones that are consequences of the application of lawyers' skills.
Even today, the legal profession's recent rush to require the law
schools to give courses on the rules of professional responsibility
and adoption of a national examination on professional respon-
sibility is a pitiful substitute for preparing students to understand
and deal with the real challenges that lawyers face. The technical
rules of professional responsibility of the kind tested and taught
are reasonably obvious. The consequences of manipulation, con-
cealment and deception, use of power, and choices made on a
client's behalf under the pressures of competitive advocacy are
far more fundamental and morally challenging.
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